



African Journal of Political Science and International Relations

Volume 8 Number 8 November 2014

ISSN 1996-0832



*Academic
Journals*

ABOUT AJPSIR

The **African Journal of Political Science and International Relations (AJPSIR)** is published monthly (one volume per year) by Academic Journals.

African Journal of Political Science and International Relations (AJPSIR) is an open access journal that publishes rigorous theoretical reasoning and advanced empirical research in all areas of the subjects. We welcome articles or proposals from all perspectives and on all subjects pertaining to Africa, Africa's relationship to the world, public policy, international relations, comparative politics, political methodology, political theory, political history and culture, global political economy, strategy and environment. The journal will also address developments within the discipline. Each issue will normally contain a mixture of peer-reviewed research articles, reviews or essays using a variety of methodologies and approaches.

Contact Us

Editorial Office: ajpsir@academicjournals.org

Help Desk: helpdesk@academicjournals.org

Website: <http://www.academicjournals.org/journal/AJPSIR>

Submit manuscript online <http://ms.academicjournals.me/>

Editors

Dr. Thomas Kwasi Tieku

*New College, University of Toronto
45 Willcocks Street, Rm 131,
Toronto, Ontario,
Canada.*

Dr. Mark Davidheiser

*Nova Southeastern University
3301 College Avenue; SHSS/Maltz Building
Fort Lauderdale, FL 33314
USA.*

Dr. Enayatollah Yazdani

*Department of Political Science
Faculty of Administrative Sciences and Economics
University of Isfahan
Isfahan
Iran.*

Dr. Kannamma S Raman

*Department of Civics and polotics
University of Mumbai Vidyanaagari,
Kalina
Mumbai 400 098
India.*

Dr. Upendra Choudhury

*Department of Political Science
Aligarh Muslim University,
Aligarh-202002
Uttar Pradesh,
India.*

Dr. S.M. Omodia

*Department Of Political Science,
Kogi State University
Anyigba, Kogi State
Nigeria.*

Naheed Shabbir Goraya *Centre
for South Asian Studies University
of the Punjab, Lahore Pakistan.*

Dr. Muhammad Ishaque Fani

*Department of Pakistan Studies,
Bahauddin Zakariya University,
Multan,
Pakistan.*

Dr. Aina, Ayandiji Daniel

*Faculty of Management and Social Sciences
Babcock University, Ilishan – Remo, Ogun State,
Nigeria.*

Prof. F. J. Kolapo

*History Department
University of Guelph
N1G 2W1Guelph, On
Canada*

Dr. Nonso Okafo

*Graduate Program in Criminal Justice
Department of Sociology
Norfolk State University
Norfolk, Virginia 23504*

Dr. Johan Patrik Stålgren

*Department of Political Science,
Göteborg University,
Göteborg.
Sweden*

Dr. Nawal K. Paswan

*Centre for South, Central, South East Asia and South
West Pacific Studies
School of International Studies
Jawaharlal Nehru University
New Delhi 110067
India.*

Dr. Okotoni Matthew Olu *Department*

*of Public Administration Obafemi
Awolowo University
Ile-Ife,
Nigeria.*

Dr. Rudra Prakash Pradhan

*Vinod Gupta School of Management Indian
Institute of Technology, Kharagpur West
Bengal- 721 302,
India.*

Dr. Murat Gül

*Department of International Relations
Süleyman Demirel University, ISPARTA, Turkey.*

Editorial Board

Prof. TOHĂNEANU, Cecilia

*Dean -The Faculty of Political Science
Christian University, Dimitrie Cantemir", Splaiul Unirii nr.
176, Bucharest Romania.*

Assistant Prof. Bulend Aydın ERTEKIN,

*Department of Journalism Anadolu
University Eskisehir Turkey*

Dr. Zakir Husain

*Assoc. Prof. Economics,
Institute of Development Studies Kolkata, (IDSK)
1 Reformatory Street, Calcutta University Alipore
Campus, 5th Floor,
Calcutta 700 027,
INDIA.*

Dr. Yu-Kang Lee,

*Associate Professor
Department of Political Economy
National Sun Yat-Sen University
Taiwan (R.O.C.)*

Dr. Xi Chen,

*Assistant Professor
Department of Political Science
School of Social and Behavioral Sciences
208 SBS
1201 W. University Dr.
Edinburg, TX, 78541
USA*

Prof. Muhammad Saleem Mazhar

*Professor of Persian, Chairman,
Department of Persian,
University of the Punjab,
Lahore*

Prof. BOSTAN D. IONEL

*'A I . I. Cuza'
University of Iasi,
Faculty of Economics and Business Administration
ROMANIA*

Dr. Muhammad Ishaque Fani

*Associate Professor,
International Relations, Solomon Asch Center for Study of
Eth-Political Conflict,
Department of Psychology,
Bettws-Y-Coed 237 Bryn Mawr College, 101N Merion
Avenue,
Bryn Mawr, PA, 19010-2899*

Prof. Branko Dimeski,

*Department of Administration and Management
Information Systems
St. Kliment Ohridski University
Partizanska bb
7000, Bitola
Republic of Macedonia*

Dr. PRAGATI JAIN

*Associate Prof.
Sanghvi Institute of Management and Science,
Indore- 453331
(M.P), INDIA.*

Dr. Jagdish P. Verma

*Post-Doctoral Fellow, UGC Major Research Project, Dept. of
Defence & Strategic Studies, Faculty of Science, Allahabad
University,
Allahabad*

Dr. Enayatollah Yazdani

*Associate Professor
Department of Political Science
Faculty of Administrative Sciences and Economics
The University of Isfahan
IRAN.*

Dr. Amir Ahmed Khuhro,

*Assistant Professor
Department of International Relations
Shah Abdul Latif University Khairpur (Mir's),
Sindh, Pakistan*

Dr. Bharat Chandra Rout

*Research Scholar
National University of Educational Planning and
Administration (NUEPA)
17-B, Sri Aurobindo Marg,
New Delhi
India*

Dr. Mohammed Viquaruddin

*Assistant Professor
Dept. of Political Science
Deogiri College,
Station Road,*

Alemayehu Fentaw Weldemariam

*Jimma University (JU) - Faculty of Law
Jimma, Oromia 378
Ethiopia.*

ARTICLES

Review

- PBC- A commission for hegemonic peace building?** 244
Keorapetse Mmoloki Gabatlhaolwe
- Arab African Northern revolt states (2010-2014): The missed path of re-institutionalization and democratic transformation** 254
Milad ELHARATHI
- America and Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) Gas Pipeline** 260
Bhat Mukhtar Ahmad
- National power and the search for a generalized theory of terrorist target selection: An introduction to the Uyo School** 266
Robert O. Dode and Henry U. Ufomba*
- Elites and exclusive politics in Sub-Saharan African** 271
Ibrahim Baba
- Analysis of the current democratic wave in the Arab world: Lessons and implications** 275
Edun, Abdulkareem Jimoh and Lawal*, Azeez Tunbosun*

ARTICLES

Research Articles

A critical analysis of whether Zimbabwe can achieve economic development through its 'Look East Policy' 280
Shingairai Belinda Mudavanhu

The influence of Treaty Design on the participation of Developing and Developed Nations in International Environmental Agreements (IEAs) 288
Chenaz B. Seelarbokus

Unipolar world in crisis as Russia challenges U.S and allies, dragging other disgruntled countries along 302
F. A. Olasupo

Review

PBC- A commission for hegemonic peace building?

Keorapetse Mmoloki Gabatlaolwe

Xiamen University, School of International Relations, Xiamen, China, P.R.

Received 6 January, 2014; Accepted 19 September, 2014

The United Nations' (UN) organ, the Peace-building Architecture (PBA) directed by Peace-building Commission (PBC) is yet to become a distinct player in peace-building. Arguments articulate well how it continues to find it difficult to tackle challenges that mar world wide support for peace-building. It seems to display behaviours that are assumed in the modernization theory and has a vague approach to the concept of peace-building. According to the North Countries it can mean development, security or organizing elections while to the South Countries it means literally negotiating for peace. However, the PBC has excelled in securing resources for quick impact projects that delivered immediate key dividends of peace to traumatised war victims. All countries on the Commission's agenda have so far received funding through the architecture's PBSO. On the same note, It is the worry of this study that the PBC focuses exclusively on financing or rebuilding states and the fear of this author is that the PBC has just become another donor forum ('burden sharing enterprise' as this author prefers to call it), by former colonizers. This research finds out how the PBC and the PBSO add to the use of institutions to formalize power, thus making peace-building a very hegemonic and political enterprise.

Key words: Peace building, United Nations, Peace Building Commission, Africa.

INTRODUCTION

Key to the analysis of the United Nations Peace Building Architecture (UNPBA) is the many issues which have risen and still make it difficult for peace in war torn countries to be found. Since the inception of the PBA, mandated and entrusted by the international community with building peace in countries on its agenda, many commentators contest its nature and membership. Questions on its scope of authority have sufficed too. The fear that has existed before its inception is that states design institutions accordingly in order to use them to further their own goals (Koremenos et al., 2001). The UN remains divided by political friction: the Security Council

versus the General Assembly and also the North versus the South States. In addition, the 2010 review of the body reveals that the aspiration that drove the creation of the commission has lost some of its fervor and no countries on its agenda have 'graduated' from the program. Faltering commitments by many of its creators has frustrated the commission's ability to maximize its contribution to peace-building progress.

The ontological concern and question of this paper is that the PBC is marred with power politics. It appears to be a disguised guarantor of business for 'imperialist multinational companies or colonial masters who benefit from

E-mail: mmoloki.gee@gmail.com

Author agree that this article remain permanently open access under the terms of the [Creative Commons Attribution License 4.0 International License](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/)

conflict-related activities and later carry out a burden-sharing schemeⁱ in war torn countries. Related to this, is the North-South dimension of peacebuilding operations. Interventions to date have tended to reflect asymmetrical distributions of power in which Northern states have determined why, where, when and how such interventions will occur. It is clear that the PBC has failed to meet most people's expectations, but this is largely because many of these expectations have been too unrealistic. Therefore, this paper tries to analyze debates about 'imperialistic peacebuilding' that emerge still, in the PBC, in order to clarify and understand its character, so it can arrive at a clear picture of what animal it is in Africa and elsewhere. Clearly as Coning (2010) points out, there are institutional issues that can and should be addressed now, to ensure that the PBC is providing the best possible support in the efforts to consolidate peace in the countries on its agenda, as will be indicated in this and the other chapters ahead.

History of colonial intrusion in Africa

Before expressing suspicion of the PBC, it is important to bring any history of powerful countries' existence in Africa to surface in order to understand what brings about the suspicion. The objectives of establishing colonialism according to Prof. Mapangala (2000) were obvious in that "it was an instrument of imperialism whose central motive was to advance the interests of capitalist expansion in the colonies and semi colonies of Africa, Asia and Latin America." He underscores that such interests included production of raw agricultural and mineral materials for the Industries of Western Europe and North America and creation of markets for the industrial commodities. His explanation is that this capitalist expansion and the drive to fulfill objectives mentioned above, it became necessary to dominate and control societies in these continents politically and ideologically. This resulted in the establishment of colonial states in Africa.

His Excellency Paul Kagame, Former President of the Republic of Rwanda, adding to the African concern, emphasized that "the colonial system was greatly responsible for the post-independence conflicts within and between African countries" (Kagame, 2002). Some of the aspects through which the seeds of conflicts are believed to have been sown under colonialism include the following: firstly, colonialism created and consolidated divisive ideologies of ethnicity, racialism, regionalism and religious antagonism (Mpangala, 2000). Secondly, Kagame noted that colonialism divided people through the policy of divide and rule and the creation of artificial borders between colonies. Artificial borders divided people who before colonialism were under the same political organizations. Neo-colonial forces came when African countries achieved independence (Kagame, 2002). Kagame notes that this move was believed to be

a new form of extending the same imperialist economic interests by controlling the economies of the independent African countries. This was partly to be done by ensuring the establishment of puppet regimes. Today, Central Africa and Africa's Great Lakes region continue to experience serious and repetitive conflicts in the immediate post-Cold War years, despite many repeated interventions. Instead of the forces internal to a country, critics have emphasized the presence of external factors which bore hallmarks of neo-colonialism. The Congo (DR) provides us with a good example of how neo-colonial forces created conditions for post-independence conflicts and instability, according to Kagame.

Africa as a testing ground

History reveals that Africa has been one of the principal continents where new instruments have been tried out, refined and then exported to big powerful countries e.g peacebuilding or post conflict apparatus. Since 2000, international concern for African conflicts increased exponentiallyⁱⁱ. Examples are interventions led by the United Kingdom in Sierra Leone (2000), France in Ivory Coast (2002)ⁱⁱⁱ and the European Union (EU)'s Operation Artemis in DRC (2003). The continent therefore became the main theatre of operations owing to the high number of missions (over 20), the budget, and personnel deployed.^{iv} There are many African countries currently benefiting from peace-building activities under the UN PBA and the rest are the Comoros, Nepal and Haiti.^v This shows how the PBA has been more visible in Africa than other continents. Automatically, this portrays Africa as a region of instability for which attention in terms of resources, capacity and coordination strategies should be focused. This precipitates the worldwide perceptions and descriptions of Africa as the poorest and most conflict-prone region in the world. Richard Dowden says that the African "reputation" is often cast in the indivisible realities of poverty, disease and war (Aning and Lartey, 2010).

Hegemonic interventions

Hegemony, derived from Gramsci's work, refers to the forms of consent, which develop within a society between dominant groups and wider social forces.^{vi} In light of this explanation, from the days of colonization to date; powerful countries and coalitions of the willing and the rich have increasingly carried out projects in developing countries, and recently all in the name of peace building. Former colonial powers such as the UK, France, and Belgium, etc. have and continue to play significant roles in recent peace building operations. However, their motivations for doing so are questioned primarily because of their exploitative colonial past. They have interfered with outsiders' direct influence on the domestic

affairs of countries of the South. One wonders why, but according to Bretton Woods, hegemony has always needed a strategy for dealing with challenges to the status quo (Schellhaas and Seegers, 2009). It is understood that the quest for regional or world hegemony may unfortunately be one of the powerful motivating factors for this involvement of powerful nations in countries of the South in the name of the PBC. Desperate times call for desperate measures; as the 'coalition of the willing' cobbled by the US practically disintegrates, these countries can find other ways of staying on top as the US sank in the quagmire in Iraq and Afghanistan and its recent pronouncement of its pivot to the South East Asia.

PBC-Disseminator of Western Norms

The PBC seems to provide yet another forum where great powers co-operate to impose a common juridical framework over the entire globe. This author is tempted to see the PBC as an industrial-strength disseminator of Western norms to post-conflict states. In its deliberations, such cosmopolitan values as the need for elections, gender equality and transparent governance are discursively reinforced. This is just a repeat of what used to happen in the past, where for centuries stronger powers intervened along their peripheries to establish politically acceptable forms of order (Barnett, 2006). The former Secretary of the UN was quoted in 2000 as saying,

"There are many good reasons for promoting democracy...not the least in the eyes of the United Nations is that, when sustained over time; it is a highly effective means of preventing conflict, both within and between states."^{vii}

The general concern has been that the universalization of liberal values such as democracy, capitalism and secularism undermines the traditions and practices of non-Western cultures. To add to this, the host countries regard the Western liberal democracies that dominate the international development assistance as more or less seeking to rebuild failed states in their own image. It also suffices that the PBC uses foreign resources of the same types to build acceptable states in areas that pose a perceived threat to powerful actors or international security. Nevertheless, the motive always comes to the surface; post-war operations attempt to transform states, rather than absorbing them into other, more powerful, units.^{viii} For example, Jenkins (2008) observes that donor governments and UN agencies saw the IPBS preparation process as a means of steering the policy and institutional-reform agendas in Burundi and Sierra Leone toward issues that, they felt, had been under emphasised in previous national framework documents. In the case of Burundi, for instance, the establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission was a key priority for many PBC member-states. In the Sierra Leone case, considerable discussion centred on the need to place the issue

of natural resource extraction as a potential source of misgovernance and renewed conflict higher up on the policy agenda. This has not been easy. Part of the problem where war torn countries seem not to achieve any peace, lies in the inability of localities to adapt to foreign structures and demands which are alien and distort the indigenous and locally preferred constructions.

Politico-military focus for transformation

Although the UN has no clear standards for the type of government legitimate for its members but the big powers which dominate the PBC, emphasize the democratic and capitalist systems, which have sharpened confrontations in already divided societies of the focus countries. These have shown peacebuilding to have a progressive rhetorical cover that it is in fact a tool of riot control or even neo-imperialism designed to re-colonize regions of the South. In the Burundi context, several statements emphasize security actions as the most important condition in order to achieve peace: "the return to peace and security in Burundi requires a return to the barracks of members of the Forces de Defense Nationale (FDN)".^{ix} Training and reforming security agencies is equally political, as the PBC introduced some army and police projects in these countries.

Again, it was argued that "improving Burundi's security situation after over a decade of conflict is a *sine qua non* condition for restoring an environment conducive to economic recovery and national reconciliation"^x. This informs the argument that the PBC focus was undoubtedly on political (to democratize countries of the South) and military measures at the expense of psychosocial aspects, which to a large extent have been neglected. For instance, despite much focus on the political and military dimensions, the March 2009 violence in Sierra Leone and the Guinea Bissau assassinations of top Government officials after elections reveal that elections are being rushed before necessary stable platforms have been constructed. Yes, the PBC simultaneously carry out disarmament campaigns, collect illegal weapons, reintegrate militia members and support the return of refugees after elections. However, intended results are never achieved, it shows that it is important to bear in mind that the physical effects are much easier to treat than the invisible psychological wounds, and that Development can only take place in a stable environment.

Imported Peacebuilding

Currently, countries on the agenda feel left out in all decision making. Efforts to achieve local ownership in connection to peacebuilding operations seem to focus on creating local support for the already defined mandate of the operations. This means that local ownership is thus

not seen 'as an ultimate goal or vision but as a practical strategy for action'.^{xi} What is to be owned is clearly, in other words, an externally defined agenda.^{xii} This proves that even the local actors, talent, and wisdom seem not to be drawn upon at any stage of the peacebuilding process Agenda. Even though the PBC's founding resolutions 'Notes the importance of participation of regional and local actors' and 'Encourages the Commission to consult with civil society, non-governmental organizations, including women's organizations, and the private sector engaged in peacebuilding activities, as appropriate'^{xiii} this allows for the participation of regional and local actors, but they are not seen as central actors. It does not suffice that the civil society consultations were conducted in the countries. This proves the contention that the role of external actors in peacebuilding is more dictatorial, instead of being supportive.

This has resulted in programs that do not support indigenous capacity for locals to address the root causes of conflict on their own. In addition, some programmes usually include certain methodologies, objectives and norms. Since the problem is pre-defined as a lack of liberal institutions etc., local preferences, culture and practices are devalued, often seen as part of the problem, and knowledge about these factors is considered to be relevant insofar as it will help implementing the liberal peacebuilding model (Call and Cousens, 2008). The universality assumption means that the gathering of 'lessons learned' from previous engagements is seen as a useful way to better fine-tune future peacebuilding practices. The fine-tuning is therefore merely a repackaging of hegemonic practices.^{xiv} This is despite the fact that the level of state fragility in Africa varies in degrees and scope of security threats that prevail in focus countries.

To cite an example of 'ownership' according to the PBC; the texts of the IPBSs are drafted in the capitals, giving the host governments a central role in developing the contents of the IPBSs. However, the texts are then negotiated, almost word-by-word, in New York, and are thus affected by the usual intergovernmental dynamics of the UN (Stamnes, 2010). This is in spite of the originally proposed idea of PBC that the strategies would be developed in the field with additional support from New York. Now, representatives of the Burundi and Sierra Leone governments have argued that the process has been New York-centric and has not empowered local governments.^{xv} Even if it intended to, some have argued that "there is nothing in them that is not already in the Poverty Reduction Strategy"^{xvi}. This has caused a number of actors, including EU donors, to think that PBC, thereby, duplicates other processes without adding value. For example, while stressing that Germany strongly supports PBC, Dr Rudolf Fetzner from the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development called for PBC to leave the preparation of country strategies to other organizations to avoid duplication

(SEF News, 2008). Moreover, one should not forget the asymmetric power relationship between the donor states that are members of the PBC and the focus countries. A major motivation for inviting the international community to take part in discussions of their internal affairs is arguably the expectation that this will lead to financial benefits.^{xvii} Given that the PBC is made up of member states, it means that the organization is too much 'the servant of the present state system, responsive to the existing configuration of power', however, it has an option of turning into an interlocutors for the new forces that, in the long run, can change forms of states and the very nature of the state system (Cox, 1997).

Power politics in the PBC

Since its inception, the debate on the PBC in the General Assembly has been in a struggle about the balance of power between the Security Council (SC), the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and the GA as revealed by the report on the conference organized by FES and GMZ.^{xviii} At one extreme is the US position that has contended that the PBC should report exclusively to the Security Council, a condition for effectiveness and a reflection of the US lack of trust in ECOSOC. At the other end is the effort of Egypt, shared in different shades by a number of southern countries, to prevent the creation of a PBC from reinforcing a trend visible over the years before the advent of the PBC. The Southern countries have always contended that the Security Council has been gradually expanding its mandate and increasingly encroaching upon the prerogatives of ECOSOC and the GA. Other states have remained passive members of the PBC, generally following the lead of the few activist members. Like all organizations, they are interested first in their survival and expansion and are viewed fundamentally as bureaucracies.^{xix} As such, they are populated by unelected and overpaid international civil servants who are not publicly accountable and are highly susceptible to interest group pressure and the PBC is not excluded in this group. Nevertheless, the PBC's design also recognizes that some constituencies have a greater stake than others do.

For example, the EU and the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) have both applied to be formally recognized as key actors in the affairs of the peacebuilding. Some would question whether African countries have sufficiently coalesced as a group and developed a coherent identity to effectively influence policy development at the UN. Normally the Africa Group expresses itself through the auspices of the African Union. The AU issued a position on UN reform and in particular on the reform of the Security Council by noting that "in 1945, when the UN was formed, most of Africa was not represented and that in 1963, when the first reform took place, Africa was represented but was not in

a particularly strong position” (Ezulwini Consensus^{xx}). Africa’s capacity or lack thereof, to represent its security interests at the UN may be attributed partly to the lack of permanent African representation on the UN Security Council – an issue that is still the subject of considerable debate. Africa has two rotating seats of two years each in the present composition of the Council. Concerning the AU’s non-membership to the PBC, Ezulwini Consensus notes that the AU has not made a similar request even though the work of the PBC is, and will be, vital to a significant number of African countries.

Membership Issues of the PBC’s Organisational Committee (OC)

Issues surrounding the membership of the Organizational Committee are a bone of contention within the UNPBC. The current international approach to peacebuilding tends to be compartmentalized in order to easily manipulate, with inadequate links between decisions made by major financial actors such as the IMF, the World Bank, and the UN development system, and political support offered by the United Nations (McCandless, 2010). The membership issues fall into two categories: firstly, the contribution of the different membership streams; secondly the representation of the PBC. To start with, in general terms it is the Western powers that are seen to dominate the agenda of peacebuilding and, within the West, one nation and its allied multinational corporations are in charge (Shaw, 2002). Intense competition within the Group of Latin America and Caribbean Countries (GRULAC) for PBC membership during the Commission’s very first rotation of members in June 2008 and the resultant postponement of the turnover of PBC membership suggest that the PBC is highly vulnerable to member state politics to the extent of disrupting the Commission’s work. Much of the year 2008 in the OC was dominated by a nine-month disagreement regarding representation on the PBC by regional representatives of the members of the troop-contributing countries (TCC), ECOSOC and the General Assembly. The OC was able to arrive at a solution acceptable to all its members in December 2008. The high degree of interest and competition among member states regarding the elections to the OC resulted in postponement of the decision from April until December.

As per country reports of the PBC, mainly donor countries took on heavy responsibilities as chairs of various configurations of the PBC. Other countries that are neither among the five Permanent-Five (P5), nor major financial or troop contributors, are keen to preserve their rights of oversight of the PBC via the General Assembly GA. The perception that the SC is extending its scope of activities at the expense of the GA and ECOSOC is always clearly reflected in all conferences held. At issue is not only the relationship, which the PBC

should entertain with these stakeholders, but also the number of members each group of stakeholders should be entitled to on the Commission. The 5 year review report^{xxi} of the PBC reveals that currently the decision-making structure of the PBC follows a narrow vertical chain from the UN country teams to the Commission in New York, in which a point of weakness at any level can affect the work of the entire architecture. Furthermore, in such architecture, national ownership is dictated by the New York based PBC leadership, whose priorities may not match those of the wider population, the report explains. Consequently, the report notes that peripheral issues are often prioritized at the expense of the core conflict legacies, such as inter-ethnic reconciliation or problems related to complex state formation processes.

In the absence of a serious conflict analysis informed by broad social representation, decisions are made before a consensus on priorities has been reached and countries on the agenda are the victims of a multi-tiered colonial power presence. However, in this new phase, non-western states (among them Nigeria, Kenya, Ghana and China^{xxii}) supplied most of the troops, as western countries were extremely reluctant to contribute to UN missions. Jenkins (2010) writes that most of the top Troop Contributing Countries, as it happens, are mainly developing countries; so are the majority of PBC members drawn from the GA and ECOSOC quotas.

Security Council VS the PBC: A war of attention seekers?

This Commission, despite its pretended good intentions, merely augments and reinforces the Security Council as an instrument of aggression and plunder in the South countries. Jenkins (2010) reveals that in its first years the Commission has had an awkward relationship with the Security Council. In addition, due to this influence, the Peacebuilding Commission has precisely turned into nothing but the discredited Security Council in a more malignant and obnoxious form. Already, the structure of the PBC is loosely attached to the UN system as it only acts as an advisory body to the General Assembly and the Security Council with no apparent powers to directly influence strategic political decisions regarding peacebuilding activities (Severine, 2009).

Here is a clear example by Jenkins (2010): the Security Council’s quota of seven seats (five of these automatically assigned to the Council’s five permanent members) represents the group of states that, for any case under consideration, will have to decide whether to wind down an existing peace operation, whether to change the terms of an operation’s mandate, or whether to begin a new one. This means the Security Council can tout procedural issues and adopt a posture of pushing through agendas, dictating and pronouncing on issues that related to Africa, without adequate consultation or due diligence of the

ramifications and consequences of such a top-down approach. This is especially true because the P5 can, and still do, prevent resolutions that are important to Africa from even being considered as was the case with the genocide in Rwanda in 1994. According to review reports of the PBC, there are concerns among many delegates to the UN about the way the P5 members of the Security Council “insinuated” themselves into the OC of the PBC. Some delegates believe that this has not set the right tone, as far as the objectives and operationalisation of this Commission are concerned, particularly given its focus on “soft” security issues rather than the “hard” security issues which are rightly the preserve of the UN Security Council.

The Security Council was established to “ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations” for maintenance of international peace and security (UN Charter, Article 24); it is seen as a Holy Crusade by the imperialist countries headed by the US in the 21st century in order to further dominate the South countries under the shibboleths of neo-liberalism and sham democracy.^{xxiii} According to the UN Charter, the Security Council should carry out its duties on behalf of *all* members of the UN. Unfortunately, even when the majority of Security Council members have agreed that it is necessary to undertake collective measures to restore security, too often one of the P5 Council members has vetoed or threatened to veto a proposed action based on its own narrow national interests. In the most recent case, Russia vetoed to condemn as illegal a referendum on the status of Crimea which switched hands from Ukraine in February 2014 to Russia Federation’s control, a status not recognized by the United Nations.^{xxiv} The UN charter for permanent members to exercise the veto has been abused to advance extraneous national political interests. Through the use of veto, the PBC has simply become an extension of the Security Council. Therefore, procedural processes of the PBC are surely subjected to the internal dictates and pace of commitments by the major powers, especially the permanent members of the UN Security Council. For example the 2013 report notes that there is a significant overlap between the membership of the Security Council and the PBC, and some members of the Security Council have shown more interest than others. For countries that left the council in 2012 South Africa was intensely interested and the UK, among the P5, was cited as having had shown “the more consistent and informed interest while the rest showed almost no interest.^{xxv} Moreover, the priority given to the permanent members of the UN Security Council over and above other considerations such as troop and financially contributing countries in making a determination on peacebuilding responses have raised potential tensions among key actors, which have in turn derailed the strategic coordination objectives of the PBC. A living example is that the United States has reservations against the proposed reforms in the Security Council, which will ease

the envisioned political pressure. In addition, The 2011 Council has a large number of members who are also members of the PBC’s OC and whether this will allow for innovative ideas on how to develop an organic relationship between the Council and the PBC is unclear.

United Nations: Guarantor of the status quo

It is clear that the relations among the major powers of the global politics determine the future of key agencies (UN) with the inclusion of the PBC. This is fueled by the assumption that the United Nations sources of influence come from the moral authority of the international community, the military power of member states and the political and financial backing provided by the members themselves (Bertram, 1995). As it stands, the PBC is overly influenced and guided in this way and uses internationally generated models and theories of change. It is obvious that powers could be possibly using it as an instrument to exert and legitimize their power and substantially increase their presence in the countries of the South. To attest to this, the Independent League of People’s Struggle organization^{xxvi} slammed the UN World Summit that resolved that the PBC be created as having a pretentious and deceptive agenda, from supposedly solving global poverty, debt and development to reforming the UN’s two major organs - the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council.

It is possible that these powers find it convenient to use the UN in an attempt to cover and share with other countries the rising political and material costs of occupation and to counter the increasingly effective, broad-based resistance of the South Countries’ people against the US and its allies’ imperialist domination. Through a powerful Organizational Committee that includes all the permanent members of the Security Council, the US is assured of a leading role in the Commission. This could bear some level of truth since membership in the Organizational Committee of the PBC is based solely on the amount of regular and special contributions to the UN.

The Peacebuilding Commission comes across as an organ intended to further unify the imperialist countries against the people within the frame of the US-instigated schemes of neoliberal globalization and escalating repression and aggression under the pretext of peacebuilding. For instance, Sison (2005) saw it as the real objective of US imperialism and its allies to give the UN imprimatur to the US invasion and occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan through the creation of a Peacebuilding Commission. She believes that the UN has been an instrument to window-dress the bullying by the “great powers,” notably the United States, of small and weaker developing states and seeks to continue this role through the PBC. For example, the support rendered by the UN allowed the intervention in Afghanistan to enjoy

international legitimacy (no state opposed it) and considerable support in Afghanistan, where Afghans saw it less as destroying sovereignty than as potentially restoring it after years of interference by neighbouring countries. Right now, many cry foul and see the intervention as a mistake because it is considered to have brought more harm than good to the country. Sison also thinks that through the PBC, the UN seeks to provide the US with a political and economic mechanism that allows it to appear as exiting from Iraq but at the same time to retain military bases for directing the puppet regime and controlling the oil resources and all major business enterprises and contracts.

Before 1991, Iraq was a relatively strong client state economically and strategically, but it repeatedly showed disobedience to US dictates. Now Iraq is in danger of disintegration as a nation-state and fragmentation into smaller and weaker entities organized along sectarian lines. While the US has so wantonly violated the norms and instruments of international law and the principles and charter of the United Nations, the invasion of Iraq is only one of a long list of cumulative examples of such outlawry. Nations have been calling for the PBC to take over from the US. Iraq and Afghanistan are seen as two countries that deserve the attention of the PBC. The US has since shown no intention of relinquishing its paramount role in determining their strategic direction. Failure to undertake any such effort in Afghanistan and Iraq has showed that, while the end of zero-sum strategic competition made co-operation possible, it also lowered the stakes for major powers, who were content to allow some problems to fester. Now the challenge that still lies ahead is to square the heterogeneity of UN member states' interests with the requirements of efficacy and efficiency. As indicated earlier, the PBC is operating by consensus, which Africa is not party to. It seems the PBC is often not able to address certain countries and issues and its agenda is dominated by the biggest UN member states. Preventive and conciliatory maneuver dominates member states' negotiations regarding the countries that are on the PBC as well as who chairs it. This is revealed as another example of power politics.

The North/South Politics

Interestingly, the 'negatives' such as war, underdevelopment, barbarism etc. are located in the global South. Critics take issue with the fact that the promotion of what are essentially Western values is treated as having universal validity. In other words, these are values that are historically and spatially specific but are portrayed as being timeless and spaceless truths. Moreover, derived from these values are particular forms of state, economy and social structure. By insisting on their universality there is little room for alternative interpretations (Pugh, 2004). So, not only does this approach presume that it is possible to establish a set of

'root causes' to conflict, and an ever valid recipe to address them, it also allows for 'the pre-representation of the political interest of war-torn societies'. Politics and context are thus taken out of the equation. The universal presentation and apparently altruistic and benign motivations behind these prescriptions make them very persuasive and critics like Cox (2005) and Panitch (2000) are convinced US hegemony is deeply malignant, unaccountable and unopposed^{xxvii} even though finely materialistic (Rothschild, 2003). Ginty (2007) adds that the prescriptions or interpretations of the US and the UK (on peacebuilding) are always associated with the United Nations and the 'international community. If indeed this is the case then a possibility for alternative interpretations of the liberal peace based more solidly in the culture and conditions of the recipient societies will be clouded. The inherent 'goodness' and desirability created by the rhetoric of peacebuilding serves to appease fears of Western hegemony (Peterson, 2010).

Forman (2005) sees the PBA as a natural follow-on to efforts by governments, such as the UK and the US, to develop their own civilian-response capabilities, the shortcomings of which had become apparent soon after the US-led invasions of Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003. A dedicated intergovernmental body was needed because of the risk that, as new crises crowded their way onto the international agenda. Hence, many post conflict situations would 'fall into the category of forgotten or neglected crises,' as Forman put it, for which it would prove increasingly difficult to secure the requisite financing, expertise, diplomatic backing, and logistical support. In simple terms, his opinion is suggestive that the PBC is a scheme for countries that would otherwise be forgotten. The PBC relies on willing financiers, an old mechanism, and it is yet to gain credibility as a new mechanism with new approaches to sustainable peace. This is so because with the current turn of events, the PBC may (if it has not already) become politically polarized as competition for its capacity and resources intensify. Of course lack of funding could render the PBC meaningless.

Entry and Exit: Peace building is a process

It is the view of this author that dealing with situations of risk of relapse into conflict is likely to remain the focus of PBC work. This view is informed by the fact that since the end of the cold war, post-conflict peace-building operations have been conducted in eight states: Namibia, Cambodia, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Mozambique, Angola, Rwanda, and Bosnia. Of these eight cases, only Namibia has achieved stable peace to date (Paris, 1997). The founding Resolutions (Operative Paragraph 12) identify four avenues by which countries may come on the PBC Agenda: referral by the Security Council, the General Assembly, and ECOSOC and by the Secretary-General. All referrals to date have been made by the Security

Council, and (despite the reference to regional balance in the Resolutions) all are African countries. Interestingly, all countries currently on the PBC's agenda are also on the Council's agenda. The question arises as to why not a more diverse range of countries – in terms of size, regional background, and the stage of the peacebuilding process, which has been reached – has not been referred. Jenkins (2010) says that there were some who felt that Sierra Leone was too far along the post-conflict path to even make a good case for a new inter-governmental body dedicated to smoothing the path from peace implementation to development. A similar reaction was mooted out when Guinea Bissau was announced as the third case on the PBC's agenda. It would have been fair to select and include a case from outside Africa, for instance East Timor for the sake of 'regional balance' to the PBC's portfolio. Jenkins notes that Guinea Bissau was an intriguing choice because it represented a different kind of post-conflict country one whose brief period of open conflict had ended almost eight years earlier, in 2000. Political instability has clearly afflicted Guinea Bissau in the interim. Nevertheless, She clarifies that to classify Guinea Bissau or Sierra Leone (which seemed more of a post-post conflict) as states 'emerging from conflict' is fundamentally to redefine this category of cases.

It is worthy to note that the reason why there is no regional balance in PBC focus countries is that the PBC's role is not acknowledged or sought after even by key constituencies. Instead, the PBC seems to have fallen into a safe routine replicating its 'one size fits all' approach in each new country with little variation.^{xviii} Actually, this approach had to be abandoned in the case of CAR and replaced with one that was deemed to be appropriate for the local situation. Another issue is that there has not been a strong demand from post-conflict countries for PBC's assistance. Due to pressure from developing countries, the PBC only focuses largely on post-conflict reconstruction and not on conflict prevention. Moreover, many Africans remain skeptical based on experiences with the UN in Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Liberia, and CAR; they are worried that this new body will not make much difference in mobilizing the resources required for post-conflict reconstruction efforts in Africa. Their worry is brought about by the Major Powers' use of the UN to pursue their sometimes very narrow foreign policy interests.

As for the Security Council approach, the Co-facilitators have already indicated a concern about possible circularity – a Security Council that sees the PBC as insufficiently relevant. On the other hand, the PBC feels that it does not have sufficient opportunity to demonstrate its relevance. With the Security Council involved, there is a possibility that some countries on the agenda's involvement was a forced one. However, in early 2006, the Security Council suggested that Burundi and Sierra Leone be the first two countries on the PBC agenda, following requests from these countries. However, the

decision to do so was not automatic. In the case of Guinea-Bissau, it took the Security Council five months to transmit the request because it was not clear on what grounds countries should be placed on the agenda. This reflects confusion within the Security Council over what criteria should guide selection and over the role of PBC, including whether it should deal mainly with countries in relatively late peace consolidation.

As mentioned earlier, PBC has had fewer than six countries on its agenda since its inception to date. Therefore, this brings about possible capacity constraints, as new countries cannot indefinitely be added without the graduation of any of the existing Agenda countries. Jerkins points out that part of the ambiguity that surrounds the role of the PBC in any UN wide comprehensive conflict-prevention system stems from the question of when a post-conflict country stops being a post-conflict country. Is it when a country has progressed to a situation where its challenges are essentially developmental rather than distinctively of a peacebuilding nature? Is it when an Agenda country feels it is ready to graduate? A report issued by DPKO's Best Practices Unit concluded that 'it is the prerogative of the Security Council to decide whether a United Nations peacekeeping operation should hand-over responsibility to another United Nations body or non-United Nations entity, and withdraw.'^{xix} What is important is to move beyond a limited and limiting view of the PBC; the PBC is an instrument that was created and designed to make a real difference and should be challenged to do so. In practice, this would mean a readiness on the part of the Security Council to consider a wider range of situations for referral: these could include larger countries, or sectoral or regional situations. Some national and international officials from Sierra Leone and Burundi seem anxious to initiate a process of disengagement.

Conclusion

Even though one of the PBC founding Resolutions provides scope for a preventive dimension, the PBC has not carried it out despite the situations on the ground requiring it. It is the author's worry that in Burundi the PBC continues to react to events as they unfold rather than being proactive and bringing necessary attention to looming issues. It seems above that the principal constraint comes from the very nature of the United Nations itself, as a profoundly state-centred organization. States constitute the membership, govern the institution and are given priority in all of its deliberations. Therefore any peacebuilding process undertaken under the United Nations' auspices will tend to privilege state concerns. Although the UN resolutions creating the Commission call for the engagement of local actors from civil society and business organizations, they continue to be marginalized and most attention is invariably given to the priorities identified by Member States, rather than those of local

civil society. The author agrees with Biersteker (2007) who posits that the resolutions that created the Peacebuilding Commission, like most UN resolutions, contain ambiguities and compromise language. There is no clear definition of peacebuilding itself to begin with. Participants in stabilization operations attempt to use foreign resources of the same types to build acceptable states in areas that pose a perceived threat to powerful actors. The threat may derive from the control of a state by an anti-status quo leader ('rogue' states – the main concern of the United States) or the breakdown of control under the impact of strategic or economic competition ('failed' or collapsing states – of greater concern to globalist humanitarians). These operations aim at building states, sometimes after a transitional stage of international administration or occupation. They aim to make such states more effective agents of control over their own territories and population.

In addition, there is no cultural approach to peacebuilding. As Paris (2002) has argued, peacebuilding is founded on liberal institutionalism, which is an entirely western invention. This western culture is not necessarily suitable for a non-western country. For example, it has been argued that the UN often has failed to acknowledge the fact that traditional reconciliation takes a considerable amount of time in certain cultures. PBC's strategies do not empower national leadership, they rather add little value to other strategic exercises and is too labour-intensive looking at the number of people involved. With this approach PBC is limited to addressing very few countries. This author adds to the pressure that seeks to see more and wider range of countries increasing on the PBC docket. The issue of how and when to wind down, disengage or "graduate" a country from the PBC agenda, while sustaining international attention, should also come clear. The PBC must be aware. The risk of directing international attention for the creation of peace to the promotion of democracy could either help or hinder the process as a whole. The resistance of communities to the hegemony of democracy may create insecurities and thus further conflict. As in the Burundi and Sierra Leone cases, the enforcement of liberal internationalism is shown to have devastating effects on the recipient states. Guinea-Bissau and Central African Republic too continue to suffer gravely from political instability. Influence over the domestic patterns of development and organizing principles of state must be eliminated from the PBC and indigenously created democracy must be allowed to function.

Conflict of Interests

The author has not declared any conflict of interests.

REFERENCES

Aning K, Lartey E (2010). Establishing the Future State of the

- Peacebuilding Commission. Working Paper, Centre for International Policy Studies, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Ottawa: University of Ottawa.
- Barnett RR (2006). Peacebuilding and State Building in Afghanistan: Constructing Sovereignty for Whose Security? *Third World Quarterly*. Routledge: Taylor and Francis Ltd. 27(1):175-185.
- Bertram E (1995). Reinventing Governments.: *Conflict Resolution* (Yale University) 39(3).
- Biersteker T (2007). Prospects for the UN Peacebuilding Commission. *Disarmament Forum* 2: 38-44.
- Call C, Cousens E (2008). Ending Wars and Building Peace: International Responses to War-Torn Societies. *International Studies Perspectives*, 1:1-21.
- Coning C (2010). Clarity, Coherence and Context: Three Priorities for Sustainable Peacebuilding. Working Paper, Centre for International Policy Studies, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, University of Ottawa.
- Cox R (2005). Is there a specifically Canadian perspective in the world. Working Paper 45, Centre of International Relations.
- Cox RW (1997). Reconsiderations in The New Realism: Perspectives on Multilateralism and World Order. Edited by Robert W. Cox. Basingstoke: Macmillan.
- Forman S (2005). Working Better Together: Implementing the High Level Panel's Recommendation on Peacebuilding. Working Paper, New York: Center on International Cooperation.
- Ginty RM (2007). Reconstructing post-war Lebanon: a challenge to the liberal peace? *Conflict, Security and Development* 7(3):471-472.
- Jenkins R (2008). The UN Peacebuilding Commission and Dissemination of International Norms. Crisis States Programme, Working Paper. Ralph Institute for International Studies, City University of New York.
- Jenkins R (2010). Re-engineering the UN Peacebuilding Architecture. Working Paper, Centre for International Policy Studies,, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Ottawa: University of Ottawa, pp4-35.
- Kagame P (2002). The Great Lakes Conflict: Factors, Actors, and Challenges." Inaugural Lecture at the Nigeria War College on 16th September, 2002, Abuja.
- Koremenos B, Lipson C, Duncan S (2001). The Rational Design of Institutions. *International Organization*, 55: 761-799. http://dingo.sbs.arizona.edu/~ggoertz/pol596ist/koremenos_et al2001 a.pdf
- Mpagala GP (2000). Ethnic Conflicts in the Region of the Great Lakes. Origins and Prospects for Change,. Dar es Salaam: Institute of Kiswahili Research.
- Panitch L (2000). The new imperial state, *New Left Review*, pp5–21
- Paris R (1997). Peacebuilding and the limits of liberal internationalism (*International Security*) 22(2) : 54–89.
- Paris R (2002). International peacebuilding and the 'mission civilisatrice'." *Review of International Studies*, 28: 635-656.
- Peterson JH (2010). Rule of Law initiatives and the liberal peace: the impact of politicized reform in post-conflict states. *Disasters* 34(1): 15-39.
- Pugh M (2004). Peacekeeping and critical theory. *International Peacekeeping* 11(1):39.
- Schellhaas C, Seegers A (2009). Peacebuilding: imperialism's new disguise? *African Security Review* 18(2): 2-15.
- Severine RM (2009). Does the UN Peacebuilding Commission Change the Peacebuilding in Africa? Briefing Papers, New York: FES.
- Shaw M (2002). Exploring imperia: Western-global power amidst the wars of quasi-imperial states.
- Sison JM (2005). UN Security Council and Peacebuilding Commission are Instruments of Imperialist Aggression and Plunder. http://www.defendsison.be/pages_php/0509132.php (accessed 03 30, 2011).
- Stamnes E (2010). Values, Context and Hybridity: How can the Insights from the Liberal Peace Critique Literature Be brought to bear on the practices of the UN Peacebuilding Architecture? Working Paper, Centre for International Policy Studies, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, University of Ottawa.

End Notes

- ⁱ This phrase is coined by this study to describe an arrangement that countries come up with in order to assist a country that they would not usually commit to under normal circumstances.
- ⁱⁱ Several reports testify to this increasing concern: Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Changes (2004), and the Secretary-General's report "In Larger Freedom" (2005).
- ⁱⁱⁱ France maintained a significant military presence in Africa with bases in Djibouti, Senegal and Gabon, and a large contingent (4,600 soldiers) in Ivory Coast.
- ^{iv} The UN intervened in Burundi (BINUB), Chad (MINURCAT), Ivory Coast (UNOCI), Liberia (UNMIL), Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC), Ethiopia-Eritrea (UNMEE), Sahara (MINURSO), Sierra Leone (UNAMIS), Sudan (UNMIS), among others. In 2008, of 20 missions worldwide, 10 were in Africa; their budget totalled \$7,000 million and over 70% of the personnel deployed.
- ^v See UN, *Report of the Secretary-General on the Peacebuilding Fund*. A/63/218-S/2008/522 (UN, 2008).
- ^{vi} See <http://paulstubbis.pbworks.com/f/PeacebuildingHegemonyandIntegratedSocialDevelopment.pdf>
- ^{vii} Annan 2000.
- ^{viii} Robert Jackson & Carl G. Rosberg, 'Why Africa's weak states persist: the empirical and the juridical in Statehood', *World Politics*, 35(1), 1982, pp 1 – 24. For a more recent interpretation, see Michael Barnett, 'The new United Nations politics of peace: from juridical sovereignty to empirical Sovereignty', *Global Governance*, 1(1), 1995, pp 79 – 97.
- ^{ix} PBSO Priority Plan for Peacebuilding in Burundi
- ^x IMF Country Report No 07/46
- ^{xi} See Hannah Reich, 'Local Ownership' in conflict transformation projects: Partnership, Participation or Patronage?', *Bergh of Occasional Paper No. 27*
- ^{xii} Lidén "Building Peace between Global and Local Politics", 626.
- ^{xiii} A/RES/60/180 and S/RES/1645, 20 December 2005, paras 19, 21.
- ^{xiv} Read from Charbonneau, .8; Stamnes, "United Nations Preventive Deployment in Macedonia", 78.
- ^{xv} See more at <http://www.gsdr.org/docs/open/HD657.pdf>
- ^{xvi} See, for instance, Geneva Peacebuilding Platform (2008).
- ^{xvii} See, Action Aid, Cafod and Care, 25.
- ^{xviii} See more on the report on the conference at <http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/global/50189.pdf>
- ^{xix} R. Vaubel, "International Organization", in C. Rowley and F. Schneider (eds.), *Encyclopaedia of Public Choice* (New York, NY and Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2004), 319-20.
- ^{xx} See http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/files/AU_Ezulwini_0Consensus.pdf
- ^{xxi} http://www.gpplatform.ch/sites/default/files/Consultation%20Report_1.pdf
- ^{xxii} With 1,200 blue helmets in missions such as those in the Western Sahara, Mozambique, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Ethiopia/Eritrea and DRC.
- ^{xxiii} http://www.defendsison.be/pages_php/0509132.php

^{xxiv} Read more about Crimean crisis at <http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/27/us-ukraine-crisis-un-idUSBRE A2Q1GA20140327>

^{xxv} See the Special Research Report on the Security Council and the UNPBC at http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/special_research_report_1_pbc_2013.pdf

^{xxvi} Read the statement that was given by the Chairman of the International standing Committee Prof Jose Maria Sison at <http://www.josemariasison.org/inps/UNSecCouncilinstimpaggre.htm>

^{xxvii} See Shaw, *Exploring imperia*.

^{xxviii} The term "path dependence" is used to explain how decisions taken in any given circumstance are limited by previous decisions, even when past circumstances may no longer be relevant.

^{xxix} See United Nations Secretariat, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Best Practices Section, *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines* (New York, 18 January 2008), Para 174.

Review

Arab African Northern revolt states (2010-2014): The missed path of re-institutionalization and democratic transformation

Milad ELHARATHI

Benghazi University, Political Science Department, Libya.

Received 31 March, 2014; Accepted 15 September, 2014

The quick current of revolt spread rapidly from Tunisia to Egypt, and then from Egypt to Libya, in one timing date, threatening entrenched regimes and the status quo. For example, Libya's revolt turned into a bloody civil war, spilling over armaments, everywhere in the country. By the end of 7th of February, 2014, the General National Congress will end its mandate, which will lead into political vacuum in the country. In Tunisia, the Muslim movement (Nahda Party) led the country into social unrest, only in the end of January, 2014, and after four years, Tunis launched its new constitution. In addition, Egypt and its revolt turned into Christian-Muslim confrontations, and it turned its destination twice (January uprising, 2011 and the road to 30 of June, 2013) with widespread of unrest and instability between the civic moments and the ousted Brotherhood. This progress was led by the military rule under the Commander, Assisi, who called his Egyptian people to march against the Brotherhood presidency, Morsi, in 30, June, 2013, that led to the interim government, and hunting of all the brotherhood elites.

Key words: Revolt, re-institutionalization, democratic transformation, upheavals, turmoil.

INTRODUCTION

While many observers have drawn parallels with the rising of the American control of the International Order and the domination of the Western alliances, and its major leading role in combating terrorism, and the eastward spread of democracy to Eastern Europe, the outcome of the Arab revolts is far from bringing political and social stability in the AANS's region. This popular revolt has challenged authoritarian rule in the whole region, and highlighted the widespread desire for a

responsible government. Libya, in particular, is an evidential and exclusion example among other Arab revolts, that NTO played a major powerful militarized intervention in the name of supporting Obama's terminology of "Arab Spring". In this regard, the Arab revolt states could be described as immune towards democratic transition and transformation, revolts stolid in, overthrowing some regimes and shaking each other (Kaplan, 2011). Four years (2010/2014) have passed since the

E-mail: Milad.moftah@yahoo.com.

Author agree that this article remain permanently open access under the terms of the [Creative Commons Attribution License 4.0 International License](http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/)

arrival of the Arab uprising, turmoil, and leaders and decision-makers have been trying to analyze such historic transformation in order to find traction in the region that has been looking different from bad to worse, with new dynamics, unknown elites and political topography. Observers noticed, during these events, the timing of the whole changes in leadership and state's political system, and new elites occupied the political landscape of the region. This would suggest that the external factor was an essential motive in advancing such stages of sudden changes in the region.

To repeat our previous notion of immunity, it appeared that this region is still not well prepared, culturally, politically and economically, to conceive, or perceive, or to advance, any external ideas. The region seems still in need for a charismatic leader, as usual, to lead the community in the region, away from the modern aspects of democracy. This societal phenomenon of the region requires further analysis and observation, in order for one to search for the uncover conceptions and other incidents and circumstances.

This article tries to read the indications of this societal and political phenomenon and connects it to other. This search is often a worthless one especially due to the unavailability of the literature, which mostly is not adequate to explain the various aspects of what has happened during these changes. In addition, first we must articulate the term of revolution in the light of what happened exactly. In other words, what happened in these states of revolt is not a revolution, in its exact mean, but it was just stages of uprising, turmoil and upheavals. Having said that, and within this framework, the current continuing uprising, turmoil and upheavals have proved not to express their own characteristics and features which require further analysis

This personal articulation may reveal another face of the current picture, and will try to analyze the current political and geopolitical surroundings in the AANS's revolt, in an attempt to illustrate some applicable conclusions and provide a feasible setting of the future course in these revolt states. As a regional observer, who followed the region events moment by moment, it can be argued that the events of the current Arab revolt states were molded within two combined factors, the external factor, the strongest one, and the weakest internal factor; both were operating under the roles of the international factor.

ARAB AFRICAN NORTHERN STATES: CURRENTS OF CHANGE

The AANS have never had one state that assembles all the AANS's society. However, as they had common history, language, religion and traditions, they have always felt closer to other Arabs and Africans rather than any other nation. Tribal links and kinships remain evident

and one family can exist in two or three or more Arab Northern states, mainly in Libya and Tunisia, Libya and Egypt, Libya and Algeria. The notion of Arab identity of states (as of today) had never been revealed before (Sykes–Picot of 1916), which separated the Arabs of North Africa into stateless, regimes and nationals.

Historically, (Helmreich, 1974) the compartment of the Ottoman Empire (1911 /1922) was a political incident that carried the strategic vision of neutralizing expected threat from the Turkish Empire and terminating any likely mount through partitioning and dividing the massive mass of territories and peoples that formerly comprised the former Turkish emperor into several new nations. In this historical context, the existing power during the collapse of the Turkish Emperor, dominated and fragmented the region into a multitude of comparatively weak and, to an extent, artificial states, at odds with each other. The weakening of the state effectiveness and unpopular ruling elites amongst Arab Northern region was referred in the political history of the region as foreign imposition characterized as illegitimate post-colonial entities.

Correspondingly, Bernard Lewis condemns the false democratic practice in the Arab political debate, when pointing out the fraud parliamentary systems that were installed and bequeathed by Italian, British and French rule in the former colonial states. As a matter of fact, we can see that in the removal of several Arab leaders (poisoning Yasser Arafat, hanging Saddam Hussein, Jamal Abdel Nassir's heritages of Pan-Arabism, and assassinating Gaddafi) part of a plot aimed to get the region from any regional power, in terms of leadership, which can be serious qualification trying to re-organize the local traditional systems for more independent policies, from outside intervention.

Furthermore, comparatively scrawny states, emerged as Western protectorates against opposition, seeking external patrons and means for the regional power struggle and survival, have remained dependent for their security on the Western former colonial powers long after formal independence. Fearing the vistas of changes, the superiority of security issues over social issues in the region is evidenced, when experts noticed that most Arab states went strongly, for military expenditures, while about 34.6 million Arabs were living under the two-dollars-a-day international poverty line, and double-rate unemployment.

It can be argued that the current round of uprising, turmoil and upheavals, now termed wrongfully "the Arab Spring", does not constitute the first manifestation of Arab mass protests that have led to a change in the social and political structure of (AANS) societies. In fact it comes as unknown current of changes, each possessing its own grounds, circumstances, ideologies, slogans and outcomes. Right or wrong, the term of Arab Spring has been used by Barrack Obama, when advancing his policy toward the region and describing the street movements in the capitals of Tripoli, Tunisia, Cairo and Damascus.

The Arab currents of change

First of all, first current of change attempt took place in 1914. It was called the Arab Revolution that characterized that it had a leader, who led the revolution and the main target was ending Turkish rule in the land of Hejaz (Saudi Arabia now). This current overlapped, while the disappearing and finally the collapse of the Turkish, was the major regional episode. This development was on the internationally driven, as the revolutions were supported by two major proceedings, regionally and externally. World War I was the major global episode

The British were targeting and aiming to end and replace the Turkish presence in the region. Consequently, the outcome of the revolt current was transitory as they were bereft of their independence, when the colonial powers planned their way in that region. Throughout this period, a number of ideologies were legitimized through this current of revolt, and the main slogan was nationalism. It was considered important; in order to give confidence Arabs to get purge of any other subordination, mainly political Islam, which unavoidably meant wrenching out of any association to the Turkish rule, and the warding off of any desiring for the Turkish culture.

Secondly, the second current of the Arab revolts took place during the 50s and 60s, and the term the Arab Spring was used and invented for the first time in the French writings. For example, Jacques Benoist-Méchin (1959) described, in his book, "the Arab revolts" that took place in the Arab region, and tried to link them to the European Revolutions of 1848, known as the 'Spring of Nations' or people's springtime. Comparable to the first current, the second current of Arab revolts came after two most important events, one regional and another external. It was the World War II, which had a great collision on the revolt currents and caused them to be driven by external factors. The foreign powers and forces encouraged and even motivated these revolts as eastern powers wanted to fight the Western presence and colonizing in the Arab region. For that reason, "justice", 'fighting Imperialism', 'progressivism', "freedom", "democracy" were among other key themes during this period.

Thus far, the major regional episode that occurred during that period was the establishment of "Israel" and the Egyptian revolt of 1952. This led to the backing of "Pan-Arabism" to oppose "Zionism movement", which led to the creation of "Israel" in 1948. Pan-Arabism was proficiently endorsed by late Egyptian President Jamal Abdel Nasser, as his heritage of Pan-Arabism was associated with the second current of Arab revolts. Moreover, some scholars see that when the great powers were prevented, divided during the Cold War and hegemonic involvement was thus deterred; the conditions for regional sovereignty could have been better and the region was more probably united against the external rule.

Pan-Arabism prevalent struck a harmony with and inspired other Arab leaders who guided revolts in their home countries. As a result, Pan Arabism expanded attractiveness in Arab streets, as "Nasser" belongs to Nasser the late Egyptian president (1952/1970), and had an evident influence on Arab political movements (Ba'ath parties in Syria and Iraq (1970/2003), Gadhafi in Libya (1969-2011) and others. This current of revolts did not target "Israel" only, but 'other colonial' presence in the region- regarded to be the real instigator of the Zionist movement and therefore the State of "Israel". In this view, a number of circlets, destined by their association on Western "imperialistic" powers, paid the price and were toppled in Libya, Iraq, and first and foremost in stick .

Pan-Arabism, which mainly intended sticking to Arab identity of unity, turns downed increasingly over the course of the past 60 years. For instance, the position of Arab states was united and remarkably rock-solid facing the establishment of "Israel" in 1948 and opposing the UN partition plan. Parallel position was upheld during the 1973' war or 'oil crisis'. Nonetheless, the peace agreement, which signed between Israel and Egypt (1979), gravely announced the decline of Pan-Arabism. In this line of revolt development politics, most Arab states stayed away from Egypt, and the Arab League headquarter was removed from Egypt to Tunisia. A number of episodes chased and boosted this division, including Arabs controlled reaction on Israeli invasion to Beirut, the Iraqi- Iranian war. The later war put Iraq, the neighbouring sister state to Syria in the opposite camp with Iraq and US's military strike on Tripoli and Benghazi in 1986, with a modest reaction of Arab states, was just a box in point.

In short, Iraqi invasion of its neighbouring sister state of Kuwait (1990) had serious ramifications and a direct role in the declining of Pan-Arabism and solidarity; predominantly, Iraqi invasion separated Arabs into two entities, one of which was enthusiastic to call for foreign intervention to attack their Arab sister states. Conceivably, the US occupation of Iraq in 2003 and the hanging of Saddam Hussein, the stem supporter of Pan-Arabism, affirmed the past its best of Pan-Arabism.

The second path of the analysis comes within the thoughtful context. Debatably, the current confusion of revolts or uprising, upheavals or turmoil or temporary societal disorder in the AANS might be well thought-out as the fourth current of democratization, not democracy with reference to the concept developed by Milad ELHARATHI: democratization is not related to the family of democracy, each notion is followed by a reverse one. Each notion has its own environmental society to be implemented; democracy must be born and implemented when society creates its own state, and initiated by society, in order to be its servant; thus democratization is not a society's initiative, it is created by the modern state, it is a state's initiative, for the society to be a servant of the modern state.

Samuel (1991) in his book went further in defining the stages of the revolutions waves, as he termed it, in which he classified the waves into three stages of revolutionary waves. Huntington argues that each wave was followed by a reverse one and the first wave occurred between 1828/1926, with its roots in the recent French and American revolutions. This wave swept Europe and Latin America, and was manifested by military coups. It lost momentum in the interwar period between World War I and World War II when a number of dictators rose to power, which led to a shift away from democracy toward traditional despotic or new ideologically-driven, mass-based one-party regimes.

The second wave started from 1943 to 1962, and featured coups and the creation of authoritarianism across Latin America, South and East Asia and allied occupation post- World War II. Huntington proposed that the beginning of the end of Western colonial rule fashioned a number of new states with democratic inclinations. Nonetheless, he argues that political development, especially in Latin America, took on an authoritarian cast, and the decolonization of Africa led to the largest multiplication of authoritarian governments in history. Therefore, one third of the working democracies in 1958 had become dictatorial by the 1970s.

Ali Sarihan (2011) in the co-author work observed the collapse of the former Soviet Union, Southern Europe, South America and Africa. In consequence, a number of scholars have opted to insert the current Arab revolts within this framework. They discuss that with the commencement of the current Arab Spring, the fourth wave of transformation or "Democratization of Communist and Islamic Regimes" began as per the fact that it has an impact on other regions and inspired revolts and demonstrations in Europe, Asia, Latin and North America; it gained its international curves.

He embraces the changes, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, leading to democratic transitions of varying success in Eastern Europe in the fourth wave of democracy. However, Sarihan inserts the current Arab revolts within this framework. He orates that with the arrival of the current Arab Spring, the fourth wave of transformation or "Democratization of Communist and Islamic Regimes" began. The collapse of the former Soviet Union, the disappearing of Arabism, overthrowing a number of Arab regimes and the declining of historical Arab leader states led to a power vacuum and blankness future in the region and the intervention of foreign powers (either regional or international) became foreseeable. The conventional super powers are still seeking a bigger, newer role in the Arab region, mainly among USA, China and Russia, in response to the changes. The US, Russia, China and Europe compete with each other in order to guarantee the larger scale of influence and wider traction in the region, at times using their soft power instruments, at others their historical cooperation, not forgetting economic inducements.

Iran, Turkey, and Israel, on the other hand, are the most favoured regional powers with this end in view. Nonetheless, Israel's chances hinge greatly on a peace agreement with the Palestinians, not to mention the obvious fact that "Israel" is culturally different from the rest of the states in the region. Religion, History and culture overshadow Iran's probabilities over Israel, as it has also succeeded in building a network of allies within the region. However, Iran does not appear to be an attractive model for many Arab states, more than ever when it comes to freedom, human rights, economy and relations with the rest of the world.

Turkey, historically which is a part of the culture, history and religion of the region, comes into view to have the best probability in its preferences. It presents a charming model, in theory, for its democracy, freedom and modernity, human rights, booming economy and relations with the West, along with the presence of Islamic elites in power. Up till now, the term "the Turkish Model of the Brotherhood Deep state (BDS)" has been ham it up and has put Turkey's reputation on the line, and among other challenges, Turkey's potential in the Arab region is spoiled by its explicit eagerness and blatant use of its soft power, which may lead to untoward effects.

Hitherto, striding the path into the Arab region should be graphed suspiciously. It is well known for being one of the most hot-blooded regions, and for its convulsion is often described as a cold-blooded in quick sand. At this instance, it is not difficult to fathom out the feeling of dissatisfaction that pervades, nearly every Arab society, who believes that their fate should not pivot on others, but stay on in their own hands. Unfortunately, this considered necessary outcome will not materialize until historical Arab leadership states rise and shake the dust of weakness and reluctance from their societies' bears.

Why NATO's assignment in Libya was not in Egypt or Tunisia?

Libya is a major exporting oil country in the region, while Tunisia's economy depends on its limited resources, and its economy depends on tourism revenues, and Egypt's economy depends on foreign aid, mainly from the United States and from international agencies' donors. This is because it is a populated state with diversity of religions.

In fact, Libya holds approximately 46.4 billion barrels of oil reserves, the largest in Africa and in close proximity to Europe. In 2010, Libya produced an estimated 1.8 million barrels per day bbl/d of the world's 88m barrels a day of oil, of which 1.5 million bbl /d was exported. The ousted regime had planned to up its production to 3 million barrels a day by 2020, and further develops its natural gas sector in an effort to stimulate economic recovery against the backdrop of US and international sanctions during the 1980s and 1990s. France, Britain, Italy and Spain accounted for nearly 85% of Libya's oil exports.

Of these nations, Italy received over 28% of its total oil imports from Libya which amount to 370,000 barrels of oil per day. Italy's role was also outstanding as Silvio Berlusconi's government offered the use of seven air and navy bases for the Libyan operation at the early stages of the military operations .

Regarding France, it receives 17% of its oil from Libya, along with Britain who receives 8% of its oil from Libya as well. It is also interesting to point out that France, UK and Italy were the first NATO countries that undertook sorties and military logistical assistance across Libya as part of collective efforts to enforce a no-fly zone during the initial phases of the intervention. Furthermore, Libya is, also, awash in natural gas resources with an estimated capacity of 55 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) of proven natural gas reserves. According to estimates by the International Energy Agency (IEA 2011) prior to the upsurge of popular revolution, Libyan production by 2012 could be increased by as much as 50 percent if planned pipelines and gas-fired power plants would have been built.

The natural resources of Libya attracted NATO members to organize and lead a major military campaign in the binging of the second decade of this century. Certain advanced questions remained without imperative answers; and how such NATO's involvement, in supporting Libya's revolt that created a large amount of debatable political and economic impacts on Libya's affairs? The above arguments could explain why the NATO's intervention happened in Libya, as a show business for testing new weapons and creating new bazaar of arms supply to the region (Nick, 2011). On the other, Egypt and Tunisia would be less interesting marketplace and not enriched oil supply.

Conclusion

There is no feasible path that the Arab revolt states will move societal and politically from the current state of immunity against democracy, in its the fashionable style, in which, these states could be described as immune entities towards democratic transition and transformation. Yes, the currents of changes overthrow some regimes and shake each other. Four years (2010/2014) have passed since the arrival of the Arab uprising, turmoil, and leaders and the new region's elites are still trying to analyze such historic transformation in order to find traction in the region that has been looking different from bad to worse, with new dynamics, unknown elites and political topography. Observers noticed, during these events, the timing of the whole changes in leadership and state's political system, and new elites occupied the political landscape of the region.

This would suggest that the external factor was a crucial motive in advancing such stages of sudden changes in the region

At this stage the mission of uprising, upheavals and turmoil in the AANS might have developed an appetite

for collapsing despots political systems in the region by using the smart power, in directing street movements from distance , but the question would be whether the hitherto vague outcome of these currents of change adventure could turn into a Pyrrhic victory for the old regimes in the region since concerns are running high that the western leaders are pertaining to exporting democracy, the regional medley and its fanatic resources for sole-problem, might fall into the hands of Islamist rulers in the region again . For that reasons, as far as AANS and exporting democracy to the region, re-institutionalization and democratic transformation in this particular region, remains a difficult and long-far term course to be reached; indeed, it is the missed path toward those undefined causes of the region's upheavals, uprising and turmoil.

In short, the Arab uprising spring started the transformation of long-lasting regimes in the AANS region into democracies from the bottom up, as a series of grassroots, leaderless movements, with the people's cry for change facilitated by, among other things, new communication technologies. But overall, the so-called Arab revolutions would have been impossible without the help of the military, externally, as the case of Libya, and internally as the cases of Tunisia and Egypt.

The military was the cornerstone of the former authoritarian regimes, but when it allowed the change, part of these 'revolutions' became top-down managed by military elites. This article postulated that these social uprisings were not true revolutions, but rather calls for a transition or transformation of the existing regimes into different institutional patterns. Toppling the regimes and having the first free elections is not enough to consolidate these young democracies. This article argued that there are four criteria for the consolidation of democracy: constitutional consolidation, constitutional institutions need to be consolidated; consolidation of representatives, political parties and interest groups need to be consolidated; consolidation of behaviour, will the veto-actors defy and challenge the new democracy?; consolidation of democratic political culture, will the values of the people challenge the values of a democratic regime, and if so, will the values of Islam challenge democracy?

Conflict of Interests

The author(s) have not declared any conflict of interests.

REFERENCES

- Benoist-Méchin J (1959) *Un printemps Arabe*, Paris, Albin Michel.
 Edward G (1916). *Sykes-Picot Agreement*. WWI Document Archive, Official Papers
 Helmreich PC (1974). *From Paris to Sevres: The Partition of the Ottoman Empire: The Peace Conference of 1919-1920*, UAS: Ohio State University Press.
 International Energy Agency (IEA) (2011). *Libya Energy Data, Statistics and Analysis*-
<http://www.eia.gov/countries/analysisbriefs/cabs/Libya/pdf.pdf>

Kaplan R (2011). 'Libya, Obama and the Triumph of Realism', The Financial Times, 28 August 2011, <http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/a76d2ab4-cf2d-11e0-b6d4-00144feabdc0.html>

Nick M (2011). 'NATO Admits Civilians Died in Tripoli Bombing Raid', The Daily Telegraph, 19 Jun 2011. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/libya/8585248/Nato-admits-civilians-died-in-Tripoli-bombing-raid.html>

Samuel MH (1991). The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, USA, University of Oklahoma Press.

Sarihan A (2011). "Fourth Wave Democratization: Democratization of Communist and Islamic Regimes", Turkish Weekly: <http://www.turkishweekly.net/op-ed/2918/>

Review

America and Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) Gas Pipeline

Bhat Mukhtar Ahmad

Aligrah Muslim University, India.

Received 22 April, 2014; Accepted 3 September, 2014

India and Iran share a historical and long term economic relation that has formed the basis of close bilateral relationship. In contemporary World politics, energy resources play an important role and are considered as the engines of economic growth and development for a country. India's growing energy demand and Iran's vast energy resources make the two nations natural economic partners. For India, Iran becomes attractive because it occupies second and fourth place among the countries having the highest reserves of gas and oil in the whole world. Iran, on the other hand, needs substantial investments not only in its oil and gas industry but in educational, health, defence and in technological sector as well. The sanctions imposed by the West particularly by United States of America have made it difficult for Iran to emerge as a major regional power on the basis export of gas and oil to its nearest and huge markets (Pakistan and India). This paper examines the Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline as a confidence building measure in developing strategic relationship between India, Pakistan and Iran, secondly the nature of American attitude and influence on the relationship between Iran and India particularly in context of the proposed (IPI) Iran, Pakistan and India gas pipeline.

Key words: India's growing energy situation, Iranian energy sources and IPI gas pipeline, IPI Gas Pipeline and Regional integration, U.S.'s influence on IPI Project.

INTRODUCTION

India and Iran have a rich history of civilization going back several millennia. Their bilateral relationship is the continuity of an ancient phenomenon, since the Aryans era and shared common homeland as well as traditions. Historians claim that Indo-Iranians belong to a single family and lived together for many centuries in the pasture land of Central Asia that is known as Oxus valley (India embassy in Tehran, 2014). The Indo-Iranian relationship was given concrete foundation during the period of Mughal rule over India. Mughal rulers not only invited the Iranian architects to India but also the

educationalist of that times, who translated important books related to medicine, poetry and religion from Persian language to Hindi language. During the period that both countries enjoyed collateral relations, there were free movement of traders, architects, poets, and educationalist (Haider, 2001). With the appearance of British colonial rule over India ties between the two countries were broken till the independence of India. In post-independence period India and Iran established their formal relations on 15th March 1950 by signing the "Treaty of Friendship" that states "there shall be perpetual

E-mail: mukhtarbhat24@gmail.com

Author agree that this article remain permanently open access under the terms of the [Creative Commons Attribution License 4.0 International License](http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/)

peace and friendship between two Governments of the two countries and their differences shall be settled through ordinary diplomatic channels, by arbitration and by such peaceful means as deemed suitable by them” (Abedi, 1996). However, their emerged various factors like with the creation of Pakistan India and Iran lost the direct land link, out-break of wars in South Asian subcontinent (India-China, India-Pakistan), and the Iran’s support to Pakistan as well as Iran’s partnership with the West. All these factors became obstacle in transforming their past relations into long term strategic partnership. However it was after the Iranian revolution of 1979 which changed the whole political structure and leadership of Iran, both the countries started looking at opportunities for re-establishing their relations by exchanging the official visits from time to time. It was in April 2001 the visit of then Indian Prime Minister, Mr. Atal Bihari Vajpayee who provided a break-through and opened a new chapter in the history of Indo-Iran relationship. The visit boosted the efforts for developing a close Indo-Iran relationship based on mutual interests like Taliban dominated Afghanistan, independence of Central Republics due to the fall of USSR, the economic interests like export of natural gas, developed technology, investment opportunities in areas like health sector, defence and industrial sector etc. Both the countries have identified mutual interests for developing long term strategic partnership especially in information technology, fertilisers, petrochemical and energy sector etc (Khan, 2008).

In contemporary times, India and Iran have not only deepened this relationship but also expanded it to cover wide ranging political, economic, security as well as science and technological aspects. The importance of Iran for India lies in its geostrategic position, energy resources as well as in providing access to the Central Asian region. Iran can play a pivotal role in a number of regional configurations in the Persian Gulf, Afghanistan and in the Caspian areas for India. Iran ultimately will help India not only in countering expanding Chinese and Pakistan’s influence in these areas but also in securing reliable and huge energy sources required for developing its economy and in becoming as well as in playing the role of a regional power. But there are various challenges and issues (role of U.S.A., Iranian Nuclear Program, and Afghanistan, so on) which have become the main factors for the two countries to redesign their foreign policy towards each other.

Since the end of the Cold war, United States has been seeking to establish a permanent global dominance in order to take control of strategically important regions of world and particularly of West Asia region of which Iran is one of the major countries. Iranian nuclear programme and its possible implications for the entire region, its ideological disposition, and its huge oil reserves, strategic and economic importance of the Strait of Hormuz, all

these make Iran an important regional actor. While as the policy of United States towards Iran is to undermine the Iranian regime and make it subordinate. United States want to go to any extreme to have an excuse to put the square on Iran either by imposing unilateral sanctions or by the threat of military action. From time to time India became the tool for implementing the policy of United States either due to its national interests or due to the inability of its policy makers in handling the issues efficiently.

India’s growing energy situation

Currently, India is one of the world’s fastest growing economies. From the year 2006 and 2010, the India’s gross domestic product (GDP) increased at a CAGR (Compound Annual Growth Rate) of 8.2%, while global GDP increased at a CAGR of 4.5% (World Economic Outlook Database, 2011). The rapid increase in economic activity has been accompanied by rising energy consumption. From 2006 to 2010, India’s primary energy consumption increased at a CAGR of 8.3%, from 381.4 million tons of oil equivalent (MTOE) to 524.2 MOTE. Coal, oil and natural gas are major sources of primary energy in India, accounting for 52.9, 29.6 and 10.6%, respectively of the primary energy consumption. However, the country has the world’s fourth largest coal reserves. The demand and supply gap of coal has been continuously increasing with domestic production unable to keep pace with the demand. In case of oil and gas the deficit is even more. India holds just 0.7% of the world’s proven oil reserves while accounting for 3.9% of the global oil consumption. Similarly, the country has 0.8% of the world’s proven natural gas reserves, while accounting for 1.9% of the worldwide gas consumption which results in India importing nearly 20% of its natural gas consumed through LNG¹. Over the past few years, the country’s dependence on imported oil has steadily increased as a result of stagnant domestic production and rising demand. This has significant implications on energy security and the overall financial health of the country. While as Domestic production remained flat, hampered by limited prospectively delays in the commissioning of new projects and declining production from existing maturing fields. Disruption in crude oil supplies has always been a cause of concern for India. The recent upheaval in the Middle East countries especially in Libya and Egypt triggered a drop in crude oil production in the region, resulting increased crude oil prices driving up inflation in India. According to Goldman Sachs, the increase in oil price by US\$10 per barrel could potentially

¹. BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2011
http://www.bp.com/.../bp.../statistical_energy_review_2011/.../statistical_revie
 Accessed on 13/10/2013.

slow India's GDP growth by 0.2% and may inflate the current account deficit by 0.4%. The recent depreciation of the rupee raised the cost of crude oil imports for India, which in turn has led to increase in inflationary pressures on the economy. Notably, the import of crude oil and oil products rose from US\$50.3 billion in Financial Year 2006 to US\$115.9 billion in Financial Year 2011. In Financial Year 2012 (till October 2011) imports touched US \$75 billion.² Over the long run the widening trade deficit may result in the dearth of foreign exchange reserves for the country to deploy in other critical infrastructure and social projects.

As India is one of the fastest growing energy markets in world with the demand continuing to outstrip the supply and the main drivers of energy consumption in India are industrial operations, transportation, and urban and rural household uses. The energy sector in India decides the direction of economic growth, as there is a direct correlation between the two faster economic growths continues to accelerate the demand for energy products. Although Indian government has plans for enhancing the exploitation of its hydro power, nuclear energy, and renewable energy resources the analysis indicates that the impact of these supply side alternatives is minor when compared with the total requirements of commercial energy by 2031. Although, the contribution of nuclear hydro and renewable energy forms together increases by about six times during 2001–31. These sources can at most contribute to a mere 4.5% of the total commercial energy requirements over the modelling time frame. It is, therefore evident that the pressure on the three conventional energy forms that is coal, oil, and gas will continue to remain high at least in the next few decades. As the world's third largest coal producer, India probably will rely on coal to meet the majority of its energy needs for the foreseeable future. Coal currently provides 60 percent of India's commercial energy consumption. Between 1984 and 2004, coal consumption in India increased from 140 million tons (mt) to over 400 mt annually, growing at a rate of 5.4 percent per year. Of the coal consumed 90 percent is produced domestically while about 10 percent is imported, primarily from Australia and South Africa. However, the adverse effects of coal like global warming are already visible. On the other hand, no doubt India has signed the nuclear agreement with US for overcoming India's energy crisis. But it will put further burden of millions of rupees on the annual budget for developing a single nuclear plant. Further it (nuclear deal) has developed the feeling of insecurity in the minds of large section of population which is the witness of the Union Carbide gas leak in 1984, which killed thousands of people and the persons responsible for the accident

were let free by the government of India, even the victims struggled for long period for the insufficient compensation, relief and rehabilitation that was given to them by government. Further by enacting the nuclear liability bill Indian government has deepened the feeling of insecurity in the minds of its people by following the same path which led to the Union Carbide accident by (a) fixing the liability of the operator of the nuclear installation in case of accident only 1500 crores at the place where loss could be huge and unimaginable (b) not making the nuclear material supplier responsible for his role in case of nuclear accident due to negligence while supplying the material to the nuclear plant (c) by fixing the maximum period of 10 years for claiming the compensation by the victims (d) Victims are not given right to sue anyone neither the operator nor the supplier (Suvrat and Ramana, 2010). As a result of this now local population protests against the construction of nuclear plants in their areas the latest example is the Kudankulam nuclear plant. So it clearly indicates that natural gas is a preferred option for power generation as well as for the production of nitrogen fertilizer. The availability of natural gas therefore, needs to be facilitated by removing infrastructural constraints. Besides its high end-use efficiency, it is a cleaner fuel and relatively much easier to handle than coal, nuclear material and nuclear plants (Bhat, 2013).

Iranian energy sources and IPI gas pipeline

In terms of Iran's potential to meet India's rapidly growing energy requirements, Iran has the second largest gas reserves in the world and is seeking to repair damage caused by the Iran and U. S. relations and sanctions. Iran hope for an opportunity to exploit its natural gas reserves through the mega-project (Iran, Pakistan and India gas pipeline) that could spur economic prosperity in the provinces where the pipeline ran. The IPI gas pipeline project could transform Iran from being merely an oil producer to a major energy exporter. That ultimately enhances Iran's regional and global stature (Nadeem and von Ochsee, 2009). The projected Iran-Pakistan-India Pipeline (IPI) would stretch 1,724 miles, or 2,775 kilometres, is now under construction to deliver natural gas from Iran to Pakistan. Iran has already completed a 900-kilometre portion of 56-inch diameter pipeline from Assaluyeh to Iran Shehr. The remaining 250 kilometre portion up to the Pakistan border is still under design and is expected to be completed in limited period. In 2012, Pakistan decided to finish the huge pipeline project "at any cost" as it suited Pakistan in odd circumstances. The capacity of the pipeline would be between 8.7 billion cubic meters to 40 billion cubic meters of natural gas per year. It could be raised up to 55 billion cubic meters per year. It is generally believed that gas delivered from Iran would be cheaper than delivered through the proposed Trans-Afghanistan Pipeline (Daheem, 2013). The idea of

² 'India's impending energy crisis.' India's energy security Key issues impacting the Indian oil and gas sector (FICCI). [http://www.ev.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/Indias_energy_security/\\$FILE/India-s_energy_security.pdf](http://www.ev.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/Indias_energy_security/$FILE/India-s_energy_security.pdf) Accessed on 10/12/2012.

an overland trans- Pakistan pipeline was first proposed in 1989 by Ali Shams Adekani then acting Deputy Foreign Minister of Iran and R.K. Pachauri, the then Director General of the TATA Energy Research Institute in New Delhi (Temple, 2007). It was in 1993 both countries signed Memorandum of Understanding for the project. However, at the earlier stage, the project did not influence many because of Pakistan's initial reluctance to participate in the project. The negative response of Pakistan forced Iran and India to look for other possible options for laying down the pipeline project. Thus they started looking at the options of shallow water pipeline and to the deep sea (sea bed) route for carrying out the project which was much expensive than the overland proposal. While with the change in the government of Pakistan in 1999, it announced its support and participation in the proposed gas pipeline project. At the early stage, both India and Pakistan tried to relate the project with their political issues like India wanted to link it with the transit right for trade with Afghanistan and demanded to remove its restrictions on the bilateral trade. While, Pakistan tried to link it with the resolution of the long pending Kashmir dispute. But later on since 2005, both countries have taken it positively and dropped these demands in order to overcome their energy shortage in their respective countries. In response to the security concern for the gas pipeline raised by India, Pakistan tried to assure both Iran and India that Pakistan would guarantee the security for the project. In a letter, the then petroleum and natural gas minister of Pakistan Usman Aminuddin to his Iranian counterpart assured that Pakistan is prepared to address all concerns of the Indian government. Further Iranian government also assured that if Pakistan at any point of time stopped the gas supplies to India, Tehran will not only stop the supplies to Pakistan but also provide India equal amount of LNG as the same price (Naaaz, 2008).

The prospect of supplying energy to two major markets just next door was an enticing one for Iran. Iran figures very prominently in Indian thinking and is considered highly beneficial to the country's economic future. Piped natural gas poses perhaps the most environmentally and economically cost-effective solution to India's dire energy situation. Not only the IPI pipeline could provide the necessary fuel to India's fertilizer and industrial sectors but also imported gas could help revitalize the defunct electricity market. India's inadequate infrastructure could also benefit from a reliable energy source, which would in turn encourage further foreign investment. As the Planning Commission report on an integrated energy policy has noted, the benefits of a stable power source would eventually be tangible for people at every socio-economic level of Indian society. Furthermore, since high demand for gas in the private sector will only increase over time, the pipeline is guaranteed to be profitable even if the power sector is eventually able to overcome its

dependency on thermal generation (Temple, 2000). For India and Pakistan, the energy needed to fuel economic growth projections could not be fulfilled from a single line (source). Though both states had sought to diversify their energy sources, with natural gas being a crucial component of their strategy and inadequate domestic reserves make those plans imagery without foreign sources. Thus, access to Iran's vast gas reserves by the pipeline project would go in long term towards energy security and Pakistan on its part enjoys an additional incentive of transit fees that can be profitable revenues for boosting its economy.

IPI gas pipeline and regional integration

Finally, the economic integration inherent in the project offers the possibility of improving strained India-Pakistan political relations. The Project can act as a confidence building measure in the process of integrating whole South Asia particularly India and Pakistan politically, economically, socially and culturally. It can play a vital role not only in resolving the decades old disputes like Kashmir, Siachen and Sir-creek, etc but also provide a peaceful atmosphere as well as bring an end to the arms race between the two countries and ultimately help both the countries in developing their health sector, educational sector, eradicating poverty and unemployment. Despite constraints and series of disputes between India and Pakistan, still the project is still seen by all the three countries as indispensable for their development. Thus IPI gas pipeline can be treated as measure of removing trust deficit between the countries and integrating them in an interdependent whole. On the part of Pakistan by this project it not only would earn a large amount of revenue in the form of transit fee but also would enhance its relations with India in other areas like education, health, information technology, industry and electricity generation as well, which could be helpful for Pakistan in boosting its war torn economy. While on the part of India it would be in its interest to deal with Pakistan economically that not only will weak the anti India forces and propaganda in Pakistan but also push Pakistani government to dismantle the basis of anti-India forces and restrict their activities. IPI also will become an important source of energy for energy starved country like India in long run. The IPI pipeline project would further act as a bridge for both countries (India and Pakistan) to get access to the Persian Gulf and Central Asian countries through Iran. Hence, the IPI project may become a source of regional integration i.e. why some experts called the IPI as the "Peace Pipeline."

U.S.'s influence on IPI gas pipeline

While as U.S. on the other hand has been applying

pressure against India and Indian companies which have energy relations with Iran. The most prominent is the Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) gas pipeline project. Iran and Pakistan have announced that they will go ahead with the project at a bilateral level for the time being. Following the announcement of the recent sanctions against Iran, Washington has told Islamabad that it could be subjected to US sanctions if it went ahead with the pipeline project with Iran. India seems to have delinked from the same though the government has not withdrawn formally. India claims that security and pricing issues with Pakistan and Iran respectively are the main obstacles to its participation, though there has been substantial pressure from US against proceeding with the project. Many in U.S. Congress voice concern about India's relations with Iran and their relevance to U.S. interests. As America's concerns about the Iranian nuclear program have increased, so increased the pressure on India about its participation in gas pipeline project with Iran. The United States has endured India's friendship with Iran as an irritant that could be ignored, the development of the India-Iran energy relationship is a new serious threat. Such a relationship has the potential for revitalizing the Iranian energy sector, as well as opening up new possibilities for the export of oil and gas from the wider Caspian region through Iran. This would undermine the U.S. policy of isolating the Iranian regime in the global polity and economy. The U.S. government reportedly has warned leading oil companies, as well as governments of various nations including India that sanctions are possible if they pursue energy deals with Iran (Steven, 2007). With signing of the U.S.-India civil nuclear pact in 2005. India's relationship with Iran has attracted an even closer scrutiny from America. In March 2005, the US Secretary of state Condoleezza Rice visited India and Pakistan. In New Delhi she said that "the United States had conveyed its concern to India on the gas pipeline. Our ambassador to India has made statements in that regard. So those concerns are well known to India." The US Energy Secretary Samuel Bodman queried his Indian counterpart Murli Deora regarding the pipeline during his visit to India, declaring that Washington needed to stop it. The Sam Lantos, chairman of the foreign Affairs Committee of the US House of Representatives, led a group of US congressmen in writing a letter to the India Prime Minister advising that India pull back not only from the pipeline but from the LNG deal with Iran too (Dietl, 2008). Under American pressure, it has stopped the export, largely by reliance of oil products to Iran and reduced oil imports from Iran. Since 2010 India's payments for its oil import from Iran have become problematic. Its search for payments took India to banks in Germany, Turkey and U.A.E. Even both the countries agreed to partial payment through Indian Rupee. On the American part India was asked to prove its loyalty by providing support to U.S. on the question of Iran's nuclear program at the International

Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Some analysts are of the opinion that as large reserves of natural gas have been discovered in India's offshore territory. However, given India's projected huge and growing demand for gas, it will require import of gas, at least in the future. While as the U.S. sponsored Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan and India gas pipeline is highly uncertain because of the internal situation of Afghanistan. As long as law and order is not restored in Afghanistan and writ of the government established in the tribal areas of Pakistan and one cannot expect to see the project getting functionalized. Furthermore, the quickly changing internal situation of Afghanistan and the withdrawal of foreign forces from Afghanistan and the chances of Taliban emerging as a strong political power are likely to make the situation more complex. So Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline becomes important and reliable source of energy for both India and Pakistan. That may be the reason why India is not officially closing the project of the IPI gas pipeline. As an Indian official who was closely involved with the negotiations said, barring a few issues, everything is in place for the project to be brought to fruition. As and when India feels the time is right for implementing the project, it will do so (Shebonti and Mahtab, 2010). Therefore, it is evident that the IPI pipeline has not gone ahead due to American pressure.

Conclusion

Energy is one of the most important and efficacious elements in the strategic collaborations between Iran and India. India being a country having second largest population with fast growing economy is in need of new energy sources. In the field of energy, it can be claimed that because of Iran enormous resources of oil supplies it is known as India's one of the most important oil trade partner. The strongest capacities and potentialities for developing relationship between Iran and India lie in energy and trade collaborations. There are sufficient areas through which the mutual collaboration can be transformed into strong mutual integration and energy can be one of the most consequential fields for the expansion of ties. While as, on the other hand United States has left no stone unturned to put pressure on other countries particularly on India not to establish friendly relations with Iran for its personal benefits. Now with the change in the leadership of Iran, the new moderate president Hassan Rouhani has shown flexibility in order to remove the sanctions imposed on Iran for resolving the economic crisis and the issue of Iranian nuclear program peacefully and as per news reports U.S. as well is thinking of easing the sanctions on Iran. So it is time for India to play an active role as a mediator and supporter of negotiations between Iran and United States and on the other to start thinking and approaching to the

Iranian authorities in order to resolve the issues related the price and transit fee of gas in order to secure and to protect the huge energy sources as well as the historical relations with Iran from the influence of other countries particularly of China.

Conflict of Interests

The author has not declared any conflict of interests.

REFERENCES

- Abedi AAH (1996). Relations between India and Iran 1947-1979. Iran. J. Int. Affairs 4(7):877-902 <http://catalogue.sipri.org/cgi-bin/koha/opac-detail.pl?biblionumber=52382>
- Bhat AM (2013). India and Iran Relations: The Need for Constructive Re-engagement, Country-specific Studies, STUDIES on IRAN Responses, Articles Foreign Policy Research Centre NEW DELHI (India).
- Daheem M (2013). 'Pak-Iran gas pipeline agreement' The Frontier Post voice of the Federation, 21/10/2013.
- Dietl G (2008). "Transnational Gas Pipeline: Global Context, Indian Experience" India and West Asia in the era of Globalisation by Alam Anwar, publication: New Century publication New Delhi, India p40.
- Haider M (2001). Indo-Iran Relations: Historical and Cultural Perspectives, In: Prof. S. M. Waseem (ed.) Indo-Iran Relations. Iran Culture House18, Tilak Marg, New Delhi (India) pp.32-60. <http://newdelhi.icro.ir/uploads/indo-iran.pdf>
- India embassy in Tehran (2014). India and Iran – Age Old Ties. www.indianembassy-tehran.ir/india-iran_historica_links.php
- Khan MN (2008). Vajpayee's Visit to Iran: Indo-Iranian Relations and Prospects of Bilateral Cooperation, 15 Jul. The Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses. Strategic Analysis 25:6
- Naaaz F (2008). Indo-Iran Relations: Vital factors in the 1990s. Strategic Analysis, 15 July. The Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses New Delhi, Rautledge, London U.K. 25(2):231-232.
- Nadeem S, von Ochssée TB (2009). "The Iran-Pakistan-India Pipeline Project: Cross-Border Gas Pipeline Challenges April," IGU Magazine.
- Shebonti RD, Mahtab MAR (2010). "US Sanctions on Iran and their Impact on India". June 21. http://www.idsa.in/system/files/IB_USSanctionsonIran.pdf Accessed
- Steven RW (2007). "US Cautions Foreign Companies on Iran Deals," Mar. 21, New York Times.
- Suvrat R, Ramana MV (2010). The Other Side of Nuclear Liability, April 17. Econ Political Weekly 45:16.
- Temple D (2000). The Diplomatic Matrix - Balancing the Objectives of Different Stakeholders APRIL, The Iran-Pakistan—India Pipeline IPCS Research Papers.
- Temple D (2007). The Iran-Pakistan-India Pipeline: the intersection of Energy and Politics. April. Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies New Delhi. p.6.
- World Economic Outlook Database (2011). International Monetary Fund. September <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2011/02/pdf/text.pdf>

Review

National power and the search for a generalized theory of terrorist target selection: An introduction to the Uyo School

Robert O. Dode and Henry U. Ufomba*

Department of Political Science and Public Administration, University of Uyo, Uyo, Akwa Ibom State, Nigeria.

Received 23 October, 2013; Accepted 5 September, 2014

The assumption that terrorist organizations (TO) select their target(s) putting into consideration its own limited resources and the impact of the selected target on the national power of the victim state has been the underlying assumption of the Uyo School. In the face of the increasing search to uncover the determinant of terrorist target selection which has become central in terrorism literature does the Uyo School provide a generalized theory on the issue? And are its assumptions robust enough to provide the needed theoretical framework as a research program for more rigorous and scientific study on the subject matter? This paper makes a presentation of the core propositions of the school. It concludes that the school provides the most promising theorization on the subject.

Key words: National power, political capacity, economic capacity, demography, terrorist attack, terrorist organization, power foregone, endurance capacity.

INTRODUCTION

One of the most reoccurring themes in terrorism literature is the search for the structure and rationale in terrorist target selection (TTS). As early as 1998, C.J.M Drake theorizes that there exists a linkage between the ideological base of a terrorist organization (TO) and its target preference since ideology provides the framework through which the TO evaluates its actions on other people and reaction. Ideology therefore lends itself as the moral framework through which terrorists judge the credibility of their actions (Drake, 1998).

Since the September 11 attacks on the United States, there has been unprecedented explosion on scholarly

work on the subject matter. These extensive scholarly works concluded that:

1. There exists a linkage between the decision-making process of a terror group and its interaction with the state (Bueno de Mesquita, 2005a, 2005b; McCormick, 2003; Lake, 2002)
2. Terrorist activities (including target selection) are shaped by the resource limitation and the ideology of its supporters (de la Calle and Sanchez-Cuenca, 2007; Lapan and Sandler, 1988)
3. There is a connection between the time of terrorist

*Corresponding author. E-mail: ufomba@gmail.com.

attack and its target and technique choice (Pape, 2003, 2005; Bloom, 2005; Kyudd and Walter, 2002; Berman and Lantin, 2005)

4. There exists a linkage between the state defensive and pre-emptive policy and terrorist target behavior including their target choice (Bandyopadhyay and Sandler, 2011; Brandt and Sandler, 2010; Bernulandt and Polborn, 2010; Sander, 2010)

5. Terrorist groups make target choice(s) that creates dynamics of action-repression which arouses sympathy for its cause from the populace (de Figueiredo and Weingast, 2001)

6. Target choice(s) are selected by TO based on its capacity to draw media attention (Hoffman, 2010)

7. Terrorist groups choose targets that neutralize government advantage over them in their 'bargaining interaction' for public support (Nemeth, 2010)

8. There is a linkage between terrorist target choice and the state's allocation of security resources (Mathews and Loweberg, 2012; Power 2002; Berhandt and Polborn, 2010; Brandt and Sandler, 2010).

More recently a perspective on the subject has emerged known as the Uyo School. This school of thought is of the opinion that TO has limited human and material resources compared to the state. In its interaction with the state TO aims at forcing the victim state (VS) to make concession to its demand(s) by attacking its core components of national power which are identified by power transition theorists to include political, economic and demographic capacity, in order to optimize its limited resources. This suggestion appears to be logically since it presents TO as having the capability of making rational choice in its target selection in face of its limited resources. But do this suggestion and other core assumptions of the school constitute a veritable framework in the complex art of explaining and maybe predicting terrorist target(s) in the future? Does the Uyo School lend itself as a generalized theory in the expanding discipline of terrorism studies which compared to other social sciences has been found wanting in theoretical sophistication and methodology? This paper will answer these questions. It will present the core assumptions of the Uyo School as a veritable research program.

The theoretical foundation of the Uyo School

To make a proper appraisal of the postulation of the Uyo School on terrorist target selection, it is imperative to first and foremost bring into limelight the theoretical framework upon which its assumptions were developed.

The school is an extension of the core tenets of the Power Transition Theory (PT) which is an IR research program into the realm of terrorism studies. The school replicated the success of PT which is one of the most

robust theoretical and empirical explanations of war and peace, and which stands out among the theories of international conflict and co-operation (Eminue and Ufomba, 2011; Lemke and Werner, 1996; Tammen et al., 2000; Kim, 1991, 1992, 1996; Abdollahian and Kang, 2008).

PT was first put forward by A.F.K Organski in 1958 to explain the causes of conflict between major powers. To the adherents of this theory, the international system is a hierarchical structured system wherein the position of a state is determined by its national power. And national power is made up of three core components- political capacity, economic capacity and demography. And as the national power of a state increases or decreases in relation to other states, its status in the hierarchy changes. When a state advanced to the position of a major power it will challenge the status quo if it does not suit its own interest in other to alter it – a situation which accounts for conflict between it and the existing power whose interest is to maintain the status quo.

Since it has been developed into a more generalized theory of war and peace by Kugler and Lemke (1996), PT has been extended as a research program to explain virtually all known phenomena both in inter-state and intra-state interaction. For example, Lemke (2002) applied it in the explanation of the duration of conflict at regional level. It was adopted in the correct prediction of the rise of China and India to major power status by Wilson and Purushothaman (2003), Maddison (2003), Organski (1958) and Fogel (2007). Other successful application of PT includes Kang and Kugler's integrated formal deterrence structure using a game theoretic approach (Kang and Kugler, 2007), Abdollahian and Kang's analysis of conflict in multiple level among sub-national, national and regional actors (Abdollahian and Kang, 2008), Alsharabati and Kugler's theorization on the stability of deterrence building (Alsharabati and Kugler, 2008), Abdollahian's development of a system of non-linear differential equations to simulate the structural conditions that lead to inter-state conflict or co-operation (Abdollahian, 1996) among other breakthrough in scholarship (Coan and Kuglar, 2008; Arbetman-Rabinwitz and Johnson, 2008; Feng et al., 2008). Recognizing PT as a powerful framework of analysis Dicocco and Levy concluded that PT is a lively and expanding research program that has moved forward in several important substantive directions (Tammen, 2008). Most theoretical extensions of power transition principles have generated novel predictions, many of which are empirically collaborated, and proponents of the research program have been particularly good at developing improved operational measures of key theoretical concepts (Dicocco and Levy, 2003:147-148).

The Uyo School therefore situates itself within this successful research program by adopting its core concept of national power to explain the factors that

shapes the target choice of terrorist organizations in its interaction with the state.

Tenets of the Uyo School: An evaluation of its strength and weakness

The foundation of the Uyo School was first laid by Okon Eminue and Henry Ufomba in their seminal paper titled 'Modeling Terrorist Target Selection: Organski's Power Transition Theory' and expanded into a more encompassing and elaborate model by Dode and Ufomba (forthcoming). The school developed its theory of TTS by moving Organski's Power Transition Theory (PT) from its traditional realm as an IR theory to the more restricted borders of terrorism studies. This was achieved by employing PT phenomenon of national power to model the linkage between terrorist target choices and the VS (Ufomba, 2013). It therefore suggests that the same variables¹ that determine a VS's status in the international hierarchy also determine its relationship with a terrorist organization in the event of the latter's selection of target (Eminue and Ufomba, 2011). In their work, Dode and Ufomba (forthcoming) extended the model by incorporating into it the dual concepts of endurance capacity and power forgone² to simulate the determinants of a VS post-attack behavior using a game-theoretic approach. With this extension the theorization of the school can be summed to contain five core assumptions which are:

Assumption 1: Terrorist groups lack the immense resources of the state both in human and material perspective. Hence, to achieve its aim they optimize their resources through the selection of critical targets that will compel VS to make concession. The cost of the attack is lower than the damage done on the VS.

Assumption 2: Critical targets are the three core components of the national power of VS. These components are its' political, economic and demographic capacity³.

Assumption 3: VS has the capacity to maintain its stance after been attacked by TO. This is its endurance capacity.

Assumption 4: The endurance capacity of VS is a function of its willingness to sacrifice its national power to maintain its stance on a particular demand. The loosed power is its power forgone.

Assumption 5: The endurance capacity of VS is its breaking point beyond which it is likely to make concession to TO on a particular demand and at a particular time/period.

From the above five assumptions the school theorized

beyond 'why' and 'how' a TO selects its target but also it laid down the rational expectation of a VS behavior in its post-attack interaction with TO. The 'why' TO chooses its target⁴ is its rational behavior of resource. Its broad perception encompasses previous postulations and goes beyond it since available data on terrorist targets worldwide point the core components of national power has been the target of most terrorist attacks globally (Table 1). Well this data does not present itself as a perfect statistical analysis but it suggests the prospect of these assumptions unveiling itself as a robust and generalized theory of terrorist target selection.

As stated above, while these assumptions have not been subjected to rigorous empirical analysis nevertheless its logic presents itself more than any other theory as a veritable framework for future research work on terrorist selection since previous postulations are limited to variables that are not robust enough to explain terrorist target selection on a wide spectrum of cases in comparison with the Uyo School.

Conclusion

Although terrorist organizations conduct their activities as a clandestine group, it has been an increasing interest in terrorism literature to uncover the factors or determinants that shape its decision making process in general and its target choice in particular. To this end there has been avalanche theorization as the subject matter which spans from Drake's view that ideology plays a key role in shaping target choice to Hoffman's 'media attraction' as a veritable stimulant in terrorist target selection among others. Situated within this quest, the Uyo School presents itself as a powerful theory to explain terrorist target choice. Its proposition that national power is the main target choice of a TO in its quest to force VS to make concession to its demand(s) is logical and in line with available data as shown in Table 1. The robustness of its assumptions also explains the post-attack rational behavior of VS. Hence, its theorization is an important contribution to the literature since it gives room for future extension and modification making it a superb framework for future research in the field.

ENDNOTES

1. The variables here are PT's established components of national power which are political capacity, economic capacity and demography (see, Abdollahian and Kang 2008; Tammen 2008; Tammen et al 2000 among others)
2. In the taxonomy of the Uyo School the concept of 'power forgone' is used to refer to the amount of national power as state is willing to sacrifice at a particular time as are sult of a terrorist threat or attack in the process of

Table 1. Terrorist attacks worldwide and their relation to national power – demography (Dem), economic capability (ECO), political capability (POL).

Targets	Number of attacks	Relation to national power
Private Citizens and Property	17010	DEM/ECO/Pol
Business	12558	ECO
Govt (General)	11059	DEM/ECO/POL
Military	11007	POL
Police	9802	POL
Transportation	4132	ECO
Journalistic/Media	1694	POL
Religious Figures/Institutions	1609	-
Educational Institution	1490	ECO/POL/DEM
Others	1426	-
Airport/Airlines	933	ECO
Unknown	913	-
Terrorist	842	POL
NGO	739	ECO/POL
Telecommunication	453	ECO
Tourists	289	ECO
Abortion related	261	-
Maritime	159	ECO
Food/Water Supply	108	DEM

Source: Eminue and Ufomba (2011) and Global Terrorism Database of the University of Maryland.

resisting terrorist demands. In the other hand 'endurance capacity' is the point at which V Sisno longer able or willing to sacrifice anymore of its national power in its refusal to TO's demand. It is assumed that beyond its endurance capacity VS is likely to make concession.

3. These concepts were used in the context of PT parlance.

4. The expectation here is that TO is a rational decision-maker that makes the best possible choice at a particular time from a wide range of choices putting into consideration its limited resources and its ultimate aim of satisfying its own want.

Conflict of Interests

The authors have not declared any conflict of interests.

REFERENCES

- Abdollahian M, Kang K (2008). "In Search of Structure: The Nonlinear Dynamics of Power Transitions". *Int. Interactions* 34(4):337-357.
- Arbetman – Rabinowitz M, Johnson K (2008). "Power Distribution and Oil in the Sudan: Will the Comprehensive Peace Agreement Turn the Oil Curse into a Blessing?" *Int. Interactions* 34(4):382 – 401.
- Bandyopadhyay S, Sandler T (2011). "The Interplay Between the Pre-emptive and Defensive Counter-terrorism Measures: A Two-Stage Game" *Economics* 78:546-564.

- Berman E, Latin D (2005). "Hard Targets: Theory and Evidence on Suicide Attacks" NBER WorkingPaper 11740.
- Bloom M (2005). *Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terror*. New York. Columbia University Press.
- Brandt P, Sandler T (2010). "What do Transnational Terrorists Target? Has it changed? Are we safer?" *J. Conf. Res.* 54:214-236.
- Bueno de Mesquita E (2005a). "The Terrorist Endgame: A model with Moral Hazard and Learning" *J Conf. Res.* 49:237-258.
- Bueno de Mesquita E (2005b) "Conciliation, counter-terrorism and Patterns of Terrorist Violence" *Int. Org.* 59:145-176.
- Coan TG, Kugler T (2008) "The Politics of Foreign Direct Investment: An Interactive Framework" *Int. Interactions* 34(4):402-422.
- de Figueiredo R, Weingast B (2001). "Vicious Cycle: Endogenous Political Extremism and Political Violence" Paper available at (<http://slantchev.ucsd.edu/courses/pdf/figueiredo-vicious.pdf>) University of California, San Diego [Date of consultation: October 27, 2012].
- de la Calle L, Sanchz-Cuneca I (2006). "The Production of Terrorist Violence: Analyzing Target Selection in the IRS and ETA" Paper available at http://www.yale.edu/macmillan/ocvprogram/OCV_Calle.pdf
- Dode R, Ufomba H (2014). "A Game-Theoretic Assumption on the Nature of The Interaction Between Victim State And Terrorist Organization Using The Eminue-Ufomba Model. *J. Conflictol.. Spring* 5(1). <http://journals.uoc.edu/index.php/journal-of-conflictology/article/viewFile/vol5iss1-joc/vol5iss1-joc-en>
- Drake CJM (1998) "The Role of Ideology in Terrorist's Target Selection". *Terrorism Pol. Violence* 10:53-85.
- Eminue O, Ufomba H (2011) "Modeling Terrorist Target Selection: Organski's Power Transition Theory" *Def. Sec. Anal.* 27(4):375-382.
- Feng Y, Kugler J, Swaminathom S, Zak P (2008). "Path to Prosperity: The Dynamics of Freedom and Economic Development" *Int. Interactions* 34(4):423-441.

- Fogel RW (2007). *Capitalism and Democracy in 2040: Forecasts and Speculation*. National Bureau of Economics Research.
- Hoffman AM (2010). "Voice and Silence" Why Groups Take Credit For Acts of Terror". *J. Peace Res* 47(5):615-626.
- Kang K, Kugler J (2007) "Conditional Deterrence: Why Do Actors Engage in Extreme Wars?" Paper delivered at the Annual Meeting of the Peace Science Society, Columbia, Sc. November 2-4.
- Kim W (1996). "Power Parity, Alliance and War from 1648 to 1975" In: J. Kugler and P. Lemke, eds., *Parity and War: Evaluations and Extensions of the War Ledger*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press pp.93-105.
- Kim W (1991). "Alliance Transitions and Great Power War" *Am. J. Pol. Sci.* 35:833-850.
- Kim W (1992) "Power Transitions and Great Power War from Westphalia to Waterloo" *World Pol.* 45:153-172.
- Kugler J, Lemke D (1996). *Parity and War: Evaluations and Extensions of the War Ledger*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Lake D (2002). "Rational Extremism: Understanding Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century" *Dialog-Int. Org.* 1(1):15-29.
- Lapan H, Sandler T (1988). "To Bargain or not to Bargain: That is the Question". *Am. Econ. Rev.* 78:16-31.
- Lemke D (2002). *Regions of War and Peace*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Lemke D, Werner S (1996). "Power Parity, Commitment to change and War" *Int. Stud. Q.* 40:235-260.
- Maddison A (2003) *The World Economy: Historical Statistics*. OECD.
- Mathews T, Lowenberg A (2012). "The Interdependence between Homeland Security Efforts of A State and A Terrorist's choice of Attack" *Conf. Manage. Peace Sci.* 29:195-218.
- Nemeth S (2010). *A Rationalist Explanation of Terrorist Targeting*. Ph.D Dissertation. University of Iowa.
- Organski AFK (1958). *World Politics*. New York. Alfred A. Knopf.
- Pape R (2003). "The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism". *Am. Pol. Sci. Rev.* 97:343-361.
- Pape R (2005). *Dying to Win: The Strategic of Suicide Bombing*. New York. Random House.
- Tammen R (2008). "The Organski Legacy: A Fifty Year Research Program" *Int Interactions* 34(4):314-332.
- Tammen RL (2008). "The Organiski Legacy: A Fifty-Year Research Program" *Dicocco and Levy ed Int. Interactions* 34 (4):314-332.
- Tammen RL, Kugler J, Lemke D, Stam A, Abdollahian M, ALsharabati C, Efird B, Organski AFK (2000). *Power Transitions: Strategies for the Twenty-First Century*. New York. Chatham House.
- Ufomba H (2013). *National Power AS A Critical Terrorist Target Choice: A Dataset of The Activities of The JamaaAhl al-Sunnah li-da'wawa al-Jihad (Boko Haram) Sect in Nigeria (2009-2012)* Berkeley Electronic Press. Available at http://www.academia.edu/4754244/National_Power_As_A_Critical_Terrorist_Target_Choice_A_Dataset_on_The_Activities_of_The_JamaaAhl_al-Sunnah_li-dawawa_al-Jihad_Boko_Haram_Sect_in_Nigeria_2009-2012_
- Wilson D, Purushothaman R (2003). *Dreaming with the BRICS: The Path to 2050*, Global Economics paper 99, Goldman Sachs.

Review

Elites and exclusive politics in Sub-Saharan African

Ibrahim Baba

Department of Public Administration, Mai Idris Alooma Polytechnic, P. M. B 1020 Geidam, Yobe State, Nigeria.

Received 13 February, 2014; Accepted 22 August, 2014

This paper examines democracy as a major and popular form of government which is finding ground across the African continent. The study also examines the degree to which political power is concentrated in the hands of elites while the ordinary citizens are relegated to voting alone when elections are due shortly after which they are soon forgotten in the governance of state affairs. Conducted with the use of secondary sources of data collection, the work examines some of the reasons responsible for the concentration of political power in the hands of few and the exclusion of the majority from the governance of state affairs. The article also explores some alternative solution to this type of political exclusion and concentration of power in the hands of the elites in sub-Saharan Africa since the end of colonialism in many countries in this region of the continent.

Key words: Elites, Sub-Saharan Africa, democracy, government, elections, colonialism.

INTRODUCTION

The point at which slavery ends, freedom is expected to begin. At the expiration of alien rule in countries across sub-Saharan Africa, the class which captured political power is itself a colonially manufactured segment within the society. The fact that occupation of elective positions is determined by the highest number of votes scored in election makes democracy a form of government consolidated on majoritarian principle. The rotation of political power or elective positions and public leadership among persons of the same class and social strata equally implies that politics which breeds leaderships is in the hands of the elites. The stratification of African societies along economic patterns was part of the colonial government political engineering directed towards the establishment of an agent with which state power would

be entrusted at the termination of colonial rule. The elites with whom state power was entrusted have continued to serve as domestic collaborators of the metropolitan bourgeoisie in perpetuating economic domination of African societies even in the post-colonial era. This has made the elites completely conceived by those they govern as the domestic agents of imperialism in Africa. State leadership in the modern era and democratic dispensation is a property of the majority segment of the society. Across sub-Saharan Africa, the ordinary citizens are the majority. Besides social stratification, other factors like tribe, religion, etc. play a major role in the people's choice of leadership when elections are due. The accentuation to political power of citizen from the working or labor class in sub-Saharan region of the

E-mail: babaibrahim194@yahoo.com. Tel: +2348082676186.

Author agree that this article remain permanently open access under the terms of the [Creative Commons Attribution License 4.0 International License](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/)

continent is often difficult. In cases where this has turned around to be possible, elites are in such cases not only aware but also in support of this cross class transfer of political power under a severe agreement and conspiracy to use the installed leader as a stooge for actualizing elites agenda and conspiracy.

Political power in a modern state, government and democracy is a popular instrument fabricated by the supports of the majority. Power is not an exclusive reserve right of the elites. It belongs to both the elites and the masses. The decision of who governs is not an exclusive power of the elites. It is the power of the entire citizens in their capacity as the total members of the society to and which they are all components. Sovereignty resides in the people in a democratic state. Inclusive politics is a good condition for the promotion of democratic governance. The act of circulating power among persons of the same social strata and class is an exclusive principle because it keeps away the majority from the governance of state and political power. The mobility of political power from one clique to another within the same social class and strata is a negation of inclusive principle which popular regime and government encourages.

In human society, all cannot be leaders. But the power to decide who rules is not also the function of few as obtained in some countries of sub-Saharan Africa. Through popular participation in election by voting in open, free and fair elections which are also periodic, the people equally participate in deciding who governs or rule them. Inclusive politics implies a system where majority without segregation are in as much as they fulfill the required conditions are allowed to participate in voting. After which they through their representatives can also participate in governance of the affairs of the same state to which they are also members.

The power to decide who rule the state belongs actually to the people. They can exercise this power through franchise. Whoever is chosen by the majority in a democratic state to occupy state leadership position automatically becomes leader. This selection is best done through voting in an open, free and fair election. The power to nominate candidate to contest for elective position is done by political party in a democratic state and system. Political party is membered by persons from different social strata and class. Therefore, for persons from the same social strata and class to always emerge as nominees of party when elections are due is clearly an indication that elites have excluded persons of other classes from the leadership of state affairs in sub-Saharan Africa. Elites' persistent consolidation of tight grip on state power and exclusion of some kinds of political tensions which if care is not taken may later on triggered social revolution in sub-Saharan states of Africa the way it has happened in the North African Arabian states of Tunisia and Egypt.

LITERATURE REVIEW

In Plato's academy, Aristotle pointed out that man by nature is a political animal. Hobbes, Locke's and Rousseau under the social contract theory also observed that men are moved to action not by intellect or reasoning but by appetite, desire and passion. Democracy was not only adopted as a form of majoritarian rule to give the citizens the opportunity to participate in the election of their leaders into elective positions. But it was adopted as an alternative to control the animalistic tendencies of men in politics and state leadership.

The political systems in Africa have undergone unprecedented change. The democracy revolution detonated by changes in global power calculus following the end of the cold war in addition to international and domestic pressures compelled African states and governments to adopt multi-party system and democracy (Abrahamsen, 1997, Gana, 1995; Whitehead, 1996, Diamond et al., 1997). This system resulted however, in majoritarian principle which democracy and multi-party system is often associated with. The concentration and rotation of state power among a selected clique of persons within the wider populace is itself not a reflection of inclusive politics as democracy requires. Elites have formed a clique to rotate state power among themselves due to their economic status and social influence, what Hornby (2001) refers to as elite. The concentration and rotation of state power within a clique of persons due to their economic status and social influence have resulted in exclusive and elite politics in states across the sub-Saharan region of Africa.

Elites rule and politics is, in practice, rule on behalf of the vested interests of elites. It is not a justification of majority principle. As argued by Mosca, Pareto and Plato, elites rule and politics in democracy do not reflect a true protection of majority interest because it is a product of elitism which believes that government ought in principle, always and everywhere, to be confined to elites. Some commentators regard majority principle as self-evidently the appropriate way of determining law or policy of state rather than resulting to personal views of selected persons usually known as elites. Legitimate political authority expresses the will of the majority. And as evident in Locke and Rousseau, majoritarian principle refers to the consent of the majority which in most cases represents the common good of the people (McClean and McMillan, 2003).

The modern state, for practical purposes, consists of a relatively small number of persons who issue and execute orders which affect a larger number in whom they are themselves include; and it is of the essence of its character that, within its allotted territory, all citizens are legally bound by those orders (Laski, 1982). States in Africa are modern from all aspects and ramifications. Both the smaller and larger number of persons who

execute and obey orders is all citizens of the state. Therefore, laws made and obeyed must be in the common interest of the state and of all its citizens but not of few or smaller number who issue and execute such laws. The small and larger number of persons as Laski (1982) posits can be referred to as the elites and non-elite citizens.

Political liberty as Appadurai (2006) submits is the indispensable minimum factor of democratic form of government. Inherent in this liberty as Laski (1982) asserts are the equal rights of all normal adults to vote and stand as candidates for election as well as equal eligibility for executive, judicial and elective offices provided the essential qualifications for the performance of these duties are satisfied. In Africa, democracy seems to be dodging away from this factor. By virtue of economic status and social influence, both the elites and masses can vote but on the other hand, the financial implication attached to standing as candidate for election has excluded the masses from enjoying such rights and made it a sort of politically reserve right of the elites.

In fact, small groups of elites which dominate politics, intellectual capital and business are at the heart of the failures of most African countries since independence. As a result of these privileged, minorities have become richer and more entrenched, while the poor segments of the African societies have become poorer. Most of today's African elite come from the educated political class of the first independence movements, traditional leaders or royalty and were the power brokers under the colonial system. In some African countries, departing colonial powers deliberately created small black elite, often from one ethnic group, as part of their divide-and-rule policy. These post-independence elites in politics, business and civil society formed a new aristocracy or network, had access to lucrative government jobs and contracts, secured public service promotion and benefited from economic empowerment and affirmative programs at independence to replace local ownership and representation in property, business and the economy; the beneficiaries were mostly elites from the dominant independence party (Gumede, 2010).

South Africa's African National Congress (ANC), Zimbabwe's Zanu-PF, Mozambique's Frelimo and Angola's MPLA are good examples of independence parties which created avenue for elites to capture and control state economic and political powers. Although the emergence of narrow elites challenging the control of state economic and political power by a group of the same people seems to be springing up across Africa. The activities of Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) and Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) in both Zimbabwe and Kenya which forced the ruling elites into adopting a power sharing deal and government of national unity are good examples of these challenges. Although far from emerging narrow elites constituting

themselves into opposition movements and parties to challenge the persistent control of state power and economy by old established elites, Wanda (2010) opines that referenda may be the panacea to tackle Africa's entrenched elites.

Africa's entrenched elites by virtue of their economic and political power have always influenced public policies and decisions made by them in order to consolidate their control over state affairs at the expense of the people they govern. State policies, laws and decisions are made to favor and protect the interests of those who made them but actually for the protection of the majority interests.

DISCUSSION

The majoritarian principle promoted by liberal democracy imported into Africa from abroad may be to larger extent alien and unfamiliar to the particular generation which witnessed the transfer of political power from colonial to indigenous rule. But with time, this principle of allowing majority to participate in the election of representatives and leaders into elective positions through open, free and fair election is quickly gaining ground, popularity and acceptability among the current generation. This pattern of popularity which ought to make public leadership open to persons from various strata and segments of the society has only succeeded in giving the elite class the opportunity to dominate politics, consolidate their grips on state power, rotate same within themselves and turn persons from the other classes especially proletariats into instruments of gaining political power.

Economic power to a larger extent plays a vital role in the achievement of political power. The economy in post-colonial African states is in the hands of the elites and also partly in the hands of the metropolitan bourgeoisie. The economic interest of the northern hemispheric states and capitalists in Africa which has continued to necessitate their supports for the elites conceive as their domestic collaborators contributes seriously to the promotion of elite's dominance and exclusion of the masses from the political leadership of states affairs across the sub-Saharan region of the African continent.

The elites are just a minor portion of the population of sub-Saharan Africa. The fact that this minor segment of the population control states economies across this region of the continent has also continued to give the class an upper hand and advantage over the poor majority who have nothing other than their sweats to sell in return for money. Elites in this region of the continent are very good at taking advantage of the poverty from which the masses are suffering to not only dominate the masses but also to rotate state leadership among themselves and exclude the masses politically from the governance of state and public affairs.

Electoral laws and policies of states in Africa's sub-Saharan region are designed to favor the elites. These laws are designed by elite themselves in protection of class political interest. In cases where others are represented in adopting such policies and laws, their inputs do not have reasonable effects to make on the life and interests of the groups they represents. Elites are the dominant members of parliament in African countries south of the Sahara. They make laws for the states and consider certain sensitive national issues before they are implemented by the state or government. By so doing, elite influence state acts in its member's interests. The exorbitant rate at which forms are purchase at political party level to be able to contest in party primaries and also for elective positions when elections are due is a reflection of the view that elective positions are beyond the reach of the ordinary citizens who are battling to overcome the burden of subsistence. Masses are not financially buoyant to shoulder the type of extravagances that are connected with campaigns prior to conduct of elections in South Saharan Africa. Money politics incubated by elite is a political strategy of excluding the masses from having access to public or state leadership in this region of the continent. This logically leads not only to exclusive politics but also the concentration of state leadership and political power in the hands of members of the elite class.

Conclusion

Democracy and political party politics seems to be getting funny and childish in action across sub-Saharan Africa with time. Masses are only needed when it is time to vote. As soon as elections are over, little or none is needed from them as contribution in decision making and government are formed with the supports or votes casted by them. This pattern of political exclusion in this region of the continent is another form of political domination and disenfranchisement. Elite rotates political power among themselves while the masses can only provide votes needed to authenticate the elite control of state power. State economy found control in the hands of elites. But then, one thing as Gumedede (2010) believes seems certain, unless the traditional elite in many African countries become more inclusive and open their doors to wider cross section of the society, widespread prosperity will remain elusive.

Conflict of Interests

The author has not declared any conflict of interests.

REFERENCES

- Abrahamsen B (1997). *Military Professionalism and Political Power*. California; Beverly Hills Sage.
- Appadurai AA (2006). *The Substance of Politics*. (Revised Edition). New Delhi; Oxford University Press.
- Diamond L, Kirke-Greene A, Oyediran O (1997). *Transition without End*. Ibadan; Vintage Publishers International Limited.
- Gana AT (1995). *The Limits of Political Engineering; A Critique of Transition Program*. Jos; Covenant Press.
- Gumedede WM (2010). "Toast Masters". In *BBC Focus on Africa Magazine*. October-December 2010 21(4):22-23.
- Hornby AS (2001). *Oxford Advanced Learners Dictionary of Current English* (6th Edition). New York; Oxford University Press.
- Laski HJ (1982). *A Grammar Politics*. (7th Impression). London; Allen and Unwin.
- Mclean I, McMillan A (2003). *Oxford Concise Dictionary of Politics*. New York; Oxford University Press.
- Wanda RE (2010). "The Big Question". In *BBC Focus on Africa Magazine*. October-December 2010, Vol 21, No.4, P 24.
- Whitehead L (1996). *Transition from Authoritarian Rule*. Baltimore; Johns Hopkins University Press.

Review

Analysis of the current democratic wave in the Arab world: Lessons and implications

Edun, Abdulkareem Jimoh and Lawal*, Azeez Tunbosun*

Kwara State College of Education, Ilorin, P.M.B. 1527, Ilorin, Kwara State, Nigeria.

Received 24 January, 2013; Accepted 10 September, 2014

The Arab world which occupies the vast desert land of the Middle East is one of the most blessed in natural resources and with a peculiar socio-political setting distinct from the West. This oil rich region which has over the years been governed by monarchical rule witnessed an unrest that started at the end of 2010 attracting interest in the western democracies, in the middle and near eastern nations, whose instability will compel changes in western policies for the region. However, this paper, using both political economy and political culture approach, sought to extricate the dichotomy between the Arab world and the west in terms of political ideology. The central argument of this paper is that the current Arab revival is not a trend but rather a long time project designed by western powers and therefore posited that democratization should be a home grown process and the west may not be able to achieve politically in its current bid to democratize or “liberalize” the desert except it incorporates Islamic-political culture in its effort. More importantly, the west needs to carry along the Arabian government and its people for the full actualization of its interest(s) in the Middle East and desist from using ‘force’ on the people to accept a new form of political administration.

Key words: Arab spring, western liberalization, political transitions, democratic wave.

INTRODUCTION

The political whirlwind that is sweeping across the Arab world can be regarded as the consolidation of the fourth wave of democratization process. The first wave which was the suffrage aggregation in United States of America began in 1820 and ended in 1926 with about 29 democracies as a consequence, while the triumph of Allied forces in World War II heralded the second wave. The propagation of democracy in 1974 to the Latin American nations made the third wave. Though, for every wave, there is always a link to dictators; examples are Benito Mussolini of Italy, Adolf Hitler of Germany and

Alfredo Stroessner of Paraguay among others. Franco of Spain brought the first wave to a halt while the ideological contest between capitalism and socialism brought the second wave to its end. In the mid 1970s the third wave of democratization began, continuing in force through the 1990s and 2000s with the end of the cold war (Strand, 2012; Samuel, 1991). However, the wind of the current wave that blew across the Arab world has been described as “Arab revival”, “Arab awakening”, “Arab Hurricane”, “Arab Spring”, “Arab Tsunami” or “Arab political whirlwind”, and various titles have been given to

*Corresponding author. E-mail: bosunlawal@gmail.com.

the current political tide in Arabian peninsular. It started in Tunisia as a reaction to injustice and monumental inequality that existed in the political system but is about to consume almost all Arab countries from Tunisia, Libya, Syria, Yemen, Saudi Arabia to Bahrain. Presently in Syria the dimension has taken a violent form and there seems to be no end to the political virus.

Though, some called it a trend but there has been a long term design by European community to open up Arab's Middle East to the outside world. In the 1990s, it code-named Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), and the September 11 attack made it mandatory to change the name therefore, it become the Greater Middle East Initiative (GMEI) which legalized the invasion of Iraq and Lebanon by the world powers and their allies.

However, by 2004, the G.8 group of industrialized countries comprising USA, France, Italy, Germany, Britain and Russia assumed the post of prophets of democracy and mildly or violently, democracy must be the world religion irrespective of the political culture of any country. Therefore, the name Broader, Middle East Initiative (BMEI) was adopted in June 2004 by the G.8 in Sea Island summit, Georgia.

This paper, therefore, examines the current wave in the Arab world using mixed methodology of political economy and political culture.

The paper is divided into three segments. The first segment formed the introduction, the second segment examined the current wave in the Arab world and made attempt to create a dichotomy between the Arab world and Western world. The segment also encapsulates deep historical root of the Arab world and explained the factors that accounted for the present trend. The last segment is the concluding chapter which encompasses the recommendations.

Arab political whirlwind: Trend or project

Arabian states emerged as a response to Ottoman autocratic regime. It was as a result of spontaneous resentment by Arab-speaking countries to this empire in the 1916 that gave birth to Arab nationalism. The intellectuals and local chiefs backed by the British, requested for instructions in the Arabic language, greater local autonomy and protection of Arab rights within Ottoman Empire and promotion of Arab unity. This revolt instigated by external forces was the first provocative or violent reaction from Arab people against their leaders which based on false promises made by the British government to them i.e. the recognition of Palestine as a sovereign state but instead of this, British and European countries gave recognition to the Jewish homeland in Palestine (Ayyad, 1999). However, a symbolic movement of this revival was that Christians share the course of Arabs at the early stage and there was clear dichotomy between Arabism and Islamic religion. Though, majority

of the population were predominantly Muslims, there were various religious faithful which differed from Muslim, and Arabism was only used as a language thus it became the strongest and greatest weapons of nation-building; mean-while, this position does not suggest that Islamic religion has no influence on Arabism or the course of Pan-Arabism. In fact, Islamic culture had been more prominent even among non-Islamic adherents. Daniel, (1999:60) pointed out this fact when he opined that:

Although many early champions of Arabism were Christians who stressed Arabism ethnic and secular content drew from Islam and its rapid rise can be partially attributed to its piggybacking on an existing Islamic identity. Whether Arabism and Islam were so intertwined that they were indistinguishable to the region's inhabitants is a matter of historical and scholarly dispute.

Even if that is the case, Islam and Arabism cannot be divorced from each other, Islam and democracy is not also at parallel to each other. At least, some Islamic doctrines meet requirements of minimum democracy. There are three basic tenets of minimal democracy – constitution, participation and equity. Islam too favours these three *tenets-shura* which enjoins Islamic leaders to consult their subjects for the decision to be taken, *Ijma* which means important state policies must be arrived at consensus, the Zakat – redistributive tax which means universalism and egalitarian society is part and parcel of Islam. Nakhle, (2009:66) rightly observed:

Even though, citizens of these Arab countries have long yearn for American style of democratization America exert great influence in fuelling the trend. Most of these countries Egypt, Syria, Tunisia, Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Uzbekistan, Yemen, Jordan are key allied of western power and they are able to use the pretext of war against terrorism to politically imprisoned the opposition political parties. They often speak in the language of democracy but resist genuine calls for political reforms. They paint all opposition – secular and Islamic with the same broad brush and either exclude them from the political process or co-opt them into acquiescence.

Nadar (2009:41) also opined:

The terrorist act of September 11, 2011 gave many of these regimes an excuse to silence all forms of opposition in the name of fighting terrors – and they use their anti-terrorism rhetoric to garner western support for their repressive policies.

However, it should be noted that the missing gap between Islamic culture and Western political culture is individualism, liberalism and the guarantee of fundamental human rights. Democracy stems from Christian religion

and Christianity has its root from Judaism. Judaism is an aspect of European culture which has been able to penetrate and permeate the national political system in such a manner that no matter how prosperous and peaceful a country is, it must imbibe the culture of individualism and liberalism which entails both social and economic liberalism. It has been observed recently that economic liberalism always leads to collapse of state economy (Italy, Greece, Spain and Portugal are in economic crises). This crises are labelled Euro Zone debt and can only be brought to a halt with the support of periphery resources and this might partly be accounted for reasons why G-8 were desperate to liberate Arabian economy in the name of spreading democracy. One begins to unfold the rationale behind France's distribution of fire-arms to Benghazi civilians in Libya under the pretext of protecting civilians during the Libya crises and the supply of illegal fire arms to Syrian rebels by the great powers such as USA and Britain through Saudi Arabia and Turkey. This action has led to illegal possession of arms by individuals and rebels and this also led to the attack of the American embassy in Benghazi and resulted into the death of America ambassadors and other American citizens at the consulate office. It is in this light that Russian foreign affairs minister maintained at the just concluded UN general meeting of September, 2012 that Middle East should be a zone free weapon of mass destruction if the world at large should have peace (Al-Jazeera, September 28, 2012).

It is paramount to state here that the enthronement of democracy needs no violent transition and rather democratic transition must be peaceful to achieve the set objectives of democracy. And in this line Ibrahim and Samir (2011:42) maintained;

Sustainability or consolidation is a key concern for theoreticians of democratic transition, and is said to occur when democracy becomes the only game in town, i.e. when no significant political group seriously attempts to overthrow the democratic regime to promote domestic or international violence in order to secede from the State.

Social liberalism always creates social vices such as gay and homosexuality which eventually create crack in the social fabrics of the society. The aftermath of the crises in Libya has been able to prove the pundits wrong that giving weaponry and psychological support to certain groups in the country is not the best option to unseat a dictatorship regime. These groups (Militant) have turned into rebels and threatened the "imposed" democratic regime. The same pattern of unseating autocratic regime in Egypt, Tunisia, Yemen and Libya is also been played out in Syria.

Meanwhile, the leaders of these western powers acknowledged this inseparability of culture from political system. Obama Hussein Barrack, the present America

president belittled secularists. Obama in Hashemi (2009) maintained:

Secularists are wrong when they ask believers to leave their religion at the door before entering into the public square. Frederick Douglas, Abraham Lincoln, William Jennings Bryan, Dorothy Day, Martin Luther King – indeed, the majority of great reformers in American history were not only motivated by faith but repeatedly used religious language to their causes. So to say that men and women should not inject their personal morality into public debate is a practical absurdity. Our law is by definition a codification of morality, much of it grounded in the Judeo tradition.

The indivisibility of culture from politics could also be seen in Chinese and Japanese political system. Today, the two countries are the leading economy in the world and their Confucian heritage is consciously inherent in their political system. This is the main argument of conflict between Islam and the West; it is a clash of civilization. Therefore, one wonders if the clash is really a clash of enthronement of democracy in the Arab world or a war between Jihad and Mcworld. As observed by Markdish (2010: 58),

In some of its more recent recasting, the slightly more sophisticated thesis defines the problem in terms of a fundamental contrast between the world of Jihad, the ancient forces of cultures, geography, tradition and community and commercialized "Mcworld" of high-tech consumerism and globalized presence of profit may be antagonistic but they are also inter-connected. Mcworld represents the natural culmination of a modernization process – some would call it westernization that has gone on since the Renaissance birth of modern.

Ibrahim and Samir (2011:7) went further to buttress this point when he says "Mcworld predominates in the modernized West, symbolized by America. Its template is America, its form is style. It is about culture as a commodity appeared as ideology".

There is no controversy surrounding the fact that the current trend in the Arab world is a design manufactured by Western powers to impose their democracy on the Arab world. What is happening in today's Arab world is not democratization but rather liberalization of Arab world by Mcworld so that they will have unfiltered access to the economy at region and probably to protect the interest of Israel in the Middle East.

Larbi (2009:36) maintained that "it is not in the interest of the West, especially America for democracy to exist in the Arab region." Arab world spreading from the Gulf of Middle East up to the North of Africa consists of about twenty three countries of the world with a population of about one and half billion (1.5bn). However, as small as

the population of the region, they contribute two third of the world oil reserve. In fact, with the whole world relying on oil for survival, it behooves on the "World" at large to ensure peace and security in the region.

Heart of the world as Arab world could be referred to as an important strategic interest of the G-8 and they have to do everything possible to democratize or "liberalize" the region. A deceit nuclear war against Iraq led to invasion of a sovereign nation, collaboration with autocratic regimes in the name of fighting terrorism and today uprooting the same regimes implanted by them in the name of liberalism and human rights. Most of these now called autocratic regimes live on the support of the West when they face strong and militant opposition internally. Prior to the latest move by G-8, most of these Arab worlds were in stable economic position. Today, Arab world has been brought into ruins with action and inactions of this G-8. The invasion of Iraq has increased the spate of terrorism, Sudan has disintegrated into two states with the newest 193rd nation of South Sudan, Afghanistan has become theater of war, Libya a once buoyant economy under Gaddafi has become a market place for distribution of ammunition with Benghazi riddling in arm proliferation courtesy of France humanitarian assistance and the capital Tripoli now became a testing ground for NATO's newly acquired war ammunition. Syria crisis has developed into "war within" and this has given the whole world a rethink on how best to spread democracy. The reflection of this could be seen in the accusation and counter during the last general assembly meeting of the UN that the organization has failed.

Yemen, Syria, Bahrain, Tunisia and even Saudi Arabia are not left out. For Egypt, protest has now become a tool to halt both political and economic progress of the state. On the aftermath of the political revival in Egypt, America and her allies have given millions of dollars to Egypt to revive their economy and billions will also come if they pursue liberal economic policy. For one, America's economy at home is in danger and notable European Union member states economy is in disarray too. One therefore, wonders if these countries are charity organizations or there is more to their motive.

In essence, the plan of G-8 on Arab world to install democracy may not materialize. One, the chance of Western democracy to work out in Arab world is slim partly because of deficit or lack of Western institutions to support democracy to work at home and the implication of this externally instigated Arab revival is that the whole world will continue to live in perpetual fear because of the insecurity in the Middle East. Larbi (2009:09) rightly observed:

Wars are barbaric and therefore there is no 'good' and 'bad' barbarism. It is fundamentally flawed by the fact that great powers in the pursuit of their international policies may do things that suit their champions of human rights,

and be aware of the publicity value of doing so, but is, quite incidental to their purpose, which if they think it necessary, are today pursued with the ruthless barbarism that heritage of the twentieth century.

The fight may not between Muslim and G-8, the fight is between G-8 and their sponsored autocratic regimes. Hossein Mubarak, former president of Egypt banned Muslim brotherhood from participating in politics; today the ban has been lifted; brotherhood are now in control of government. In other Arab countries too, Syria, Yemen, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, it has always been the case of denying Muslims their Islamic rights. Democratization is not a one way traffic and as such it should not be Eurocentric, if meaningful and world global human right is to be achieved.

Linz and Stephan in Ibrahim and Samir (2011:120) state six conditions needed for a democracy to be consolidated:

An authoritative state, a lively civil society, an autonomous political society, the prevalence of the rule of law, an effective state bureaucracy and an institutionalized economic society.

Conclusion

The paper therefore argued that much of what is inherent in democracy is not antithetical to Arab world or Islamic ideology such as consultation, participation, equality and egalitarian society. More importantly the current political whirlwind blowing across the Arab region was majorly externally-motivated by G-8 who disguisedly preach and proclaim liberalism to the Arab world, though, there have been grumbling and reactions internally such as alienation of a particular tribe or sect from participation in government, economic and social- political injustice.

The bottom line of the paper is that the current wave in Arabian peninsular is not democratization but rather liberation process engineered by G-8 group with collaboration of certain internal elements to capture Arab region for economic exploitation and political reasons. One wonder, the use of gun in promoting democracy in the Arab region. The region that is known for relative economic stability has been thrown into turmoil by G-8 through their destructive tool of NATO and the implication of this external engineered liberation and destruction of both human and material resources in this region will not augur well for the whole world whose peace is germane to the world peace and security. What Arab world need is not external engineered liberalism but rather an authority whom will be drawn from people and accountable to the people on their home grown political culture. After all, China a world leading economy today groomed its political system from her Confucian ideology. The current project of G-8 in Arab region is the reminiscence of

gunboat democracy and it may not achieve much in terms of planting real democracy in the Arab world but what the West need to do is to provide and maintain democratic institutions in these countries and allow the Arabian people to see the benefit of democracy and thereby adopt it willingly.

Conflict of Interests

The authors have not declared any conflict of interests.

REFERENCES

- Ayyad AA (1999). Arab Nationalism and the Palestinians 1850-1939, Palestinian Academic Society for the study of International affairs available at www.passia.org/publications/Arab-Nationalism/Arabs-Nationalism.pdf (Accessed: 05 January, 2013).
- Daniel EP (1999). Islamic political culture, democracy and human rights, A comparative study. London: West Port Connecticut.
- Hashemi AAMS (2009). Transcript of Interview With Ahmadinejad Aide Mojtaba Samareh Hashemi. Thursday, June 18, 2009. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/06/18/AR2009061803823.html>
- Ibrahim E, Samir M (2011). Democracy in the Arab World, explain the Deficit. USA: Routledge. <http://www.amazon.com/Democracy-Arab-World-Explaining-Routledge/dp/0415779995>
- Larbi S (2009). Rethinking Arab democratization: Elections without democracy. New York: Oxford University press.
- Nadar M (2009). Islam, Secularism, and Liberal Democracy. New York: Oxford University press.
- Nakhlen SA (2009). A necessary engagement, reinventing America relationship with Muslim world. New Jersey: Princeton University press.
- Nathan JB (2003). Palestinian politics after the Oslo Accords, Resuming Arab-Palestine. London: University of California press.
- Samuel HP (1991). The third wave: Democratization in the late twentieth century. Norman, O.K. and London: Unwen City of Oklahoma press.
- Strand H (2012). Why waves? Global patterns of Democratization, 1820-2008 folk.vio.no/hahegre/paper/whywaves_2012.pdf.

Full Length Research Paper

A critical analysis of whether Zimbabwe can achieve economic development through its 'Look East Policy'

Shingairai Belinda Mudavanhu

Zimbabwe Open University, P.B. 684 Bindura, Zimbabwe.

Received 9 January, 2013; Accepted 17 September, 2014

The aim of the paper is to critically analyse the potential of Zimbabwe's foreign policy, specifically the *Look East Policy* at stimulating economic development and growth. This analysis is based solely on selected secondary material. In response to external and internal pressure, the government of Zimbabwe redesigned its foreign policy outlook with the aim of establishing relations with countries in the East like China as an alternative to the fragmented links with the West. Zimbabwe's target is to create and sustain relations with states that it supposedly shares common goals with. China, regardless of its famous proclamation that it is driven by a desire to help the oppressed, pursues foreign policies that promote its own national interests. China is seeking opportunities to boost its economic and political status in the international system. Zimbabwe, while seeking similar goals, lacks proper guiding structures and appears to be closely associated with ZANU-PF to an extent that one is tempted to conclude that it is more of a political slogan rather than a proper foreign policy. Zimbabwe has turned into a predatory state which is on the verge of total collapse. The ruling elite are concerning themselves with security political posts as a means to accessing personal wealthy at the expense of national development. The potential of the LEP can only be realised when Zimbabwe policy makers put the needs of electorates ahead of personal gains and develop a strategic approach to its relationship with Beijing. The government of Zimbabwe needs to realise that if China does indeed become a super power it is likely going to impose its will on its weaker associates. Before positive economic development outcomes can be produced by the LEP, Zimbabwe has to change its position in this partnership.

Key words: *Look East Policy*, economic development, failed state, sovereignty, state.

INTRODUCTION

The Look East Policy (LEP) is basically a country's relationship with states in the East such as China, Korea, Japan, Malaysia, and India just to mention a few. For Zimbabwe the policy was created as a response to the effects of the sanctions that were imposed on Zimbabwe

by the Western states. These sanctions are viewed differently by various groups. The government of Zimbabwe views the sanctions as a way to force Mugabe and African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) out of office, and those who support sanctions see it as a

E-mail: sbmudavanhu@yahoo.co.uk.

Author agree that this article remain permanently open access under the terms of the [Creative Commons Attribution License 4.0 International License](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/)

way to encourage democratisation and respect of human rights. Zimbabwe has not been able to trade and sustain its relations with most states and organisations in the West because of the sanctions and continues to face economic, social and political challenges.

In order to understand the kind of foreign policies present in Africa, one has to first of all understand the kind of states that exist in the Third world. A state by definition is a political entity which has sovereignty. The four legal criteria of statehood are permanent population, defined territory over which a country exercises authority, a central government and the capacity to enter into relations with other entities (Clapham, 1996). A sovereign state should be able to establish order, ensure protection and provide for its population. In the strictest sense of the term, most of the entities in Africa fail to meet the four requirements for statehood and hence they are often referred to as quasi-states. Given the artificiality of African states, their sovereignty, borders and ability in a classic realist sense has been ambiguous (Wright, 1999).

'Quasi-states' can be categorised as dysfunctional, failing, failed and collapsed. An example of a collapsed state would be Somalia (Nkiwane, 2001). On the ninth annual Failed States Index (2013), Somalia is ranked 1 and Zimbabwe is ranked 10. The definition of a failed state entails not only poor economic performance but the breakdown of the viability and legitimacy of states (Kovacs, 2012). Rotberg (2002) classifies a failed state as one that is performing badly in its security ability, political participation, social service provision and ability to solve conflict. Using Rotberg's (2002) indicators of state failure, Zimbabwe is definitely a failed state. Zimbabwe is guilty of turning the security apparatus against its own populace, it has suppressed freedom of political participation and democracy. Zimbabwe is failing to adequately provide social services. In addition to being a failed state, Zimbabwe has also become a predatory state (Maudeni, 2002).

Evans (1995) defines predatory states as those that have elites who take large amounts of wealth and resources for their own personal gain, such that they impede economic, social and political transformation. Those in power plunder with disregard to the welfare of the masses. In predatory states wealth comes from political power. Hence those in power are rich and influential. In addition to wealth the ruling elite has monopoly over the state's security apparatus resources, and use violence and suppression as tools to secure political power (Rivero, 2008). A close look at the political scenario in Zimbabwe suggests that the fastest way to acquire wealth is through a political seat. Such a scenario has led those in power to clinging onto state power through enacting laws and acts that protect them and ensure their survival. Bratton and Masunungure (2011) argue that in Zimbabwe state officials have been allowed to secure enormous personal profits without any repercussions. The ruling elite remain indifferent to the country's economic downfall and

perceive economic growth and democracy as obstacles that would decrease their relative power. The policies being implemented by ZANU-PF are intended to cement their rule internally. Examples of such policies are the LEP, Operation Murambatsvina (Restore Order) Indigenisation and Empowerment act and the recent Zimbabwe Agenda for Sustainable Socio-Economic Transformation (ZIM ASSET). These are just a few of the many misguided policies aimed at restoring political hegemony out of fear of the opposition (Kovacs, 2012). Understanding the nature of African states helps shed light on the kind of the foreign policies being produced (Clapham, 1996). Literature on the kind of states that exist in Africa characterises Zimbabwe as a predatory state (Evans, 1995), and a failed state (Nkiwane, 2001; Rotberg, 2002; Kovacs, 2012).

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The study of international relations is informed by many diverse theories. For purposes of this discussion only three theories are examined namely; (neo)-realism, liberalism and constructivism. The main assumptions of each theory are examined briefly and illustrated using examples from Zimbabwe and China. The main aim is to see the extent to which relationship between Zimbabwe and China can be explained using these theories.

Realism is the main theoretical framework in International Relations. Realists believe the principal aim of a state is survival, states are rational actors, each state has military capacity, and great powers have the most economic and military capacity. Realism is based on the assumption that states are the main actors and legitimate representatives of their citizens and therefore the fundamental unit of analysis in international relations. States pursue self-interests of which the main interest is to acquire power defined in military capabilities (Baylis and Smith, 2006). For realists the international community is defined by anarchy, that is, they operate in a system with no central authority to enforce agreements and co-operation.

This then means that each state is responsible for its own survival and well-being (Smith et al., 2008). In light of realism China and Zimbabwe are states that engage in foreign policies that seek self-driven goals and survival in an anarchic world system. The international system is unipolar – the United States is the strongest superpower and its influence in the international community is unmatched. However there are now great nations with emerging powers, with growing political and economic abilities for example China. Zimbabwe as a dysfunctional state (Kovacs, 2012; Rivero, 2008) seeks to establish alliances with China which is an emerging power in the international system. Through this alliance, Zimbabwe is attempting to strengthen itself and ensuring its survival amidst economic and political turmoil. However, the extent to which Zimbabwe is able to successfully pursue

its own interests when tied to China is questionable.

China in turn has ventured into Africa so as to strengthen its own economy and increase the area over which it influences. China's foreign policy is shaped by its own interests regardless of claiming that it is in Africa purely for the benefit of the continent. China being a growing economic power aspires to outgrow America and eventually be 'the' superpower.

From the perspective of realism a basic set of questions constantly recurs in foreign policy analysis. Realism seeks to uncover the extent to which a state's foreign policy is a response to external pressure and incentives as opposed to internal pressures. Realists go on to look at the extent to which the policy is likely to change if a new party came into power. Realists are also concerned about how a state responds to incentives or threats (Smith et al., 2008). To put these ideas into perspective, realists in the case of Zimbabwe will be concerned with the extent to which the LEP is a result of external pressures in the form of sanctions. A closer analysis of Zimbabwe's foreign policy making process reveals that Mugabe has always stifled the voice of the public when it comes to drafting foreign policies. It seems external pressures played a minimal role in the drafting of the LEP. Instead internal needs greatly influenced the need to look east. Regardless of what the people of Zimbabwe wanted, Mugabe decided to 'Look East' as a way of showing the West that he, Zimbabwe can establish relations outside the West.

Contrary to realism, the basic tenet of liberalism is that the national characteristics of an individual states matter for their international relations. Liberalism help analysts to understand how individuals and their ideas, social forces and political institutions can have direct effects on foreign relations. Liberalism places great importance on the freedom of individual rights such as human and political rights. The four features of liberal foreign relations are "private market-based economies, existence of sovereignty, a citizenry with juridical rights, and republican representative governments" (Doyle, 1995 cited in Nkiwane, 2001, 283).

States, in the view of liberalism, are configurations of individual and group interests who then project those interests into the international system through a particular government. Before taking a plunge into liberalism one needs to understand that sovereignty and statehood are concepts used to fulfil different agendas by political leaders.

The problem with applying liberal principles to Zimbabwe and China is that international law has few mechanisms for taking the nature of domestic preferences into account. These two states may have bad human rights record (Srivma and Brown, 2007) however taking them to say the International Criminal Court (ICC) is problematic at times. Zimbabwe has yet to fully recover from the effects of the land reform programme which saw many white farmers' property and human rights severely

violated by the state. Even up today some white farmers have a tough time trying to get compensation from the government for the damages and losses they incurred. To make matters worse local Zimbabweans suffered as a result of the Operation Murambastvina (Operation Remove the rubbish). This operation saw the destruction of illegal housing and business structures at the command of the government and left many homeless and penniless as they were not given alternative housing (Youde, 2007). In 2008, the political violence in Zimbabwe further tainted its human rights record. Many people were beaten for supporting the supposedly 'wrong' party. The government has gone as far as restricting Zimbabweans from hearing or viewing foreign broadcasts. Zimbabwe acquired equipment from China to monitor mobile phone and internet communications as an attempt to resist regime change (Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2004). Even though Zimbabwe may not be the only country monitoring the activities of its own people, its actions tend to raise a lot of suspicion given its close association with China who has bad human rights records. China's human rights recorded suffered a major blow in 1989, because of the Tiananmen Square massacre (Engel, 1994). This is an event that gave the world insight into the repression going on in China. In the past recent years China has found itself under international scrutiny as a result of human rights allegations. China has also been heavily criticised for restricting content accessible to the people of China on Google. Just before the 2008 world Olympics, China is said to have stifled protests in its country. Both states have strongly resisted political opposition. With such a human rights record it is difficult to see how Zimbabwe and China can produce liberal foreign policies. Violation of human rights usually goes hand and hand with an undemocratic and repressive political system. The ruling elite violate human rights in an attempt to remain in power and maintain the status quo.

Constructivism is an ontology about the world and human motivation and agency based on the idea that the world is socially constructed through the interaction between agents and the environment. The focus of constructivism is social context. There are two variants; one is the North American version which emphasises the dominance of social norms and identity in shaping foreign policy outcomes. The European constructivism explores the role of language in mediating and constructing social reality (Checkel in Smith et al., 2008). Using the European perspective more attention needs to be paid to the prevailing discourse in Zimbabwe to be able to understand the kind of foreign policy being pursued (Halliday, 1994). A strong understanding of how Mugabe defines himself and the kind of ideas he strongly lives by, helps identify the rationale behind the LEP. Mugabe sees himself as the legitimate leader of Zimbabwe and hence strongly believes that his ideas should therefore guide Zimbabwe's foreign policy. Mugabe is strongly influenced by ideas emerging out of the liberation struggle hence he

is constantly asserting Zimbabwe's sovereignty and accusing the West in particular Britain of attempting to recolonize his country (Nkiwane, 2001).

As mentioned above the relationship with China played a huge role in helping ZANU-PF lead the way to national freedom. Mugabe and his close associates are forever mentioning their gratitude for China's assistance and have pledged to continue to maintain their relationship. It is from this kind of discourse that Zimbabwe draws upon to justify its decision to 'Look East'. China however seems to have a different view of the international system. It has a history of seeing foreigners as being of a lower status than them. Such a perspective has seen China being bold and refusing to allow external pressure to influence its foreign policy making process (Roy, 1998). However, Zimbabwe is yet to achieve this strong stance when it comes to international system.

Many theories of international relations are contested, and in their singularity are not adequate to explain foreign relations. However this study is inclined towards constructivism, arguing that foreign relations are shaped to a greater extent by the different levels of interaction between states and how these states perceive that kind of interaction.

States construct their reality based on their own interests. In the next section a brief description of the methodology, data collection and analysis method used are presented.

METHODOLOGY

The qualitative study is interpretive, and based on social constructionism. It mainly employs document analysis and to a limited extent content analysis. Documents, which formed the main data sources, included Zimbabwean Ministry of Foreign Affairs website (2010), Chigora and Chisi (2009), Chigora and Dewa (2009), Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (2004), Matahwa (2007) and Youde (2007). Papers were selected on the basis of access and availability on Internet at the time of the study. Document analysis involves reading lots of written material like public records, media, private papers and academic publications in order to evaluate and interpret the texts. The ultimate goal is to determine authenticity (reliability), credibility (free from distortion), representativeness and meaning (surface and deeper meaning). Content analysis is useful for examining patterns and trends in documents and to monitor shifts in public opinion of LEP. It is argued here that LEP is a social construct and has been shaped by Zimbabwe's history (Nkiwane, 2001).

DATA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

Document analysis was used to examine the five main data sources. The aim was to interpret authors' understanding of the LEP and to highlight components of the policy considered crucial in achieving economic and political development.

What is the Look East Policy?

The Look East Policy (LEP) is Zimbabwe's relationship

with states in the East such as China, Korea, Japan, Malaysia, and India just to mention a few. In this paper the focus is on relationship with China. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) in Zimbabwe "has never released any formal document outlining the tenets of the 'Look East Policy', but its basic thrust is clear in government pronouncements and the international travel patterns of Zimbabwean officials" (Youde, 2013, p. 4). This however does not mean that MFA's ideas do not play a big role in guiding Zimbabwe's policy decisions. The implementation of the policy is seen through the cultivation of closer ties with Asian states. Asia is seen as a model of economic development which African states can emulate in search of the kind of success being experienced in Asia.

The Zimbabwean Ministry of Foreign Affairs sees foreign policy as a set of goals that seek to outline how a country will interact with other countries in the international system as it pursues its national economic, political, social and cultural interests. The objectives of any foreign policy, Zimbabwe included, are to protect and promote sovereignty, territorial integrity, national image, improve living standards of the country, establish and sustain a conducive international environment to achieve the above goals. Officially the LEP was adopted in 2003 in response to growing challenges stemming from sanctions imposed on the country by the West (Zimbabwe Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2010).

The implementation of the LEP is guided by the Government's Policy, Vision and Strategy documents, which are designed to increase cooperation on projects that seek to promote exports and assist in the recapitalization of Zimbabwe's distressed public enterprises (Zimbabwe Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2010). Zimbabwe is aware that in international relations there are no permanent friends or enemies just permanent interests therefore, through its foreign policy. Zimbabwe seeks to foster long standing international relationships of mutual co-operation and trust (Chigora and Dewa, 2009).

Youde's (2007) article, *Why Look East? Zimbabwean foreign policy and China* sees the LEP as an attempt by Mugabe and his government to renegotiate its identity and legitimacy in the international and domestic sphere. This article is quite good as it draws upon a wide range of publications. Youde (2007) appears to have a deeper understanding of the reasoning behind Mugabe's decision to Look East. He is however less optimistic about Zimbabwe reaping tangible benefits from the LEP (Youde, 2007). The article titled, *The Look East Policy of Zimbabwe now focuses on China* by Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung is a briefing document published in 2004, presumably a year after the official declaration of the policy. The document manages to highlight the different dimensions of the relationship between China and Zimbabwe. It provides an overview of how the different sectors of Zimbabwe have been positively or negatively affected by the LEP (Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2004). The Friedrich Ebert Foundation (FES) seeks to promote political and societal education of all people and work

towards international understanding and cooperation. Overall, this article is in support of the LEP because of the way it goes to length to show what Zimbabwe benefited. The major weakness of this article is that most of the data provided were drawn from the state owned Zimbabwean Herad Newspaper. The probability of biasness in the information provided is high because as a state owned paper it was unlikely to publish any negative things about the policy in an attempt to present LEP as a positive policy.

Chigora and Chisi's (2009) article, '*The eight years of interaction: Lessons from Zimbabwe's Look East Policy and the future of African countries and Asia-Pacific Region*' aims to assess the progress that has been achieved through the policy. These two authors are academics affiliated to a state university in Zimbabwe. The authors of this article provide a more sympathetic assessment of the LEP. It is difficult to assess whether their sympathy emerges out of genuine belief in the potential of the LEP or in that they want to be seen as opposing the sanctions imposed on Zimbabwe by the West. In fact at that time Zimbabwe was classed as a failed state (Kovacs, 2012; Rivero, 2008). The authors cite evidence of economic progress in the different sectors of Zimbabwe's economy. Chigora and Chisi (2009) argue that LEP represents an example of an African state pursuing an independently developed foreign policy. They want African countries to be given the freedom to choose their own development plan regardless of what the West might recommend as the proper way of development. Surely Zimbabwe needs a policy orientation that will emphasize its independence but at the same time push it forward onto the road of economic and political progress. However, this is unlikely as long as Mugabe and his associates continue to make more enemies in the name of asserting national sovereignty.

Chigora and Dewa (2009) article titled, '*Surviving in a hostile environmet: An analysis of Zimbabwe's foreign relations in the 21st century International Relations*', is a more sympathetic discussion of the efforts by the government. The two authors believe that African countries should be given the freedom to make and pursue their own policies without influence from outside (West). They claim that given time Zimbabwe can reap positive results from policies such as LEP. Just like the previous document it is difficult to pin point where their sympathy emerges from. If it is because the authors truly believe that Zimbabwe can actually turn around its economy through LEP, they do not provide sufficient evidence to support this assumption.

The article by Matahwa (2007) titled, '*China and Zimbabwe: Is there a future?*', is a critical analysis of the policy. The author doubts the ability of the government of Zimbabwe to fulfil its economic agenda because it has locked itself in self destructive deals with China. The article provides a better insight into the relationship which

the other articles have failed to provide. Matahwa (2007) has been able to provide more details into the trade relations and deals between Zimbabwe and China than the article by Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (2004) that simply tells us what Zimbabwe received through the LEP. The later does not say what the agreements entailed and what China got in return. Matahwa (2007) is less optimistic about the potential of the LEP as he is against the idea of mortgaging off national resources in exchange for a few Chinese products. Chigora and Chisi (2009) question the practicability of the Look East Policy. Their main argument is that there is no way that the government of Zimbabwe can sustain its economy by limiting trade and opportunities with the East. Some critics maintain that it is no use trying to persist with a dreadful charade in the hope that the reality will vanish and would be replaced by wishful thinking which is what Zimbabwe is doing at the moment by refusing to realign itself with the West because of some emotional ideologies drawn from three decades ago. Zimbabwean officials need to prioritise foreign policies be it with the East or West that will enable national development and survival. If the government fails to address the immediate needs of its population, it risks becoming a non-governable chaotic entity rife with conflict and instability (Chigora and Chisi, 2009). While Chigora and Chisi (2009, p. 158) may be right to indicate that Zimbabwe should "mend its relations with the International Monetary Fund" however, as long as Zimbabwe has a weak foreign policy structure it will not be able to fully benefit from any form of international cooperation. Zimbabwe may well reap benefits from China but these will not be as much as could be if her foreign policy making system is well coordinated and well thought-out.

What has Zimbabwe benefited from the Look East Policy?

This section summarises the benefits of the various sectors in Zimbabwe's economy emerging from the main data sources. Trade relations between China and Zimbabwe are "characterised by a classical pattern of trade between 'developing' and 'developed' economies" (Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2004, p. 3). Zimbabwe as a 'developing' economy has increased its imports of machinery, electrical items, engine, motor parts and telecommunication products from China and is exporting mainly agricultural products. Such trade relations make it impossible for Zimbabwe to diversify its own economy as it heavily relies on the limited income from the sale of "raw materials needed by China" (Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2004, p. 5).

The tourism sector has seen a huge influx of visitors from China into the country and Zimbabwean visitors into China have also increased (Chigora and Chisi, 2009).

The two countries have signed an agreement which

makes it easier to travel between Harare and Beijing. China granted Zimbabwe an Approved Destination Status, which simply means that China is committed to actively “encourage people to travel to Zimbabwe by simplifying visa requirements” (Alden, 2007, p. 153-155). Zimbabwe has responded to this influx by introducing direct flights. However, despite the agreement Zimbabwe has yet to be ranked as one of the most favoured destination by Chinese. There is evidence that “some people interviewed in the tourism sector raised doubts in the estimation of Zimbabwean authorities of Chinese tourists arrivals” (Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2004, p. 4). Bad international publicity has not made it easier for Zimbabwe to portray itself as a safe destination and she is still seen as having little tourist attractions. A lot of effort has to go towards international publicity to portray Zimbabwe as a safe and good place to visit (Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2004). Overall, one can conclude that the increase has remained largely marginal.

According to Musarurwa and Moyo (2014), there has been a 25% increase of Chinese tourists into America and Europe between October 2013 and March 2014. The growing relatively rich middle class in China are spending and travelling more. An estimated 97.3 million outbound Chinese tourist spend approximately US\$129 billion during their travels. However, of the 80000 Chinese tourists who visited Southern Africa, only 5000 visited Zimbabwe. These figures are disappointing given that Zimbabwe is targeting to draw at least 5% (5 million tourists) of the 100 million tourist leaving China every year. The talks and suggestions by different ministers to relax visa requirements for Chinese nationals and citizens so as to facilitate an increased flow of tourists have not significantly made a difference.

Retail shops seem to be enjoying thriving business as there has been increased sale of Chinese made products which are more affordable to the ordinary Zimbabwean. However, products are being sold “well below the prices of local products” (Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2004, p. 4). It is important to note that there is nothing new about Chinese products in Zimbabwe as crossborder traders have been going to Botswana, South Africa and Zambia to purchase cheap Chinese products for resale way before the Chinese flooded in the country (Chigora and Chisi, 2009, p. 154). The only difference is that cross border traders brought in fewer products as compared to what is happening today. Further, the local textile and leather industry have suffered greatly and are finding it hard to keep afloat. They are not able to produce goods cheaply and in huge quantities. Chinese companies are able to meet the demands of the markets and therefore there has been a sprawling out of ‘China town’ places in Africa. Retail trade has remained one-sided as China has made it difficult for Africans to establish African markets or businesses in their country.

China is interested in raw materials, for example, iron, steel, chrome, diamonds and platinum in the mining

sector. By “signing several cooperation and trade agreements” (Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2004, p. 5), Chinese companies have been granted access to mining exploration rights in most of the Zimbabwe mining industry. Closely linked to this, is the agricultural sector which has received equipment for the land reform programme (Srivam and Brown, 2007). In June 2006, China announced energy and mining deals worth US\$700 million, including building 3 coal fired thermal power stations, repayment was not spelt out but China was set to get access to several minerals notably chrome (Ingram, 2006). The major problem with Chinese presence is that there seems to be little benefit for Zimbabwe.

According to Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (2004), the construction sector has received significant investments in cement, tile and brick production and China has also been given tenders to construct roads along Harare-Mutare highway. Despite the general economic crisis the construction sector especially private housing is not suffering (Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2004). The economy cannot however be sustained and made better by private construction; it requires the construction of large projects such as roads, schools, hospitals, business towers, dams, stadiums and the like which will add to national wealth and its ability to generate income (Chimakure, 2010a, b). However, where China has done construction the buildings are substandard and hence have a short life span.

The transport sector has been one of the biggest beneficiaries of the LEP. First, “Air Zimbabwe, bought two long haul MA60 bringing the total number of its fleet to 8 and Air Zimbabwe was therefore able to briefly expand its domestic, regional and international routes (Chigora and Chisi, 2009, p. 154). Second, “in November 2004, an agreement was signed between National Railways of Zimbabwe (NRZ) and China Northern Locomotive and Railway Stock Industry (CNR)” (Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2004, p. 6). The agreement helped put back the once dysfunctional railway system back into business, though not at full capacity. NRZ was able to acquire cheaper parts to replace the ones that had been worn out. Third, “Zimbabwe United Passenger Company (ZUPCO) acquired 135 conventional buses and 41 mini buses from China” (Chigora and Chisi, 2009, p. 154), cars and heavy machinery for agricultural and construction purposes (Srivam and Brown, 2007). These vehicles helped deal with the huge transport woes once a common feature in Zimbabwe. The problem was that this was short lived as soon things returned to the usual transport woes, when the vehicles especially buses started developing faults and the government could not acquire more loans to keep them running.

Most of Zimbabwe’s military equipment such as fire-arms, fighter jet and and military vehicle have been sourced from China (Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2004). Further, “in 2008, Zimbabwe acquired 8 Karakorum trainer jets, to boost internal security apparatus and also got

water cannons to subdue protesters and bugging equipment to monitor cell phone networks" (Chigora and Chisi, 2009, p. 156) and radio jamming equipment to put public communication under government surveillance (Brown, 2007). It is argued in this paper that improvement in the Information and Technology sector was not realised yet the ruling elite was able to maintain a stronghold onto power. The government of Zimbabwe feared regime change and hence sought to enhance its political power through repressive measures.

In addition it can prove to be dangerous to choose friends and make enemies based on an emotional commitment to some ideology. Zimbabwe therefore needs to learn from other countries. China has realised that isolation will not help it achieve the kind of economic and political success it needs, therefore has sought to establish relations that will advance its interests. Zimbabwe needs to do the same and develop relations that will ensure that it achieves its own interests to a greater extent (Nkiwane in Wright, 1999). It is for this reason that shunning the West over ideological differences will not do Zimbabwe any good. If possible Zimbabwe should seek to reconnect with the West so that it can meet its own goals and targets.

The norms and practices of China as a donor remain unclear, which hints at the possibility of conditions being actually attached on aid and business arrangements. In the world we live in there is nothing for free and therefore aid usually comes with strings attached. The government of Zimbabwe seems to be not telling the truth about its relationship with the East in particular China, hence the notion of "political slogan" (Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2004, p. 1). The government hardly state what the Chinese are getting in return for their presence in the country. At face value China offers package deals that include infrastructure development or long term low interest loans that Western countries can rarely compete with and which African states are blindly accepting as manna from heaven (Sautman and Hairong, 2007). Unlike the West and Japan, China is willing to invest in a risky emerging African market. Chinese believe that conflict in Africa is drawing to a close and Africa is ripe for an economic take-off; which China wants to lead. China's need and search for natural resources is part of Beijing's strategy of increasing its diplomatic and economic profile as it asserts itself as an emerging superpower (Vines, 2007). China will not leave its own continent to be a hero in Zimbabwe or even in Africa for no gains.

Conclusion

In summary, China's activities, like other developed states are motivated by its own economic, security, diplomatic and political interests. Just like Western capitalist economies, China seeks markets for its goods and a return on its investments; in this way China's self interested

relationship with Africa is not significantly different from that of the West and Africa. Given such a stance it is naive for Zimbabwean leaders to assume that China acts purely out of anti-colonial solidarity in the 21st century. Zimbabwe needs to fully understand China and general dynamics of international relations and rethinks its foreign policy structures so that even as a small landlocked country it will be able to negotiate for relationships that will enable it to pursue its own national goals and at the same time be an active participant in the global system. Zimbabwe is locking itself into self-destructive deals by mortgaging off its national resources and engaging in barter trade whereby it forgore earning foreign currency. The other problem with the LEP is that it is strongly linked with Mugabe and ZANU-PF and hence appears to be nothing more than a political slogan. It is difficult to see the current opposition party leader or any other continuing with the same policy. Political backing has not always translated into hard economic benefits for Zimbabwe, for example, a raft of deals totalling \$US13 billion for the construction of new coal mines and 3 thermal station in 2000 have not yet been started. Zimbabwe is a sleeping giant; as soon as it emerges from the politics of autocracy, repression and kleptocracy it will be possible to resuscitate its economy. It needs to stop entering into fragmented and uncoordinated bilateral contracts with China. Instead of just looking East, Zimbabwe should look West, North and South; by so doing will realise that East and West are different sides of the same coin.

The main driving goals of African foreign policies should be security and economic development. However, states use their foreign policies to assert or redefine their identity, values, interests and ideologies (Clapham, 1998). In Zimbabwe policies such as the LEP are being used to push forwards the ideas and needs of the ruling elite. The process of foreign policy making involves the negotiation between domestic and international relations. There is no one size fits all theory or way of analysing foreign policies of different states. The foreign policy orientation of many states is influenced by levels of vulnerability, political and economic development in different ways (Hill, 2003). A foreign policy is more reliable and effective when it has the backing of domestic support. In Zimbabwe, the case is different. A lot of dissatisfactions over the LEP have been raised by the people but their concerns have fallen on deaf ears.

Conflict of Interests

The author has not declared any conflict of interests.

REFERENCES

- Alden C (2007). *China in Africa*. London: Zed Books Ltd.
 Bratton M, Masunungure E (2011). *The anatomy of political predation*:

- leaders, elites and coalitions in Zimbabwe 1980-2010. Paper presented at The Developmental Leadership Programme, Research and Policy Workshop Frankfurt, Germany 10-11 March 2011.
- Chigora PA, Chisi TH (2009). The eight years of interaction: Lessons from Zimbabwe's Look East Policy and the future of African countries and Asia-Pacific Region. *J. Sustain. Dev. Afr.* 10(4):147-161.
- Chigora PA, Dewa D (2009). Surviving in a hostile environment: An analysis of Zimbabwe's foreign relations in the 21st Century International Relations. *Afr. J. Polit. Sci. Int. Relat.* 3(3):92-98.
- Chimakure C (2010a). Economy sick- Biti. Retrieved July 09, 2010, from The Independent, Zimbabwe <http://www.theindependent.co.zw/2010/07/08/economy-sick-biti/>
- Chimakure C (2010b). Economic recovery starts with doing the little things right- S Mashakada. Retrieved July 09, 2010, from The Independent, Zimbabwe: <http://www.thestandard.co.zw/2010/07/08/economic-recovery-starts-with-doing-the-little-things-right-s-mashakada/>
- Clapham C (1996). *Africa and the International system: The politics of state survival*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Clapham C (1998). *Third World Politics: An Introduction*. London: Routledge.
- Evans P (1995). *Embedded autonomy: States and industrial transformation*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. (2004). The 'Look East Policy' of Zimbabwe now focuses on China's Foreign Relations. China. Harare: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.
- Hill C (2003). What is to be done? Foreign policy as a site for political action. *Int. Affairs* 79(2):233-255.
- Kovacs RJ (2012). What makes a failed state? Examining the case for Zimbabwe. <http://www.e-ir.info/2012/05/31/what-makes-a-failed-state-examining-the-case-of-zimbabwe/>
- Maudeni Z (2002). State culture and development in Botswana and Zimbabwe. *J. Modern Afr. Studies*, 40(1):105-132.
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Zimbabwe. (2010). Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
- Musarurwa D, Moyo A (2014). *The great Chinese visa headaches*. The Sunday Mail, Business. Harare: The Herald House.
- Nkiwane T (-2001). African and International Relations: Regional lessons for a Global Discourse. *Int. Polit. Sci. Rev.* 22(3):279-290.
- Rivero CG (2008). Failed states in Africa: The Zimbabwean Experience http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/web/rielcano_en/contenido?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/elcano/elcano_in/zonas_in/sub-saharan+africa/ari29-2008
- Rotberg R (2002). The new nature of nation-state failure. *The Washington Quarterly* 25(3):85-96.
- Roy D (1998). London: Macmillan Press Ltd.
- Sautman BA, Hairong Y (2007). Friends and Interests: China's Distinctive links with Africa. *Afr. Stud. Rev.* 50(3):75-114.
- Smith S, Hadfield A, Dunne T (2008). *Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases*. New York: Oxford University press. <http://www.worldcat.org/title/foreign-policy-theories-actors-cases/oclc/171287641>
- Taylor I (2007). Analysis: Governance in Africa and Sino- African relations: Contradictions or confluence? *Politics*, 27(3):139-146.
- Vines A (2007). China in Africa: A mixed blessing? *Curr. History* 106(700):213-219.
- Wright S (1999). *African foreign policies*. Colorado: Westview.
- Youde J (2007). Why Look East? Zimbabwe's Foreign Policy and China. *Africa Today* 53(3):3-20.

Full Length Research Paper

The influence of Treaty Design on the participation of Developing and Developed Nations in International Environmental Agreements (IEAs)

Chenaz B. Seelarbokus

Department of Political Science and International Affairs, Kennesaw State University,
1000 Chastain Road, MD 2205, SO Bldg 22, Room 5067, Kennesaw, GA 30144-5591, U.S.A.

Received 12 March, 2014; Accepted 3 September 2014

It is an observed fact that developing and developed countries participate in International Environmental Agreements (IEAs) to different levels. Do IEA provisions exert differential levels of influence on the participation of developing and developed countries? This paper relies on multivariate regression analysis to examine the relationship between key IEA provisions and the participation of developing and developed countries in thirty-one global IEAs. The texts of the selected IEAs are analyzed and coded for the presence (or absence) of key provisions pertaining to, inter alia, strength, flexibility, transparency, and participation incentives such as financial and technology transfers. Results of the analysis show that strong binding provisions within IEAs tend to detract both the developing and developed countries from participation. On the other hand, provisions supporting greater flexibility (e.g. clauses promoting dispute resolution through negotiations first) or greater transparency (e.g. through NGO observership or reporting requirements) seem to be attractive to both developing and developed countries. These findings suggest that effective international environmental cooperation cannot be compelled; rather, it needs to be made attractive through the right mix between enforcement mechanisms and flexibility clauses, as well as through appealing participation incentives.

Key words: Treaty design, international environmental agreements, environmental regimes, participation, international environmental cooperation.

INTRODUCTION

In a world beset with increasing inequalities in terms of economic and human development, getting nation states to agree on a common framework of international environmental protection is a daunting challenge. Over the decades, international environmental agreements (IEAs) have emerged as a predominant structure for international environmental cooperation (IEC). In fact,

since the 1972 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, the number of IEAs adopted by the international community has more than doubled, and the growth continues. Commensurate with this intensified environmental treaty-making has been a burgeoning field of research into themes such as international environmental negotiations, regime formation, compliance, and

E-mail: cseelarb@kennesaw.edu

Author agree that this article remain permanently open access under the terms of the [Creative Commons Attribution License 4.0 International License](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/)

effectiveness (Andresen and Ostreng, 1989; Bodansky, 1994; Diehl, 1997; Keohane, 1984; Keohane and Nye, 1989; Young, 1997; Haas, 1990; Haas, 1992; Wilkening et al., 2000; Young and Osherenko, 1993; Sprinz and Vaahoranta, 1994; Churchill, 1996; Mitchell, 1994; Wettstad, 2001; Miles et al., 2002; Underdal and Hanf, 2000; Bohmelt and Pilster, 2010; Kutting, 2000).

Though research into compliance and effectiveness remains enduring (Bohmelt and Pilster, 2010; Breitmeier et al., 2011), of late there has been growing interest into understanding the factors influencing state participation¹ in IEAs. Both within the International Relations literature, and within the econometrics body of research, which has focused extensively on the theme of IEA participation, it is generally agreed that the design of IEAs does have an influence on the level of participation in the IEAs (Mitchell, 1994; Helm, 2000b p. 164; Sand, 1992; Schmidt, 2000b; Finus, 2001a pp. 236, 238; Helm and Sprinz, 2000). Research in this field has investigated the influence of specific IEA clauses on the level of participation sustained by the IEA. DeSombre (2000 pp. 190-228), for example, has investigated the influence of key “participation mechanisms” such as the presence of economic sanctions, provision of environmental aid, differential obligations, and the creation of club goods. A more comprehensive empirical analysis is Bernauer et al. (2013) recent investigation of the “depth versus participation” dilemma in 211 global IEAs. Findings from this study show that the presence of specific targets within IEAs reduces participation, while dispute settlement provisions and incentives such as technical or financial assistance increase participation. However, monitoring and enforcement provisions do not seem to impact participation levels, leading Bernauer et al. (2013 p. 495) to conclude that there is “only very limited evidence for a depth versus participation dilemma in global environmental cooperation.”

One crucial characteristic of the above analyses, however, is that they analyze the influence of IEA characteristics on *total* participation in IEAs, and do not differentiate between the participation of developing and developed countries. Yet, disagreements between the developing and developed countries in their international relations have a long history, dating back to the emergence of the non-aligned movement in the 1950s, and the demand for a New International Economic Order (NIEO) in 1973 (Hoskins, 1982 pp. 17-20). This North-South conflict has been very prominent during the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), especially with regard to negotiations pertaining to the issues of climate change, biodiversity, and the protection of forests (Borione and Ripert, 1994; Dasgupta, 1994; Nayar and Ong, 1996; Bowman and

Redgwell, 1996).

Disagreements typically relate to perceptions of equity and fairness, as well as the traditional concerns with economic repercussions. The US withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), for example, was premised on an understanding that projected the clauses of the agreement as unfair and inequitable. The Byrd-Hagel Resolution, which passed the US Senate unanimously, clearly stipulated that the US would not sign any agreement relating to the UNFCCC which would harm the US economy and which would “mandate new commitments ...for the Annex I Parties, unless the protocol or other agreement also mandates new specific scheduled commitments ...for Developing Country Parties within the same compliance period.”² Similarly, negotiations pertaining to the transboundary exports of hazardous wastes were colored by North-South disagreements (Park, 1998). Viewing the trade in hazardous wastes as a “crime against Africa and African people,” the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), for example, negotiated the Bamako Convention³ “in protest against the Basel Convention” (Park, 1998 p. 695). The OAU considered the Basel Convention⁴ as an inadequate legal instrument in view of its failure to institute a ban against the trade of hazardous wastes to the African continent (Marbury, 1995 p. 251; Webster-Main, 2002; Park, 1998).

In such a context of different national priorities and development concerns, how can we strengthen IEC by adopting IEAs with provisions that meet the needs and aspirations of both the developing and developed countries? In order to answer this question, we first need to have an understanding of the exact impact of specific IEA clauses on the participation of developing and developed nations. Do developing and developed countries respond differently to key IEA provisions, and if so, how? Unfortunately, there is no clear answer to this question. Most of the existing research on the influence of IEA design on participation focuses on *total* participation, and does not address the issue of the potential differential impact of specific IEA clauses on the participation of developing and developed states. In view of the fact that securing wide participation in IEAs is a necessary precursor to global environmental protection, and also considering the fact that developing countries are projected to be the future major contributors to global environmental problems (Folmer and De Zeeuw, 2000 p. 452; Pearson and Fouquet, 1996; Blackman, 2002; Schmidt, 2000a p. 14), it is important to understand the impact of key IEA clauses on the participation of

¹ Participation is defined as country ratification of an IEA, or any other technical terms deemed equivalent to ratification – such as accession, approval, adherence, or acceptance. See UN Treaty Handbook (2012) for more details on the technical terms.

²Byrd-Hagel Resolution. Thomas Locator. <http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d105:S.RES.98>

³ Full title: Convention on the Ban of the Import into Africa and the Control of Transboundary Movement and Management of Hazardous Wastes within Africa (Bamako, 1991).

⁴ Full title: The Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal (Basel, 1989).

developing and developed states.

This paper aims to fill the existing gap in the literature and hopes to formulate some understanding of the differential impact of IEA design on the participation of developing and developed countries. Thirty-one global IEAs are examined and the influence of key IEA clauses on the participation of developing and developed countries is determined through multivariate regression analysis. Results of this study show that there is scope for strengthening IEC through IEAs which engender transparency mechanisms (e.g. through regular reporting requirements, observership by NGOs, etc.) and which provide for flexible means of dispute resolution (e.g. through negotiations first) – clauses which influence developing and developed countries similarly. Moreover, the results also show that both the developing and developed countries seem to not prefer IEAs with overly restrictive and binding provisions (e.g. legislative requirements, verification mechanisms, and trade sanctions), thus demonstrating that IEC might be better strengthened through incentives and capacity-building rather than through strict enforcement measures.

The rest of the article is structured as follows. The first part of the article summarizes current research in the field, the second part details the hypotheses and methodology, and the third part discusses the findings of the study.

REVIEW OF RESEARCH INTO IEA DESIGN

In view of the crucial role played by IEAs in enhancing IEC, environmental economists have long been concerned with the theme of treaty participation and alliance building. This research has relied extensively on applications of game theory to explain state participation in IEAs. Within this body of research, IEA design has been deemed a “crucial” determinant of participation in IEAs, as well as a significant factor influencing the “stability and global efficiency” of the environmental coalition (Helm and Sprinz, 2000 p. 164; Sand, 1992; Schmidt, 2000a; Finus, 2001b pp. 236, 238; Helm, 2000a). In the case of the UNFCCC, for example, the “architecture” of the climate change regime has been deemed influential in determining both participation and compliance (Barrett and Stavins, 2003b p. 366).

Researchers have also analyzed the optimal size for an IEA, the cost-effectiveness of IEAs, and the design of instrument choices to attract high participation, often commonly referred to in the literature as the “incentive compatibility” of IEAs for enhanced cooperation (e.g. Carraro, 1999b; Downs, 1998; Helm, 2000a; Schmidt, 2000a p. 4).

Two types of incentives are mentioned in the literature: positive incentives, such as side payments and financial or technical assistance; and negative incentives, such as taxes, trade sanctions, external threats, and globally tradable emission permits (Arts, 2001; Barrett, 1995, 1992; Botteon and Carraro, 1998, 1999b, 1999a, 1997;

Carraro and Siniscalco, 1995; Cesar and De Zeeuw, 1994; Folmer and De Zeeuw, 2000; Heister et al., 1995; Katsoulacos, 1997; Schmidt, 2000a; Barrett and Stavins, 2003b pp. 361-367; Underdal, 1998a p. 106). Carraro and Siniscalco (1997) have also demonstrated the profitability and stability of linking negotiations on an IEA with Research and Development (R&D) cooperation, as the gains from the R&D cooperation have the possibility of offsetting free-riding incentives.

Studies on international environmental negotiations have highlighted the typical North-South discord that has characterized discussions between developing and developed countries (Najam, 1993; Borione and Ripert, 1994; Dasgupta, 1994; Nayar and Ong, 1996; Najam, 2002). In view of the fact that IEC cannot be effective without the solid participation of developing countries, international environmental negotiations have evolved to cater specifically to the special needs of developing countries in a bid to secure their greater participation in IEAs.

Principle 9 of the Stockholm Declaration⁵ recognizes that conditions of underdevelopment and natural disasters lead to “environmental deficiencies” which can be improved by the transfer of financial and technological assistance from the developed to the developing countries to supplement the latter’s domestic efforts. Similarly, prior to the 1992 UNCED, the Forum of International Law of the Environment, which was convened in Siena from 17-21 April 1990, considered the issue of IEA participation and the means of widening such participation, with particular emphasis on overcoming the difficulties met by developing countries in ratifying such treaties (Maffei et al., 1996). Crystallized in international environmental law as the principle of common-but-differentiated-responsibility (CBDR), this recognition of the special needs of developing countries is deemed to increase the flexibility of IEAs, strengthen equity and fairness, and foster distributive justice (Okereke, 2008; Arenas, 2008; Honkonen, 2009). Indeed, important IEAs (e.g. the UNFCCC, the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, and the Convention on Biological Diversity(CBD)) do in fact recognize that the special needs of developing countries need to be taken into consideration, and that developed nations need to provide financial and technical assistance to allow the developing states to comply with their international environmental obligations without jeopardizing their development needs (Caldwell, 1988; Chasek, 2000; Evans, 2000). Both the CBD (Article 20(4)) and the UNFCCC, for example, mention that the extent to which

⁵Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (Stockholm, 1972), accessible online at <http://www.unep.org>. Principle 9 of the Declaration reads: “Environmental deficiencies generated by the conditions of under-development and natural disasters pose grave problems and can best be remedied by accelerated development through the transfer of substantial quantities of financial and technological assistance as a supplement to the domestic effort of the developing countries and such timely assistance as may be required.”

developing countries succeed in implementing their commitments under the conventions depends, in the first instance, on the developed countries' fulfillment of their obligation to provide financial and technological assistance. Research has shown that certain positive participation incentives such as provisions for financial or technical assistance do act towards increasing the participation of developing countries (Barrett and Stavins, 2003a pp. 361-367; Underdal, 1998b p. 106). Another IEA characteristic deemed to favor higher participation is the minimum ratification clause, often also called the threshold number or the n-rule (Black et al., 1993 p. 281). The threshold number normally specifies the total number of ratifications that are needed for a treaty to enter into force. The minimum ratification clause has been characterized as an "internal stabilization" instrument, making participation "contingent" on the participation of others (Schmidt, 2001 p. 220).

Black et al. (1993) have analyzed the threshold number "as an instrument to create incentives" for IEC, and they report that the threshold number helps to increase participation in IEAs while deterring free-riding (Barrett, 2000 p. 137; Carraro et al., 2003). In this sense, the threshold number is seen as being important in making cooperation more profitable (Black et al., 1993) and more stable by decreasing the number of free-riders and increasing the number of signatories (Carraro et al., 2003). However, Schmidt (2001 p. 220) warns that "the more successful the minimum ratification clause is in making a large number of countries sign the agreement, the greater are the incentives to breach it afterwards."

In terms of the impact of strength on participation, several researchers have argued that the stricter the requirements of an IEA, the less likely it is that countries will participate in the IEA (Schmidt, 2001 p. 214), and free-riding incentives will prevail (Finus, 2001b p. 279). Carraro (1999b p. 9), for example, notes that those treaties which are "rather empty in terms of quantitative targets and/or deadlines" tend to enlist greater participation than those with precise commitments. Likewise, Finus (2001b p.314) considers that more countries sign IEAs which are meant to "achieve little." In his analysis of the UNFCCC, Barrett (2000 p. 119) considers that the UNFCCC benefited from earlier ratification and entry into force than the Kyoto Protocol because it did not require any "particular target by any particular date."

Sand (1992) interestingly posits a differential relationship of strength for developing and developed countries, arguing that developing countries seem to prefer to participate more in those treaties which have no binding commitments, and which are merely declaratory. Mechanisms to help reduce fears about other parties' free-riding and thereby increase the possibility of cooperation have been associated with transparency measures such as the inclusion of reporting requirements (Victor et al., 1994; Chayes and Chayes, 1995, 1991).

Most IEAs provide members with the possibility of

entering into reservations, of opting out of certain clauses, of proposing amendments to the IEA clauses, or of completely withdrawing from the treaties. It is generally agreed that allowing reservations tends to favor participation because it increases the flexibility of the IEAs (Harvard Law Review, 1992). On the other hand, disallowing of reservations, while effective perhaps in maintaining the desired strength of the IEAs, may nevertheless work against high rates of participation as it renders the IEA inflexible and not in line with the needs of potential party members. As stated by DeSombre (2002 p. 11):

Although many complain about opt-out provisions in regulatory treaties, the fact that no state can be bound by international law against its will makes them a necessary evil. Without them few states would agree to regulation created by less than unanimous voting.

Similarly, encouraging flexible means of dispute resolution (e.g. through negotiations) tends to appeal to a wider audience than strict requirements for recourse to the International Court of Justice (ICJ). The 1963 Optional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, negotiated under the 1963 Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, has succeeded in securing only two parties to date,⁶ compared to the thirty-seven parties to the parent treaty.⁷ Under the Optional Protocol, all disputes arising under the parent treaty are to be dealt "within the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice" (Article 1), unless the parties agree to alternate measures within a period of two months after notification of the dispute.⁸ The low rate of participation in the Optional Protocol may be due to the general 'unpalatability' within the international community of submitting disputes to the ICJ, or due to the inflexible language of the text of the Protocol, connoted, for example, by the word "compulsory."

As is obvious from the above, many of the posited relationships between IEA provisions and state participation do not provide a comparative analysis of the influence of key IEA clauses on the participation of developing and developed countries. Yet, in view of the transboundary nature of environmental problems and the global scope of their impacts, it is important to understand how developing and developed countries respond to particular IEA provisions as the success of IEAs rests upon the participation of both the developing

⁶IAEA

<http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/1999/infcirc500a3.shtml>

⁷Ronald B. Mitchell. 2002-2014. *International Environmental Agreements Database Project (Version 2013.2)*. Available at: <http://iea.uoregon.edu/>. Date accessed: 8 March 2014; Yearbook of International Cooperation on Environment and Development. 2003/2004. <http://www.greenyearbook.org/agree/nuc-saf/civillia.htm>

⁸Text of the parent treaty and the optional protocol available online at <http://sedac.ciesin.org/entri/texts/acrc/ProtVienna.txt.html> or at the IAEA site at <http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/1996/inf500.shtml>.

and developed nations. This study is thus a first step along the way towards acquiring a greater understanding of the differential impact of key IEA provisions on the participation of developing and developed countries. Three core IEA provisions are investigated, namely, participation incentives, strength, and flexibility.

METHODS

Development of hypotheses

As discussed earlier, research has shown that certain positive incentive structures, such as financial transfers, tend to enlist greater participation in IEAs – especially from developing countries (Carraro, 1999a; Schmidt, 2000a; Helm, 2000a; Barrett, 1992; Barrett and Stavins, 2003b pp. 361-367; Underdal, 1998a p. 106). However, financial transfers may seem attractive to both the developing and developed countries in view of the added benefits to be accrued therefrom. For the developed countries, the possibility of providing financial assistance may likely imply some control over how that money is to be used within the developing economies, which also often implies control over the use of technology and processes. Thus, disbursing funds may be of benefit to local industries within the developed world. Similarly, the availability of funds for implementation of IEA provisions may be seen as attractive by developing nations as this would mean financial empowerment to address environmental concerns and to improve production processes. However, *ceteris paribus*, while financial mechanisms within IEAs may be favored by both the developed and developing nations, it is likely that such financial transfers may be more influential on the decision of developing countries to participate in IEAs or not, due mostly to the fact they are normally less empowered economically than their developed counterparts. This argument leads to the following hypotheses:

H1: The inclusion of provisions for financial assistance in IEAs tends to increase participation from developed countries.

H2: The inclusion of provisions for financial assistance in IEAs tends to increase participation from developing countries.

Many IEAs also provide for the possibilities of technical training and capacity-building, especially for developing party members which do not have the necessary technical and technological infrastructure for the implementation of the IEAs. Developed countries especially may prefer to provide technical training and capacity-building rather than having to disburse funds for developing countries to implement the IEA provisions. For developing countries, possibilities for benefiting from technical know-how and much needed training can prove to be an attractive package for participation. This leads to the following hypotheses:

H3: The presence of clauses allowing for training and capacity-building tends to increase participation from developed countries.

H4: The presence of clauses allowing for training and capacity-building tends to increase participation from developing countries.

As discussed earlier, the minimum ratification clause (or the threshold number) acts as an incentive for enhanced IEC by minimizing opportunities for free-riding (Black et al., 1993; Barrett, 2000; Carraro et al., 2003). Further, states' concerns with preventing loss in their relative or absolute power, and their interest in preventing loss of control on their national sovereignty may incite them to participate in IEAs only if they can be sure that a good enough proportion of the international community is committing to the same obligations and constraints stipulated within the relevant treaty texts. A high threshold number can therefore have a positive

influence on participation in IEAs – both from the developed and developing countries.

H5: The higher the threshold number, the greater is the level of participation from developed countries.

H6: The higher the threshold number, the greater is the level of participation from developing countries.

While negotiating the texts of IEAs, there is always a concern with resolving the tension between IEA strength and IEA flexibility. It is critical to strike the right trade-off in order to secure maximum participation in the relevant IEAs. As discussed earlier, several mechanisms have been utilized to increase the flexibility of IEAs – examples include the permissibility of reservations, the allowing of withdrawals from the treaty, and the provision of flexible dispute resolution methods. It is to be expected that countries prefer to sign flexible IEAs – for example, those offering the possibility of reservations (Birnie, 1988; Sand, 1992; GAO, 1992; Granda, 1990; Hurrell and Benedict, 1992). Flexibility helps to provide a reassurance mechanism that states can still maintain their own control over their political and socio-economic decision-making and they can always find means to 'get out' if the IEAs prove to be too costly to them. This suggests that we can expect IEA flexibility to exert a positive effect on participation level – both from developing and developed countries. Thus, the following hypothesis can be postulated:

H7: The more flexible an IEA is, the greater the level of participation from developed countries.

H8: The more flexible an IEA is, the greater the level of participation from developing countries.

Closely related to the above argument is the fact that countries tend to prefer less binding commitments (Carraro, 1999a). Strong IEA clauses clearly limit a state's ability to maintain full control over its domestic policies, which in essence translate into a loss of power. A few researchers (Sand, 1992) have stated that developing countries seem to prefer to participate more in those conventions which have no binding commitments, and which are merely declaratory. This may likely be true since developing countries are still lagging behind the developed countries in terms of their economic and industrial development, and may therefore not welcome constraints on their development processes – as has been clearly demonstrated in negotiations pertaining to the climate change regime. In this context, a weak IEA may indeed seem more preferable than a strong one. Developed countries, on the other hand, may prefer binding commitments in view of the fact that they are often the ones being called upon to disburse financial and other resources for the implementation of the relevant IEAs. They may want to ensure that the resources transferred are being used to meet targets which are binding on both their developed competitors and the recipients of the resources. The following hypotheses can therefore be postulated:

H9: The stronger the IEA is, the lower the level of participation from developed countries. *H8: The stronger the IEA is, the higher the level of participation from developing countries.*

Game theorists often claim that the nature of information available to countries is of fundamental importance for the latter to determine their costs and benefits for engaging in IEC. It can therefore be assumed that mechanisms which help to reduce uncertainties and increase transparency are bound to favor IEC. Accordingly, several researchers have stated that reporting requirements, by increasing transparency on implementation, help to reduce fears about other parties' free-riding and thereby increase the possibility of cooperation (Victor et al., 1994; Chayes and Chayes, 1995, 1991). An increasing number of IEAs now include provisions for observership, either by NGOs or by other interested parties (e.g.

other non-member states or United Nations (UN) agencies). The following hypotheses can be postulated:

H10: The stronger the IEA is, the higher the level of participation from developed countries.

H11: Presence of transparency requirements tends to increase the level of participation from developing countries.

H12: Presence of transparency requirements tends to increase the level of participation from developing countries.

Models and operationalization of variables

The above hypotheses are tested from data compiled from the Environmental Treaties and Resource Indicators (ENTRI) database of the Socioeconomic Data and Applications Center (SEDAC).⁹ To understand the impact of IEA characteristics on total participation as well as participation from developing and developed countries, three dependent variables are used, and three models are proposed, as follows: (i) total participation, P_T , calculated as a percentage of total allowable parties (Model I); (ii) developed country participation, P_{DD} , calculated by dividing the total number of developed country members by the total number of developed countries allowed to participate (Model II); and (iii) developing country participation, P_{DG} , obtained by dividing the total number of developing party members by the total number of developing countries allowed to participate (Model III).¹⁰

A total of thirty-one global IEAs was selected dealing with various issue areas: 10 dealing with natural resources and nature conservation; 7 dealing with the atmosphere; 6 dealing with hazardous substances and nuclear radiation; and 8 dealing with marine waters and marine resources. Moreover, 8 of the IEAs were framework conventions and 6 were protocols. There is no existing dataset for the independent variables of direct relevance to the formulated hypotheses. This analysis therefore relies on extensive content analysis of the selected IEAs and the IEAs were coded based on specific IEA characteristics of direct relevance to the formulated hypotheses. To qualify the design of the IEAs, the presence of specific IEA clauses was indicated by 1 and absence was indicated by 0. The independent variables are thus either binary variables (0, 1) or a combination of the binary variables constituting a particular IEA characteristic. To measure the strength of the IEAs, the total score of the IEAs was calculated based on the presence (or absence) of each of the following measures for the variable *strength*: clear quantitative targets, implementation deadlines, requirements for enactment of legislation, review and verification mechanisms, and membership or trade sanctions. Participation incentives were measured by financial transfers and capacity-building provisions. The *fintransfers* variable was determined by analyzing the IEA text for presence/absence of provisions allowing for such financial transfers. Capacity-building (denoted by the variable *capacity*) relates to whether the IEA allows for education, training or specifically refers to the term 'capacity-building' in its provisions; whether there is provision for technical and scientific cooperation; and whether there are provisions for cooperation on R&D. Flexibility of the IEA is determined by whether the IEA allows parties to settle disputes through negotiations *first* (variable *Dispneg*) and whether the IEA allows individual party to propose amendments to the treaty (variable *Amendpty*). *Transparency* was obtained by adding the score for: whether the IEA allows non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and other

organizations to act as observers in the proceedings of the treaty affairs; whether there is the requirement to prepare yearly reports either by the parties or by the treaty bodies; and whether there is the requirement for parties to report on their implementation measures. The threshold number (variable *threshold*) is obtained direct from the IEA text which normally specifies the minimum number of ratifications required before the IEA can enter into force. The coding template is provided in Table 1.

The following equations summarize the investigation:

Model I: $P_T = \alpha + \beta_1(\text{strength}) + \beta_2(\text{incentives}) + \beta_3(\text{flexibility}) + \beta_4(\text{transparency}) + \beta_5(\text{threshold number}) + \xi$

Model II: $P_{DD} = \alpha + \beta_1(\text{strength}) + \beta_2(\text{incentives}) + \beta_3(\text{flexibility}) + \beta_4(\text{transparency}) + \beta_5(\text{threshold number}) + \xi$

Model III: $P_{DG} = \alpha + \beta_1(\text{strength}) + \beta_2(\text{incentives}) + \beta_3(\text{flexibility}) + \beta_4(\text{transparency}) + \beta_5(\text{threshold number}) + \xi$

ANALYSIS AND RESULTS

Since the dependent variables are continuous variables (percentage participation), the analysis is amenable to multiple linear regression analysis.¹¹ A preliminary analysis was done and the plots of residuals versus predicted values were analyzed to detect any patterns in the plots. Though there was no definite pattern in the plots, which hints at lack of heteroscedasticity, the regressions were rerun with robust standard errors to control for any non-visual heteroscedasticity that may be present in the data. The Jarque-Bera (JB) test showed that no statistically significant claim can be made that the distribution is not normal.¹² The results of the regression analyses are presented in Tables 2 – 4.

Model I: Total participation

For Model I (Table 2), the F-value of 8.47 is statistically significant at $p < 0.005$, showing good model fit. In line with theoretical expectations, stronger agreements show a negative association with total participation, and flexible provisions such as emphasizing negotiations as a means of dispute settlement or allowing any party to propose amendments to the IEA texts, show a positive relationship with total participation. The variable 'capacity' is showing a negative relationship with total participation, implying

¹¹ Pearson's correlations coefficients do not show any strong correlations among the independent variables. The highest correlation is between threshold number and provisions for financial transfers (*fintransfers*), with a correlation of 0.821. However, the high correlation of 0.821 does not seem to constitute a collinearity problem. The Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) for the different regressors in the model all range below 5, showing that collinearity is not affecting the regression coefficients.

¹² To test the normality assumptions underlying the multiple linear regression analyses, the Jarque-Bera (JB) test was used, which provides a test for any non-normality in the residuals. The hypotheses for the JB test are as follows:

H_0 : The residuals are normally distributed

H_a : The residuals are not normally distributed

The JB test fails to reject the null hypothesis of the distribution being normal at a significance level of 0.05. In other words, the JB test shows that no statistically significant claim can be made that the distribution is not normal.

⁹ Website: <http://sedac.ciesin.columbia.edu/entri/>

¹⁰ The total number of countries included in the dataset is 196, with 44 developed and 152 developing states. Thus, for total participation, P_T , actual participation level was divided by 196; for P_{DD} and P_{DG} , actual participation was divided by 44 and 152 respectively to yield the percentages for developed and developing country participation.

Table 1. Operationalization of variables.

Variable code		Legal provisions analyzed	Values
Strength	Strength	Presence of: (i) legislative requirements [1,0]; (ii) review [1,0] and verification mechanisms [1,0]; (iii) target deadlines [1,0]; (iv) trade [1,0] or membership sanctions [1,0]; (v) requirement for participation for specific countries (or group of countries) before into force [1,0]	Maximum possible value of 7; minimum 0.
	Fintransfers	Provisions for financial transfers among parties	Minimum of 0; maximum of 1.
Incentives	Capacity	(i) Provisions for education, training, or capacity-building [1,0] (ii) Provisions for technical and scientific cooperation [1,0] (iii) Provisions for cooperation on Research and Development [1,0]	Minimum of 0; maximum of 3.
	Dispneg Amendpty	Provisions for dispute resolution by negotiation first Provision for any party to propose amendments to the treaty	Minimum of 0; maximum of 1 Minimum of 0; maximum of 1.
Flexibility	Transparency	Presence of: (i) observership by NGOs [1,0] and other interested parties [1,0]; (ii) presence of reporting requirements [1,0]; (iii) requirements for submission of yearly reports by parties [1,0] and by treaty bodies [1,0]	Maximum possible value of 5; minimum 0.
	Threshold	Minimum participation requirement	As stipulated in treaty text: minimum value of 3; maximum of 60.

Table 2. Regression results for Model I – dependent variable: total participation.

Model I total participation P_T	Unstandardized coefficients		Standardized coefficients		
	B	Robust Standard Error	Beta	t	Significance
Constant	19.381	8.376		2.31	0.030
Strength	-12.247	5.370	-0.453	-2.28	0.032**
Transparency	7.728	3.273	0.441	2.36	0.027**
Threshold	0.291	0.441	0.155	0.66	0.515
Dispneg	19.404	10.650	0.331	1.82	0.081*
Amendpty	6.334	9.946	0.095	0.64	0.531
Fintransfers	2.488	15.463	0.036	0.16	0.874
Capacity	-1.085	5.707	-0.043	-0.19	0.851

N, 31; R^2 , 0.5009; F-statistic, 8.47***; * significant at the 0.005 level; ** significant at the 0.05 level; * significant at the 0.1 level.

that there is a tendency among states to view provisions for capacity-building in an unfavorable light.

Variables which are statistically significant at the 5% level are 'strength' and 'transparency', while 'dispneg' (dispute settlement through negotiations first) is statistically significant at the 10% level. The threshold number,

together with 'amendpty' (amendment by party), 'fintransfers' (financial transfers), and 'capacity' are not statistically significant.

From these results we can conclude that IEAs which have strong clauses tend to elicit lower participation rates, while IEAs which favor dispute resolution through

Table 3. Regression Results for Model II: Dependent variable: Participation from developed countries.

Model II Participation from developed countries P _{DD}	Unstandardized coefficients		Standardized coefficients		
	B	Robust standard error	Beta	t	Significance
Constant	35.584	12.820		2.78	0.011
Strength	-12.336	5.515	-0.472	-2.24	0.035**
Transparency	7.767	3.860	0.458	2.01	0.056*
Threshold	0.044	0.520	0.024	0.08	0.933
Dispneg	20.639	10.862	0.364	1.90	0.070*
Amendpty	-1.990	13.004	-0.031	-0.15	0.880
Fintransfers	-4.652	14.626	-0.069	-0.32	0.753
Capacity	2.261	6.654	0.093	0.34	0.737

N, 31; R² 0.4178; F-statistic, 4.21***; *** significant at the 0.005 level; ** significant at the 0.05 level; * significant at the 0.1 level.

negotiations first tend to sustain higher levels of participation from the international community. Further, IEAs which include transparency measures, such as allowing NGOs and other interested parties to act as observers, or requiring parties to report on their implementation, tend to elicit higher participation rates from the international community.

With all other variables held constant, the incorporation of an additional clause for strengthening an IEA will result in a loss of participation from 12 states, while the inclusion of an additional clause for increasing the transparency of an IEA will cause the IEA to sustain participation from 7 additional states. The legal possibility of resolving disputes through negotiations first will tend to increase participation in an IEA by 19 more states.

From the beta weights of the variables, the strength of an IEA seems to exert the greatest influence on total participation, followed very closely by the transparency provisions of the IEA. With all other variables held constant, an increase of one standard deviation in the strength of an IEA will result in a decrease of 0.45 standard deviation in total participation, while an increase of one standard deviation in the transparency of the IEA will result in an increase of 0.44 standard deviation in total participation. Similarly, with all other variables held constant, an increase of one standard deviation in the variable 'dispneg' (dispute resolution through negotiation) will cause an increase of 0.33 standard deviation in participation.

Model II: Participation from developed countries

For Model II (Table 3), the F-statistic (value of 4.21) is significant at $p < 0.005$, attesting to good model fit. From the direction of the associations, strong clauses within an IEA seem to detract from high participation from developed countries, while transparency provisions seem to attract more developed states to participate in the IEA. Moreover, developed countries seem not to favor clauses

allowing any party to propose amendments to the treaty text, as well as clauses allowing financial transfers to take place among parties. On the other hand, developed countries seem to favor measures for capacity-building.

Variable 'strength' is statistically significant at the 5% level, while 'transparency' and 'dispneg' (dispute settlement through negotiations first) are statistically significant at the 10% level. Variables 'threshold', 'amendpty', 'fintransfers' and 'capacity' do not show any statistical significance with participation from developed countries.

The results show that developed countries tend to participate less in stronger agreements, and more in those agreements which include provisions enhancing transparency or favoring dispute settlement through negotiations first. With all other variables held constant, the inclusion of one additional clause for strengthening an IEA will cause a decrease in participation from 12 developed countries. One additional clause for enhancing the transparency of an IEA will result in an increase in participation from 7 more developed nations. Presence of a clause allowing for dispute resolution through negotiations first will result in an increase in participation from 20 developed countries.

From the beta weights, the strength of an IEA seems to exert the greatest influence on participation from developed countries, followed by the presence of transparency clauses. With all other variables held constant, an increase of one standard deviation in the strength of an IEA will result in a decrease of 0.47 standard deviation in participation from developed countries, while an increase of one standard deviation in the transparency of an IEA will result in an increase of 0.46 standard deviation in participation from developed countries.

Model III: Participation from developing countries

For Model III (Table 4), the F-statistic (value of 9.22) is statistically significant at a p-value of less than 0.005%

Table 4. Regression Results for Model III: Dependent Variable: Participation of developing countries.

Model III Participation from developing countries P _{DC}	Unstandardized coefficients		Standardized coefficients		
	B	Error	Beta	t	Significance
Constant	14.746	7.610		1.94	0.065
Strength	-12.042	5.442	-0.433	-2.21	0.037**
Transparency	7.791	3.258	0.432	2.39	0.025**
Threshold	0.328	0.438	0.170	0.75	0.461
Dispneg	19.016	11.017	0.316	1.73	0.098*
Amendpty	8.383	9.526	0.122	0.88	0.388
Fintransfers	4.509	16.527	0.063	0.27	0.787
Capacity	-1.875	5.739	-0.073	-0.33	0.747

N, 31; R² 0.504; F-statistic, 9.22***; *** significant at the 0.005 level; ** significant at the 0.05 level; * significant at the 0.1 level.

level, showing good model fit. The direction of the regression coefficients shows that developing countries tend not to favor strong IEAs and those which have provisions for capacity-building, and to prefer IEAs which are transparent, include provisions for amendments by any party, allow for dispute resolution through negotiations first, and include mechanisms for financial transfers.

The variable 'strength' and 'transparency' are both statistically significant at the 5% level, while 'dispneg' (dispute settlement through negotiations first) is statistically significant at the 10% level. The variables threshold, 'amendpty' (any party can bring amendment to IEA text), 'fintransfers' (provisions for financial transfers) and 'capacity' do not depict statistical significance with participation from developing countries. The results show that developing countries tend to participate less in stronger IEAs than in weaker ones, and that they favor IEAs which enhance transparency and favor flexibility. With all other variables held constant, an additional clause meant to strengthen an IEA will result in a loss of participation from 12 developing countries, while an increase of an additional clause on transparency will result in an increase in participation from 7 developing nations. The possibility of resolving disputes through negotiations first causes an increase in participation from 19 developing countries, if all other variables are held constant. Both the strength and transparency provisions of IEAs seem to exert the same level of influence on participation from developing countries. If there is an increase of one standard deviation in the strength of an IEA, participation from developing countries will decrease by 0.43 standard deviation, while all other variables are held constant. Similarly, if transparency of the IEA increases by one standard deviation, participation from developing countries increases by 0.43 standard deviation, when all other variables are held constant.

DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS

The results of the regression analyses show that strong

and binding provisions exert a negative impact on total participation in IEAs, while provisions which promote transparency and flexible means of dispute settlement tend to increase participation in IEAs. Thus, emphasizing binding commitments is clearly counterproductive to securing wide participation in IEAs, which has been described as "a first priority of international cooperation" (Barrett and Stavins, 2003b p. 358). For stronger IEC, therefore, there is a need to promote transparency and flexibility measures within IEAs, and not focus overly on making IEAs more binding. Moreover, focusing on making IEAs more binding, without attendant measures for enhancing the capabilities of countries to implement the IEAs, will likely result in lack of compliance and implementation failures. As noted by Cameron et al. (1996 p. xiv), "punitive sanctions alone will not provide solutions" in so far as compliance procedures within IEAs are concerned; rather, they tend to "exacerbate tensions."

Contrary to expectations, *both* developing and developed countries seem to disfavor IEAs with strong binding provisions. This congruence in preferences between the developing and developed countries opens up a space for potential enhanced IEC, given that the concerns are the same. Though nation states are traditionally concerned with maintaining their sovereignty over their natural resources, the concept of sovereignty does evolve to accommodate the new drive for greater IEC (Handl, 1991). However, this "greening of sovereignty" (Litfin, 1999) and the various "sovereignty bargains" (Litfin, 1997) that occur in the face of global environmental challenges also rest upon adequate incentives and flexibility mechanisms to entice states to participate in the IEAs. It seems that IEAs will have to be engineered such that they succeed in striking the right balance between flexibility and strength. As argued by Barrett and Stavins (2003b p. 359) in the case of the UNFCCC, it might be better to go for a "broad but shallow" IEA rather than a "narrow but deep" one as the former is more likely to solicit greater participation, and thereby reduce the total costs of mitigation.

In all likelihood, statements referring to the preference of developed countries for stringent environmental measures may fit the regional landscape better than the global one. In the case of regional IEAs (e.g. the Baltic Sea Protection treaty,¹³ Protection of the Rhine,¹⁴ the Acid Rain Treaty¹⁵), developed countries are more directly and seriously impacted by the environmental problems, and ensuring that free-riding and non-compliance do not occur become important objectives of the negotiations. Thus, the developed countries may prefer that all neighboring states commit to the same high binding standards. Moreover, as argued by Cameron et al. (1996 p. xv), the “common culture” shared by regional states may also play a part in the success of “more sophisticated control regimes” at the regional level. Cameron et al. (1996 p. xv) also note that “[r]egional regimes seem to allow Parties to remain in closer contact with real problems and potential solutions; the Parties’ interests tend to be less disparate and their concerns more immediate.”

The predilection on the part of both the developed and developing countries for transparency measures (e.g. through regular reporting requirements) within IEA texts and for flexibility to resolve potential disputes through negotiations first reinforce the potential for strengthened IEC. These findings can be understood in terms of states’ concerns with satisfying themselves that other party members are not free-riding and that they can maintain some level of control on the dispute resolution process. Clauses enhancing transparency will likely make the processes of treaty implementation more open to international scrutiny and will likely contribute positively towards building trust and enhancing collaborative endeavors to address the specific global environmental issues. Transparency also increases the likelihood that the IEA will be effective by shedding light on various management problems such as misuse of funds transferred for treaty implementation, or inadequate domestic efforts to fully comply and implement the IEA provisions. Thus, the potential negative impact of including binding provisions can be mitigated by reinforcing transparency measures.

Control over dispute resolution is crucial in international relations among states. Loss of such control can potentially be viewed as an erosion of national sovereignty, and thus less palatable to states. The general preference for negotiations as the first means of addressing conflicts points to the fact that, at least in the international environmental domain, countries are interested in avoiding protracted tensions in their relationships and believe that they can arrive at mutually agreeable positions through the normal processes of negotiations. This is an important finding as it holds promise for peace. A preference for

negotiations is a potential harbinger of friendly debates and an open and frank atmosphere to resolve conflicting interests and establish mutually recognized rights and obligations in the environmental domain. This ties in with prior research which demonstrates clearly the peace-building potential of environmental initiatives (Frerks et al., 2014 p. 19; Conca, 2001; Conca and Dabelko, 2002; Conca et al., 2005).

The variable ‘threshold’ does not show any direct impact on total participation, as also on participation from the developing or developed nations. This is antithetic to the increasing economic exposés which posit that IEC tends to increase when there is a minimum ratification clause embedded in the treaty text. While economic analysis seems to argue that making participation contingent on that of other states will likely increase overall participation, in real policy-making contexts, this needs not be an automatic outcome. It is likely that countries may not be concerned so much about the number of required ratifications, as about the nature of participation. In other words, while countries may not care about how many other states have already ratified a particular treaty, they may nevertheless be interested in whether a particular country or a particular group of countries is ratifying or not. In this sense, the number does not really matter. Canada’s withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol, for example, followed suit to US’s withdrawal in 2002 (Ljunggren, 2011, December 13). It might be better therefore for IEAs to come into force right after the period for signature ends. This means that as soon as a country ratifies an IEA, the IEA provisions enter into force for that country immediately, without having to wait for a specific number of minimum ratifications. Given that many environmental impacts are irreversible, and that time is of the essence for many serious issues such as global climate change, having IEAs enter into force for ratifying members right after ratification is a sensible strategy.

Though the variables ‘threshold’, ‘amendment’ (amendment by any party), ‘financial transfers’, and capacity-building do not depict any statistical significance for both the developing and developed countries, what is interesting is that they depict different directions of association in each case. The results show a positive association between developing country participation and provisions facilitating financial transfers, as well as provisions allowing any party to propose amendments to the treaty. Moreover, developing country participation shows a negative association with measures for capacity-building. On the other hand, developed country participation shows a negative association with clauses allowing amendment propositions from any party member, and provisions for financial transfers; and a positive association with provisions for capacity-building measures (Table 5).

Why would developed countries depict a low preference for provisions for financial transfers? Most likely it is because, in all probability, they will be the ones

¹³Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area (Helsinki, 1992)

¹⁴Convention on the Protection of the Rhine (Berne, 1999)

¹⁵Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution (Geneva, 1979)

Table 5. Differences of IEA preferences for developed and developing countries.

IEA Characteristics	Direction of association	
	Developing countries	Developed countries
Capacity-building provisions	Negative	Positive
Amendment by any party	Positive	Negative
Financial mechanism	Positive	Negative

responsible for disbursing funds for the financial transfers. Concerns with the misappropriation of funds, lack of accountability, corruption, or dwindling financial resources (Thérien et al., 2000; Winters, 2010) may explain why developed countries seem to prefer to invest in measures for capacity-building (such as training, technology transfers, and R&D cooperation) rather than on direct monetary transfers. On the other hand, the preference of developing nations for financial transfers may be understood in terms of their perceptions that they are entitled to such disbursements since they were not responsible for creating the environmental problems in the first place. As discussed earlier, many IEAs do recognize the fact that the special needs of developing countries need to be taken into consideration.

Overall, therefore, arguments relating to the CBDR framework need to be taken seriously if the participation of developing countries is to be secured. There are serious issues of equity and capabilities that need to be successfully addressed for effective IEC. Promoting financial transfers makes sense if the goal is to increase international commitment to the protection of the global environment. The fact that developing nations are often heavily dependent on foreign aid and face high levels of various social challenges (such as malnutrition, high infant mortality, poverty) makes financial transfers an indispensable strategy for global environmental protection – as has been recognized in many of the recent IEAs. The negative relationship between developing country participation and the measures geared towards capacity-building only strengthen the finding that financial transfers seem to be a better strategy to attract developing nations to participate in IEAs. Developing nations' negative relationship with capacity-building provisions may also stem from the fact that such measures often are very diffusely framed, with no clear or concrete plans of action or outcomes. Moreover, the promise of capacity-building may not materialize in the short-time frame, as opposed to financial transfers, which are more likely to have clearly specified *modus operandi* and specific timelines. The difference in preference between developed and developing nations in so far as amendment clauses are concerned can be understood in terms of the parameters of IEA formation and adoption. Though IEA negotiations are more open to participation from developing countries nowadays, the developed countries have traditionally been the main party in agenda-setting (Shearer, 1994).

Developed nations have typically been more highly involved in the negotiations, drafting and adoption of a particular IEA text than developing nations. If after protracted negotiations a final IEA text is finally adopted, it makes sense that the negotiating partners would not welcome any one future party member to bring amendments to the treaty texts. Allowing amendments by any party member will likely alter the structure of the calculations of costs and benefits which the developed nations relied on to participate in the IEAs in the first place. Given the fact that withdrawing from IEAs is not itself without costs, amendments can only be a trigger of additional costs rather than benefits for the developed world. Developing countries, on the other hand, show a positive association with the ability to bring amendments to IEA provisions. This likely reflects developing countries' desire to safeguard their national interests and concerns in a process which did not involve them significantly in the initial phases. It is likely that the developing nations may not find all aspects of the IEA to be in their favor and they may desire to have the freedom to request for a modification of the status quo if need be.

Conclusion

This study shows clearly that effective IEC requires that IEAs be engineered such that they succeed in striking the right balance between flexibility and strength, and that the common aspirations of both the developing and developed nations be taken into account. This means that serious attention has to be given to issues of equity and state capabilities for implementing IEAs. Findings from this study show clearly that there is great scope for strengthening IEC through the adoption of IEAs which allow for flexibility in dispute resolution, which promote transparency in implementation (e.g. through reporting requirements or NGO observership), and which do not include too many binding and restrictive sanctioning mechanisms (e.g. through legislative requirements, trade or membership sanctions, verification mechanisms, etc.). The key is to flexibly solicit, rather than compel, IEC and to establish goals and targets in a framework that takes seriously the concerns of states with equity and fairness as far as international burden-sharing is concerned.

One possible starting point is to build on the preference of states for the inclusion of transparency measures

within IEA texts. This study shows that strengthening reporting requirements and allowing non-state actors to act as observers within the treaty proceedings can potentially improve participation rates. There has indeed been a definite trend towards the inclusion of such parameters in the most recent IEAs (e.g. the UNFCCC, the CBD, the Montreal Protocol, and the Kyoto Protocol, and the Desertification Convention,¹⁶ *inter alia*). On the other hand, strength and flexibility need not be in competition with each other. IEAs can be built such that binding clauses are complemented with flexible mechanisms of implementation, especially taking into account the differing capabilities of countries, and keeping the framework of the CBDR principle in mind. Developing countries' inherent logistical constraints (such as low levels of economic development, poverty, and low quality of life) will have to be met with special provisions to allow them to benefit from much needed financial transfers and capacity-building. Moreover, a package for capacity-building may be made more enticing and more effective by incorporating results-oriented strategies and programs. Flexibility in this sense may further empower participating states in their goals of abiding by the mandated targets and deadlines.

Overall, it seems that a mix of participation incentives and a right balance between strength and flexibility is important for both developed and developing countries. From a holistic perspective, therefore, state participation in IEAs has to be placed within the context of national development trajectories. Even though state leaders may consider that participating in specific IEAs is worthy as a cause, domestic development exigencies may run counter to such goals. Participation in IEAs has to be viewed as an attractive endeavor, and therefore, the international community will score greater success if emphasis is placed on developing incentives and enhancing the capabilities of nation states to participate in the IEAs, rather than highlighting sanctions and strict enforcement measures.

Given the great challenges posed by global environmental problems, there is no doubt that the concept of participation incentives has to be broadened beyond the traditional understanding of financial transfers and capacity-building. Many of the constraints faced by the developing world are related to the structure of the international order. The trading and financial international order will have to be revamped to allow developing countries to pursue human development while maintaining their commitment to sustainable growth. Unless and until the underlying root causes of massive poverty levels and low levels of human development are addressed, sustainable development will likely suffer from lack of prioritization in the policy arena.

¹⁶ The United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification in Those Countries Experiencing Serious Drought and/or Desertification, Particularly in Africa (1994)

Conflict of Interests

The author has not declared any conflict of interests.

REFERENCES

- Andresen S, Ostreng W (1989). *International resource management: the role of science and politics*, London: Belhaven Press.
- Arenas X (2008). "testing the role of the principle of common but differentiated responsibility in international environmental agreements" dissertation, school of law and diplomacy, tufts university.
- Arts B (2001). "The impact of environmental ngos on international conventions," in b. Arts, math noorman, and bob reinalda, ed. *Non-state actors in international relations*. Burlington, usa: ashgate.
- Barrett S (1995). *Trade restrictions in international environmental agreements*. London: london business school.
- Barrett S (1992). "international environmental agreements as games," In: R. Pethig, ed. *Conflicts and cooperation in managing environmental resources*. Berlin: springer.
- Barrett S (2000). "Political economy of the kyoto protocol," in d. Helm, ed. *Environmental policy: objectives, instruments, and implementation*. New york: oxford university press.
- Barrett S, Robert s (2003a). "Increasing participation and compliance in international climate agreements," *international environmental agreements: Polit. Law Econ.* 3(4):349-376.
- Barrett S, Robert S (2003b). "Increasing participation and compliance in international climate change agreements," *international environmental agreements: Polit. Law Econ.* 3(4): 349-376.
- Bernauer T, Anna k, Vally k, Gabriele S (2013). "Is there a "depth versus participation" dilemma in international cooperation?," *review of international organizations*, 8:477-497. Doi 10.1007/s11558-013-9165-1.
- Birnie P (1988). "The role of international law in solving certain environmental conflicts," In: J. E. Carroll, ed. *International environmental diplomacy*.
- Black J, Maurice D, Levi David de M (1993). "Creating a good atmosphere: minimum participation for tackling the 'greenhouse effect'," *Economica* 60:281-93.
- Blackman A (2002). "The economics of technology diffusion: implications for greenhouse gas mitigation in developing countries," In: S. S. Nagel, ed. *Environmental policy and developing nations*. North carolina: mcfarland & company, Inc., publishers.
- Bodansky D (1994). "Prologue to the climate change convention," In: I. M. Mintzer & J. A. Leonard, eds. *Negotiating climate change: the inside story of the rio convention*. Cambridge, massachusetts: cambridge university press.
- Bohmelt T, Pilster UH (2010). "international environmental regimes: legalisation, flexibility and effectiveness," *Australian J. Polit. Sci.* 45(2):245-260.
- Borione D, Ripert J (1994). "Exercising common but differentiated responsibility," In: I. M. Mintzer & j. A. Leonard, eds. *Negotiating climate change: the inside story of the rio convention*. Cambridge, mass.: cambridge university press.
- Botteon M, Carlo C (1998). "Strategies for environmental negotiations: issue-linkage with heterogeneous countries," in n. Hanley & h. Folmer, eds. *Game theory and the environment*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
- Bowman MC, Redgwell Eds (1996). *International law and the conservation of biological diversity*, boston: kluwer law international.
- Breitmeier H, Arild U, Oran R, young (2011). "The effectiveness of international environmental regimes: comparing and contrasting findings from quantitative research," *Int. Stud. Rev.* 13(4):579-605.
- Caldwell LK (1988). "Beyond environmental diplomacy: the changing institutional structure of international cooperation," in j. E. Carroll, ed. *International environmental diplomacy*. New york: cambridge university press.
- Cameron J, Jacob W, Peter R (1996). "Introduction," in j. Werksman, j. Cameron & p. Roderick, eds. *Improving compliance with international environmental law*. New York: Earthscan.

- Carraro C (1997). *International environmental agreements: strategic policy issues*, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
- Carraro C (1999a). *International environmental agreements on climate change*, Dordrecht, the Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
- Carraro C (1999b). "The structure of international environmental agreements," In: C. Carraro, ed. *International environmental agreements on climate change*. Dordrecht, the Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
- Carraro C, Siniscalco (1997). "R&D cooperation and the stability of international environmental agreements," in C. Carraro, ed. *International environmental agreements: strategic policy issues*. Cheltenham: Elgar.
- Carraro C, Carmen M, Sonia O (2003). *Endogenous minimum participation in international environmental treaties: Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Paper Series*. Coalition Theory Network. Nota di lavoro 113.2003.
- Carraro C, Siniscalco D (1995). *R&D cooperation and the stability of international environmental agreements*. CEPR Discussion Papers: 1154. <http://ideas.repec.org/p/cpr/ceprdp/1154.html>
- Cesar HA, De Zeeuw (1994). "Issue linkage in global environmental problems," In: A. Xepapadeas, ed. *Economic policy for the environment and natural resources*. Cheltenham: e. Elgar.
- Chasek PS (2000). *The global environment in the twenty-first century: prospects for international cooperation*, New York: United Nations University Press.
- Chayes A, Antonia HC (1991). "Adjustment and compliance processes in international regulatory regimes," In: J. T. Mathews, ed. *Preserving the global environment: the challenge of shared leadership*. New York: W.W. Norton & Company.
- Chayes A, Antonia HC (1995). *The new sovereignty: compliance with international regulatory agreements*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
- Churchill R (1996). "The contribution of existing agreements for the conservation of terrestrial species and habitats to the maintenance of biodiversity," In: M. Bowman & C. Redgwell, eds. *International law and the conservation of biological diversity*. Boston: Kluwer Law International.
- Conca K (2001). "Environmental cooperation and international peace," In: P. F. Diehl & N. P. Gleditsch, eds. *Environmental conflict*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Conca K, Alexander C, Geoffrey DD (2005). *Building peace through environmental cooperation*, New York: W.W. Norton & Company.
- Conca K, Geoffrey DD (2002). *Environmental peacemaking*, Washington, D.C. and Baltimore: Woodrow Wilson Center Press and the Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Dasgupta C (1994). "The climate change negotiations," In: I. M. Mintzer & J. A. Leonard, eds. *Negotiating climate change: the inside story of the Rio Convention*. Cambridge, Mass.: Cambridge University Press.
- Desombre ER (2000). *Domestic sources of international environmental policy: industry, environmentalists, and US Power*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
- Desombre ER (2002). *The global environment and world politics*. New York: Continuum.
- Diehl, PP (1997). *The politics of global governance*, Boulder, Colorado: Rienner.
- Downs GW (1998). "Enforcement and the evolution of cooperation," *Michigan J. Int. Law*, 19(2):319-344.
- Evans P (2000). "Sustainability, degradation, and livelihood in third world cities: possibilities for state-society synergy," In: P. S. Chasek, ed. *The global environment in the twenty-first century: prospects for international cooperation*.
- Finus M (2001a). *Game theory and international environmental cooperation*. Cheltenham, UK; Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar.
- Finus M (2001b). *Game theory and international environmental cooperation*. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar.
- Folmer H, De Zeeuw A (2000). "International environmental problems and policy," In: H. Folmer & I. H. Gabel, eds. *Principles of environmental and resource economics: a guide for students and decision-makers*. Second ed. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar.
- Frerks G, Ton D, Pieter V, Der Z (2014). "Conflict and cooperation on natural resources: justifying the cocoon programme," In: M. Bavinck, I. Pellegrini & e. Mostert, eds. *Conflicts over natural resources in the global south: conceptual approaches*. London, UK: Taylor & Francis Group.
- Gao (1992). *International environment: strengthening the implementation of environmental agreements*. Washington, D.C.: GAO.
- Granda C (1990). "The Montreal Protocol on substances that deplete the ozone layer," In: I. E. Susskind, Siskind E. and Breslin J.W., ed. *Nine case studies in international environmental negotiations*. The MIT Press.
- Haas PM (1990). *Saving the Mediterranean: the politics of international environmental cooperation*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Haas PM (1992). "Epistemic communities and international policy coordination," *International Organization* 46(1):1-35.
- Handl G (1991). "Environmental security and global change: the challenges to international law," In: W. Lang, Neuhold H., and Zemanek K., ed. *Environmental protection and international law*. Boston: Graham & Trotman.
- Harvard Law Review, the editors (1992). *Trends in international environmental law*. Chicago, USA: American Bar Association. https://openlibrary.org/books/OL1350489M/Trends_in_international_environmental_law
- Heister J, Ernst M, Wolf P, Frank S, Tobias S, Rudiger W (1995). *Economic and legal aspects of international environmental agreements - the case of enforcing and stabilising an international CO2 agreement*. Kiel Institute of World Economics.
- Helm C (2000a). *Economic theories of international environmental cooperation*. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar.
- Helm C, Dellef S (2000). "Measuring the effectiveness of international environmental regimes," *J. Conflict Resolution* 44(5):630-652.
- Helm D (2000b). *Environmental policy: objectives, instruments and implementation*, New York: Oxford University Press, Inc.
- Honkonen T (2009). *The common but differentiated responsibility principle in multilateral environmental agreements: regulatory and policy aspects*. The Netherlands: Kluwer Law International
- Hoskins, Linus A (1982). *The new international economic order: a bibliographic handbook*. Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, Inc.
- Hurrell A, Benedict K eds (1992). *The international politics of the environment*, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Katsoulacos Y (1997). "R&D spillovers, R&D cooperation, innovation and international environmental agreements," In: C. Carraro, ed. *International environmental agreements: strategic policy issues*. Cheltenham: e. Elgar.
- Keohane RO (1984). *After hegemony: cooperation and discord in the world political economy*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
- Keohane, Robert O, Joseph S N (1989). *Power and interdependence*. New York: Harper Collins.
- Kutting G (2000). *Environment, society and international relations: towards more effective international environmental agreements*. New York: Routledge.
- Litfin KT (1997). "Sovereignty in world ecopolitics," *Mershon Int. Stud. Rev.* 41(2):167-204.
- Litfin KT (1999). *The greening of sovereignty in world politics*. Massachusetts: MIT Press.
- Maffei MC, Pineschi L, Scovazzi T, Treves T (1996). *Participation in world treaties on the protection of the environment: a collection of data*, Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
- Marbury HJ (1995). "Hazardous waste exportation: the global manifestation of environmental racism," *Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law*, 28:251-297. Quoted from Webster-main, 2002 p.94.
- Miles EI, Arild U, Steinar A, Jorgen W, Jon Birger S, Elaine C (2002). *Environmental regime effectiveness: confronting theory with evidence*, Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
- Mitchell RB (1994). *Intentional oil pollution at sea: environmental policy and treaty compliance*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
- Najam A (1993). "International environmental negotiation: a strategy for the south," In: I. E. Susskind, ed. *Papers on international environmental negotiation*. Cambridge, Mass.: Program on negotiation at Harvard Law School. 3.
- Najam A (2002). "International environmental negotiation: a strategy for the south," In: L. Susskind, ed. *Transboundary environmental negotiation: new approaches to global cooperation*. San Francisco,

- CA: Jossey-Bass.
- Nayar JR, Ong DM (1996). "Developing countries, development and the conservation of biological diversity," In: M. Bowman & C. Regdwell, eds. *International law and the conservation of biological diversity*. Boston: Kluwer Law International.
- Okereke C (2008). "Equity norms in global environmental governance," *Global Environ. Politics* 8(3):25-50.
- Park RS (1998). "An examination of international environmental racism through the lens of transboundary movement of hazardous wastes " *Indiana J. Global Legal Stud.* 5(2):14. Available at: <http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1138&context=iijls>
- Pearson, Peter JG, Roger F (1996). "Energy efficiency, economic efficiency and future co2 emissions from the developing world," *Energy J.* 17(4):135-160.
- Sand PH (1992). "Lessons learned in global governance," In: W. Lang, Neuhold H., and Zemanek K., ed. *Environmental Protection And International Law*. Boston: Graham & Trotman.
- Schmidt C (2000a). *Designing international environmental agreements: incentive compatible strategies for cost-effective cooperation*. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar.
- Schmidt C (2000b). *Designing international environmental agreements: incentive compatible strategies for cost-effective cooperation*. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar.
- Schmidt C (2001). "Incentives for international environmental cooperation: theoretical models and economic instruments," In: G. G. Schulze & H. W. Ursprung, eds. *International environmental economics: a survey of the issues*. New York: Oxford University Press. Chapter 10, pp.209-240.
- Shearer CRH (1994). "International environmental law colloquim: international environmental law and development in developing nations: agenda-setting, articulation, and institutional participation," *Tulane Environmental Law J.* 7.
- Sprinz DT (1994). "The interest-based explanation of international environmental policy," *International Organization* 48(1):77-105.
- Thérien J, Carolyn J, Caroline I (2000). "Development assistance on the brink," *Third World Quarterly* 21(1):21-38.
- Underdal A (1998a). "Leadership in international environmental negotiations: designing feasible solutions," In: A. Underdal, ed. *The politics of international environmental management*. Dordrecht, the Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
- Underdal A (1998b). "Leadership in international environmental negotiations: designing feasible solutions," In: A. Underdal, ed. *The politics of international environmental management*. Dordrecht, the Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
- Underdal A (2000). *International environmental agreements and domestic politics: the case of acid rain*. Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Victor DG, Owen G, John I, Juan CDP, Korula A (1994). *Review mechanisms in the effective implementation of international environmental agreements*. Laxenburg, Austria: Iiasa.
- Webster-main A (2002). "Keeping africa out of the global backyard: a comparative study of the basel and bamako conventions," *Environ.* 26(1):65-94.
- Wettestad J (2001). "Designing effective environmental regimes: the conditional keys," *Global Governance* 7(3):317-341.
- Wilkening K, David Von Hippel, Peter H (2000). "sustainable energy in a developing world: the role of knowledgeable markets," In: P. S. Chasek, ed. *The global environment in the twenty-first century: prospects for international cooperation*. New York: United Nations University Press.
- Winters MS (2010). "Accountability, participation and foreign aid effectiveness," *Int. Stud. Rev.* 12(2):218-243.
- Young OR (1997). *Global governance: drawing insights from the environmental experience*, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Mit Press.
- Young OR, Gail O (1993). *Polar politics: creating international environmental regimes*, Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press.

Full Length Research Paper

Unipolar world in crisis as Russia challenges U.S and allies, dragging other disgruntled countries along

F. A. Olasupo

Department of Local Government Studies, Faculty of Administration, Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife, Osun-State.

Received 28 October, 2013, Accepted 19 September, 2014

For more than two decades after the collapse of Soviet Union and concomitantly, cold war, United States of America became dominant world power, with western powers queuing behind her. Preoccupied by domestic political and economic problems that led, in the first instance, to the collapse of the octopus (Soviet empire), the old rival and foe receded from international politics and other engagements. United States and her western allies, thus, had field days in most part of Europe, South America, Asia, Middle East and Africa. However, having gathered sufficient political and economic stability, Russia, in the last one year, is not only making foray into international politics but actually challenging US socially, politically and militarily. This paper is out to examine how Russia is doing these dragging along some disgruntled continents against United States of America and her allies.

Key words: Unipolar world, nuclear, chemical, weapons, human rights, religious rights and protests.

INTRODUCTION

Today, United State of America is roundly criticized, not least within US itself, for the self-imposed duty of global police. But US is in fact and indeed eminently qualified to play this role whether anybody, any nation or any continent likes it or not. Regretting the role Albert Einstein played in the development of atomic and nuclear bombs, which might be weapons that would destroy the world should every Tom, Dick and Harry possess it, he recommended, "After World War II", for "Allied to set up a world government to control the atom bomb" (Golden, 1999; Renn, 2005). Though he argued for possession of it (by few, and across ideological divide and as a sort of check and balances) as necessary step to "intimidate human race into bringing order into its international affairs, which without the pressure of fear, it would not do" (Philippe, 1999). United States of America, being the

first nation in the universe to develop and use atomic bomb and seeing its devastating effect, is therefore eminently qualified to be the patent global police of atomic and nuclear weapons development and deployment.

Towards further stability of mankind, nature has raised Russia to serve as effective military counterweight to US who out of monopoly of these could become a global tyrant. Although pockets of nations in the world today, especially the developed nations, possess one form of atomic weapon or the other, U.S. and Russia remain the undisputed superpowers, militarily.

Economically, America and her western allies are most economically endowed nations in the world. They control world economy, finance as well as corporate media houses such as CNN and BBC (Brian, 2013a). But of

E-mail: faolasupo@yahoo.com. Tel: +2348034065576.

Authors agree that this article remain permanently open access under the terms of the [Creative Commons Attribution License 4.0 International License](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/)

late, China, an ally of Russia, is challenging US domination of world economy.

If, militarily and economically, United States is the most powerful nation in the world, it of course should be the patent global police force. This kind of leadership cannot be elected or appointed. It is a personal quality of a nation. However, most nations in the world, and indeed, continents, are not comfortable with the way America exercises these powers. Issues over, which United States of America and its allies clash with the rest of the world range from nuclear power, chemical weapons (any weapon of mass destruction), Democracy, Human rights violation, and Religion. They recently added another issue of gay and lesbian rights, which Russia and most Africans and Arab countries kicked against.

The concern of this paper is to examine how America and her allies are being challenged by other counter-vailing powers such as Russia and China in particular as well as some disgruntled nations opposed to America and her allies' despotism with regards to monopolization of military and economic powers.

Nuclear power

Since after the First and Second World Wars, the dichotomy between the West and the East has deepened in World affairs, not necessarily military but also economically, ideologically and socially, particularly between United State of America and Russia, the inheritor of Soviet arsenal of nuclear weapons. U.S and her Western nations are the richest group in the world while Russia-China and their other allies are the more populous group (Brian, 2013a). While America and her allies are always quick to deploy military action, Russia and her allies often prefer peaceful means that, in U.S and her allies view slow down actions and waste a lot of time and resources. Ultimately, Russian and her allies approach always triumph though in the face of perceived real military threat by U.S and her allies. Cuban missiles crisis of 1961, North Korean missiles of April 2013 and the current Syria chemical weapons of 2013 are clear examples of triumph of diplomacy over militocracy.

Nations with nuclear power ambitions to which U.S. and her allies are opposed to include North Korea and Iran. Although the two nations have been dragged to the United Nations by US and her allies, the Security Council of the United Nations has never spoken with one voice. While US and her allies (Britain and France) at the Security Council favor military action against the two countries, Russia and her ally, China, opposed it. The failure of this led US and her ally to impose the second weapon, economic sanction. Russia and China seem not to have effective response to this. Thus, for a very long time, the sanction appears, lately, to be taking its toll on, first Iran, and slowly on North Korea. While Iran is currently at United Nation annual general assembly

pleading to be absorbed back into the world economy, South Korea is yet to budge. However, there is a new development recently in China, urging South Korea to end nuclear programs (Kate and Yoon, 2013). Economic sanction as a means of enforcing compliance with international standard by unipolar world and her ally is, no doubt, potentate but slow in bring about the desired result. Cold war between the west and the east, and the apartheid regime in South Africa were also brought down by this economic weapon after decades of resistance.

Nuclear power, since after the Word War II, has never been used as a means of settling international dispute, not because it is not effective in doing so but because of its over-devastating effect; and more importantly, its proliferation across regions of the world on ideological basis that began after the Second World War. But it has always been used as a means of check and balances between the west and the east, led by U.S. and Russia respectively. Its use by any nation today could trigger off the First World Nuclear War, given its proliferation across the world (Figure 1).


A study of the world nuclear map reveals "There are eight sovereign states that have successfully detonated nuclear weapons. Five are considered to be "nuclear-weapon states" (NWS) under the terms of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). In order of acquisition of nuclear weapons these are: the United States, Russia (successor to the Soviet Union), the United Kingdom, France, and China. These nations that are known to possess nuclear weapons are sometimes referred to as the nuclear club.

Since the NPT entered into force in 1970, three states that were not parties to the Treaty have conducted nuclear tests, namely India, Pakistan, and North Korea. North Korea had been a party to the NPT but withdrew in 2003. Israel is also widely believed to have nuclear weapons, though it maintains a policy of deliberate ambiguity regarding this, and is not known definitively to have conducted a nuclear test.

South Africa has the unique status of a nation that developed nuclear weapons but has since disassembled its arsenal before joining the NPT" (Wikipedia, 2013).

The detonation of atomic bomb in Hiroshima and Nagasaki during the World War II establishes the pre-eminence of United States of America in nuclear power not only by being the first nation in the world to develop, produce and deploy it but also by the fact that she has the largest number of allies with nuclear powers: western Europe, India, Pakistan and South Africa (before the collapse of Apartheid system). Her closest rival, Russia, has just China and North Korea. All these nuclear weapons are located across four continents of North America, Europe, Asia and Africa (But Africa is no longer in contention). Nuclear weapon deployment in Asia observes the traditional dichotomy and balance associated with U.S–Russia dichotomy. While Russia has nuclear weapons allies in two Asian States (China and South

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
 Jump to: [navigation](#), [search](#)



South Africa has the unique status of a nation that developed nuclear weapons but has since disassembled its arsenal before joining the NPT.

Figure 1. Lists of states with nuclear weapons

Korea), United States also have two nuclear weapons allies in the same Asian States of India and Pakistan (highly close neighbors; in fact Pakistan was part of India when the latter was under British rule). However, while China is the mentor of North Korea, which receives instructions from her (China) the two allies of U.S though also receive instructions from U.S; constantly bicker, particularly over ownership of Kashmir. The two Asia nuclear nations, under the influence of US are due to meet in New York (their nuclear headquarter) any moment from now (BBC News, 2013a). The situation in this part of Asia is a global albatross, regardless of whether it is in the sphere of U.S or Russian.

Middle East, another flash point of the world, and currently the focus of unipolar world for its terrorist activities and religious fundamentalism, is also under watch for potential nuclear weapon possession. Although there is no pragmatic evidence that Israel is a nuclear power nation, it is highly believed she possesses one. Recently, Federation of American Scientists estimates that she "has about 80 atomic weapons", which she (Israel) has always declined to confirm (Karimi, 2013). However, three reasons account for this suspicion. One,

her closeness to United States is too intimidating not only to the Arab world but other Israeli enemies worldwide. Two, if Jewish scientists had not been forced out of Germany, Germany would have been the first country in the world to produce atomic bomb. In other words, if United States had not granted Albert Einstein and his persecuted fellow Jewish scientists' emigration from Germany, and allow them to acquire American citizenship in 1939 when World War II was looming, U.S would not have become the first producer of atomic bomb. The Jews are therefore the gadfly of atomic weapons development. When the State of Israel was established in 1948, shortly after World War II; the doyen of atomic weapon – Albert Einstein –Israel was offered the presidency of the new State of Israel, though he turned it down. His reason for the rejection was that, for him, "Politics is for the moment while ... an equation is for eternity" (Hawking, 1999).

Above all, the two most powerful and pervasive religions in the world (Islam and Christianity) affirm the supremacy of Jews as the God's chosen race. Not only are Arabs and Jews product of the same region – Middle East – they also have the same paternal origin; hence a lot of

Table 1. Jesus in the Quran.

Titles	Qur'an/ Bible
1. A word from God, His (God's) word (Kalimah)	3:34/39, 40: 169/171 John 1:1; 14
2. A word of Truth (Qawl Al-haqq)	19:35/34 John 8: 32-36; Ephesians 1:13.
3. The Truth from your Lord (Al-haqq)	3:53/60 John 8:32-36, 14:6.
4. A spirit from God (Ruth)	4: 169/171; 19: 17; 21:91 Matt. 12:28, Luke 1:35.
5. The Messiah (al-Masih)	3:40/45; 4:156/157. Matt. 16:16; John 1:41.
6. Apostle (Messenger) (Rasul)	2:81/87, 254/243; 3: 43/49. Hebrews 3:1, Matt. 10:40.
7. Prophet (Nabiyy)	2:130/136; 4:161/163att. 21:11, Luke 4:24.
8. Servant of God ('Abd Allah).	4:170/172; 19:31/30, Matt. 12:18, John 4:34.
9. Son of Mary (Ibn Maryam).	3:40/45; 4:157; 171 Luke 2:48.
10. Witness on Resurrection Day (shahid)	4:45/41; 4:157; 171 Luke 2:48.
11. Witness of (over) The people	5:120/117. John 5:30.
12. Mercy from us (God) (Rahmah).	19:21; Matthew 9:27-30.
13. Bearer of wisdom (Hikmah).	43:63; Luke 2:40, 52.
14. Knowledge of the hour (Cilm)	43:61; Matthew 24:36-44; John 4:25.
15. Sign to all beings (Ayah).	3:44/50; 19:21; 21:91; Matthew 2:2; 29.
16. Sign of the hour (Judgement Day)	23:50. Matthew 24:37-38, Acts 1:11.
17. The Miracle Worker.	3:49; Mark 1:34; 5:41-42: 6:53.
18. Revelation to mankind (Ayah)	19:21. Luke 2:10; 30-32.
19. The one to be followed	43:61. John 1:37; John 10:27.
20. The one to be obeyed	3:44/50. Matt. 17:5; 8:27, Mark 1:27.
21. Giver (Bringer) of good Tidings.	61:6. Luke 4:18; Acts 10:38.
22. One of the Righteous (min Salihin)	3:40/46/ Matt. 27:19; 2 Tim. 4:8.
23. The Knowledge in Scriptures	3:43/48; 5:109/110. Matt. 12:25; John 4:25.
24. The Like of ADAM (Mathal al Adam).	3; 52/59. I Corinthians 15:45-47.
25. The Faultless (Holy, Most Pure) son (Zakiy).	19:19. Luke 23:1; 14, 41; Acts 2:14.
26. One of the Closest to God (Min at Muqarrabin)	3:40/41; 7:111/114 John 14:9-10, Hebrews 2:9
27. High Honoured (Eminent) in this World and Hereafter (Wajih).	3:40/45 Philip. 2:9-10, Ephesians 1:21.
28. The Blessed one (Mubarak)	19:32/31 Matt. 21:9; Luke 1:42.
29. The Favoured one.	43:59. John 1:18; Mark 1:11.
30. The one confirmed (Strengthened) with the Holy Spirit (Ruh Al-qudsi)	2:81/87, 254/253. Mark 1:11; Luke 4:14; Acts 2:33.
31. The Noble; Lordly (Sayyid).	3:39. Matt 21:8-10.
32. The Chaste (Hasuwur)	3:39. 2 Corinthians 5:21; I Peter 2:22.
33. A man of PEACE (Salam)	19:34/33. Isaiah 9:6, Daniel 19:25; Acts 5:31.
34. A perfect Man (Sawiy)	19:17. I Corinthians 13:10;

Source: Fatai Ayisa Olasupo, (2013) "The Role of Arabian and Western Civilization in Extinction of African Traditional Religion: The case studies of Senegal, South Africa and Nigeria" in International Journal of Sustainable Development, Canada: International Development Agency. Available at SSRN: <http://srn.com/abstract=2333260> Vol. 05, No12, PP 19-34.

of similarities in both Quran and Bible (Table 1). Israel as a nation is recognized in the Holy Quran ("Ya banii israila" that is Oh children of Israel) appears in the

following chapters 2:40; 2:47 and 2:122). However, the Jews never adopted any of these two global religions. Even though Christ is a Jew, he is never seen as their-

own Messiah and so Judaism is their adopted state religion (Figure 1). Given this backdrop, it is illogical not to expect that Jewish scientists all over the world would not have fortified their ancestral home with nuclear might.

Thirdly and finally, Hebrew University in Jerusalem is the inheritor and “guardian of his” (Albert Einstein’s) “archives which are deposited in Jerusalem” (Magidor, 2005). If a Jew is behind the discovery of Atomic Bomb which powerful nations in the world today are striving to acquire, then why not Jewish nation that has suffered immensely, firstly within their Arab neighbors and, secondly, in Diaspora, especially in Germany (Renn, 2005)? Listen to the Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu’s speech at the just concluded 2013 UN general assembly: “Israel will not allow Iran to get nuclear weapon. If Israel is forced to stand alone, Israel will stand alone. Yet, in standing alone, Israel will know that we will be defending many, many others” (The Times of Israel, 2013). Could this be a declaration from a nuclear power free nation?

The Islamic world that became unstable with the founding of the State of Israel in 1948 are searching for nuclear parity with Israel and found one in Iran. Like Israel whose nuclear possession is shrouded in mystery, Iran’s nuclear ambition is equally shrouded in mystery. While the whole world, especially U.S. and Israel, believe Iran is close to development of nuclear weapon, Iran continuously denies this; claiming that its nuclear program is for peaceful use only. After more than a decade of relentless economic sanction against Iran by U.S and her western allies, Iran has finally being brought down on her knees. As a proof that Iran is serious for her nuclear program negotiation with the Unipolar world, “The U.S and China have said they expect Iran to respond to an existing offer by the US, Russia, Britain, France, China and Germany, who form a negotiating group known as the 5+1” (Germany being the +1). Russia is however not comfortable with the dominating influence of US in the Middle East. She demonstrated this recently with the Syrian issue. We shall come back to this later (BBC News, 2013b).

Attention now focuses on North Korea who is also under heavyweight of western allies economic sanctions. To start with, Kaesong industrial zone which was closed down early last year by North Korea because of U.S. outcry over her (North Korea) testing of long range missile has been reopened. It is believed in some quarters that shortage of needed hard currency forced her to reopen it. Shortly after, her mentor, China, added her own pressure on North Korea. “The Chinese leader, Xi Jinping”, it is reported, “bluntly told a North Korean envoy on Friday that his country should return to diplomatic talks intended to ride it of its nuclear weapons” (Perlez, 2013a). As economic, military and nuclear benefactor of North Korea, China recently “published a long list of equipment and chemical substances to be banned from export to North Korea for fear they could be

used in adding to its increasingly sophisticated nuclear weapons programs” (Perlez, 2013b). With North Korea being increasingly isolated by China, her mentor and ally, it is a question of time before she appears before United Nations like her heady but subdued colleague – Iran. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel, while delivery his speech at last year’s UN general assembly attested that “North Korea, agreed in principle this week to dismantle its nuclear weapons program, and return to the NPT, abide by the treaty’s safeguards and admit international inspectors”. “And finally, diplomacy, it seems, does work after all” (The Times of Israel, 2013).

Meanwhile, the grave situation in Korean peninsula led the South Korean President Park Geun-hye to also state that “We have to build strong deterrence against North Korea until the North abandons its nuclear program and makes the right choice for the people of North Korea and peace on the Korean Peninsula” (BBC News, 2013c)

Accidentally, USA and Russia also divided up in the ways both nearly plunged the world into nuclear war by error. The nearly self-inflicted nuclear accident took place in U.S. in 1961 and in USSR in 1983. In the case of U.S. “An atomic bomb nearly detonated over North Carolina in 1961. The explosive said to be 260 times more powerful than the device that hit Hiroshima, dropped on North Carolina when a B-52 plane broke up in midair on January 23, 1961 (See example of that of Hiroshima below). “Fallout from the explosion could have spread to Washington, Baltimore, Philadelphia and even New York City, affecting millions of people” (The Guardian, 2013a). If this had happened, the instant and immediate suspect would have been USSR for no nation at that time possessed such nuclear power other than these two nuclear rival powers. Nobody would have immediately believed it was an accidental discharge.

Of recent, minor incidences –three in all – that could lead to nuclear error are also recorded in U.S and the three led to sacking of nuclear military generals concerned. First, General Michael Cary who is in charge of the U.S Air Force’s long-range nuclear missiles has been sacked due to “loss of trust and confidence” (BBC News, 2013d). He is in charge of Intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). Secondly, Vice Admiral Tim Giardina has been removed as second in command of U.S strategic command. His job was to oversee the nation’s nuclear weapons. His offence borders on illegal gambling activities. “He is accused of using counterfeit gambling chips in “a significant monetary amount” at an Iowa casino” (BBC News, 2013d). Thirdly, Admiral Giardina was demoted to a two-star admiral and is being reassigned pending outcome of an inquiry. Fourthly and finally, in another public embarrassment for the Air Force’s nuclear missile program, two crew members were found guilty of leaving silo blast doors open while they were on duty in an underground facility housing nuclear missiles. The punishment for the crew who was found derelict was to forfeit \$2, 246 in pay for each of two




Figure 2. Preparation for the first detonation of a nuclear bomb, New Mexico, 1945. Source: Jurgen Renn (Ed.) Chief Engineer of the Universe: Albert Einstein: Einstein's Life and work in context, Berlin: Weinheim and Max Plank Institute for the history of Science. P200.

months, while the other crew, admitted to similar misconduct, “on few occasions” received a letter of admonishment (Starr, 2013)

All of these borders on failed safety and security inspection that was carried out in August at a nuclear missile unit at Maelstrom Air Force base in Montana. Earlier in May, it was also reported that 17 officers in charge of maintaining nuclear missiles were sidelined over nuclear safety violations at Minot Air Force base in North Dakota. These are near-nuclear accidents of January 23, 1961 type over North Carolina (Figure 2).

On the other hand, in USSR, three decades ago, three important incidents happened that nearly triggered off nuclear holocaust. First on the 26 November, 1983, in the early morning, “the Soviet Union’s early-warning systems detected an incoming missile strike from the United States. Computer readouts suggested several missiles had been launched. The protocol for the Soviet Military would have been to retaliate with nuclear attack of its own. But duty officer Stanislav Petrov whose job was to register apparent enemy missile launches decided not to report them to his superiors, and instead dismissed them as a false alarm. This was a breach of his instructions, dereliction of duty. The safe thing to do would have been to pass the responsibility on, to refer up. But this decision may have saved the world” (BBC News, 2013e). Again, if

in error, Soviet Military had retaliated, nuclear war would have ensued. Americans too would have looked nowhere else for harbinger of the calamity other than USSR and, might therefore have also responded.

The second incident was a “major war game exercise, operation Able Archer, which involved 40,000 US and Nato troops moving across western Europe, co-ordinated by encrypted communications systems, imagined as scenario in which Blue Forces (Nato) defended its allies after Orange Forces (Warsaw Pact countries) sent troops into Yugoslavia following political unrest. The Orange Forces had quickly followed this up with invasions of Finland, Norway and eventually Greece. As the conflict had intensified, a conventional war had escalated into one involving chemical and nuclear weapons” (Guardian World News, 2013a).

Earlier in “September 1983, Russia shot down a Korean Airlines Boeing 747, killing all 269 people on board, after the plane had mistakenly strayed into their airspace. There is evidence to suggest that Russians thought the Boeing was an American spy plane”.

Before these and in the same year 1983, US President Ronald Reagan, made a high-profile speech describing the Soviet Union as the “evil empire” and announced plans to build the “Star Wars” strategic defense initiative. With distrust between these two powerful nations in the

world at unparalleled levels during this period, both sides “were operating on hair trigger” (Guardian World News, 2013a).

As Able Archer commenced and Russia close to threatening the exercise as prelude for a nuclear strike against them (USSR), the Kremlin gave instructions for a dozen aircraft in East Germany and Poland to be fitted with nuclear weapons. In addition, around 70 SS-20 missiles were placed on heightened alert, while Soviet submarines carrying nuclear ballistic missiles were sent under the Arctic ice so that they could avoid detection. Meanwhile, Nato and its allies initially thought the Soviet response was the USSR’s own form of war-gaming. These were how close the world was to nuclear disaster during the cold war.

Although the cold war is over now more than two decades ago the Director of Nuclear Information Service (NIS), an organization that campaign against nuclear proliferation, said “We continue to face unacceptable high risks and will continue to do so until we have taken steps to abolish these exceptionally dangerous weapons” because “thousands of war heads are still actively deployed by the nuclear armed states” (Guardian World News, 2013a). And not on till one of the last acts of Einstein, a week before his death is fulfilled, the world remains nuclear weapon endangered. Before Einstein’s death, there was an agreement in which his name headed a manifesto urging all nations to give up nuclear weapons (Philippe, 1999).

Chemical weapon

What began as domestic conflict two years ago in Syria has snowballed into international conflict polarizing the world into two: one led by USA and the other by Russia? The use of chemical weapon in the conflict led to the entrance of divided international community into this Syrian crisis. As in the case of nuclear bomb, this is also a weapon of mass destruction that divided the world politically, ideologically, militarily and socially. America accused Syrian government of introducing Chemical weapon into the conflict but Russia said no, Syrian rebels did. America stated that over 1400 Syrians were killed as a result of this. But, the France based medical NGO, whose doctors were on the ground, estimated the number of dead to 350 (Brian, 2013b). To stop the carnage, U.S. wanted to enter the war militarily, but Russia countered it will also enter to defend Syrian government. U.S. sent war ships and Russia also responded. The two antagonistic and ideological foes dragged themselves to the United Nations Security Council, where, again, the five permanent members divided up into two: USA, Britain and France to the right while Russia and China to the left. The recently concluded G-20 summit, held in Russia, also dichotomized the world into pro-U.S and anti-U.S – led by Russia (Brian, 2013a).

These dichotomies got to the head with name callings from both Russia and U.S using direct method of addressing their opponent’s citizens through mass media of their opponents. President Vladimir V Putin was the first to do this using New York Times op-ed contribution to do so. According to him, “Recent events surrounding Syria have prompted me to speak directly to the American people and their political leaders. It is important to do so at time of insufficient communication between our societies”.

“The potential strike by the United States against Syria, despite strong opposition from many countries and major political and religious leaders, including the pope, will result in more innocent victims and escalation, potentially spreading the conflict far beyond Syria’s borders” (Greenslade, 2013); eventually calling American Secretary of State, John Kerry “a liar”.

Responding on behalf of U.S, Senator McCain, the rival of President Obama in 2008 presidential campaign, chose an online Russian newspaper, Pravda, to do so. He said “Russians deserve better than Putin; he accused the Kremlin of punishing dissent, rigging elections, censoring the media and banishing political opponents. To perpetuate their power they foster rampant corruption in your courts and your economy and terrorists and even assassinate journalists who try to expose their corruption” (BBC News, 2013f)

However, the position of the U.S began to crumble when it began the process of shipping military weapons to Syrian coast. Her most important traditional ally, Britain, began the rebellion. The House of Common became divided on the issue and decided to put this into vote. The opposition defeated the government and the British government withdrew her military support for U.S, although it continued to support U.S diplomatically. France continued to support U.S position but stated that it would like her parliament to debate it. The hawk, U.S government, was thus also forced to ask Congress and The Senate to debate the issue of military intervention that has been stalled due to diplomatic moves that were going on.

The crack in the unity of U.S. and her western allies was reinforced by internal cleavage within the U.S itself. First was the reaction of a group of American retired intelligence officers, Veteran Intelligence Officers for Sanity (VIPS). “They warned the President not to embark on war based on dubious conclusions founded on incomplete evidence”. They were worried by the non-classified documents the American government published to defend its push for military action” as against the standard procedure. “The deviation”, according to them “is because the American intelligence community is strongly divided on the matter” (Brian, 2013b). Their objection to military intervention is also based on the fact that a secret meeting in Turkey on August 13-14 among U.S allies: Israel, Saudi, Turkish, American officials as well as rebel leaders existed. At the meeting, “the rebels were told they would soon benefit from a massive influx

of weapons and war materials. There was a talk of a mysterious event that would soon occur in Syria, bringing America actively into the war” (Brian, 2013b).

During the regime of President Bush that President Obama succeeded, VIPS were also said to have raised and sent a memo to him over impending military action in Iraq. The memo cautioned him against rushing to war in Iraq, which was ignored. At the end of the war neither chemical weapons were found nor were the Iraqis conquered. Ten years after the war, Iraqis are still enmeshed in internal war.

In short, international and continental oppositions are mounting towards whittling down the global power and influence of US. According to Fani-Kayode, for the first time in the world history, Russia, Iran and China will come together, finally pick up the gauntlet and muster the courage to say “no more” to American lawlessness, manipulation, deceit, double standards and butchery” (Fani-kayode, 2013). The process was about to begin when John Kerry larked at a press conference in London that “Assad could avert the military strike if he relinquished the chemical weapons. Russians seized his unguarded utterances as a basis for new approach”. This forestalled American military action and led to an agreement between Russia and America: “Syria will hand over its chemical weapons and America will sheathe its sword” (Brian, 2013b). This marked the end of bickering and grandstanding on Syria matter.

The UN Security Council, capping a dramatic month of diplomacy, according to CNN, voted unanimously late Friday to require Syria to eliminate its arsenal of chemical weapons or face sanctions (Figure 2; Table 2). “Today’s resolution will ensure that the elimination of the Syrian chemical weapons program happens as soon as possible and with the utmost transparency and accountability”, said the Secretary General (Walsh and Labott, 2013). The UN resolution however did not authorize the automatic use of force if Syria is said to be in violation, as was previously sought by the United States (Walsh and Labott, 2013).

CHARITY BEGINS AT HOME

U.S and Russia have also come into the focus of the world for violation of Chemical Weapon Convention. Both countries are accused of having “missed the convention’s extended deadline last year to destroy all of their chemical weapons. The Nobel committee, based in Sweden, noted that “Certain states have not observed the deadline, which was April 2012, for destroying their chemical weapons. This applies especially to USA and Russia”. United States responded by saying that “it will be at least another decade before it completes destruction of the remaining 10% of its chemical weapons, estimated at more than 3,100 tons. Russia, said to have not even started destroying her own chemical weapons at all, has

more than five times that amount left to destroy, according to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW).

In recognizing the humanitarian roles of the staff of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapon (OPCW) in Syria and its compliance with Albert Einstein’s instruction before his death in 1955, the Nobel Committee in Sweden awarded it (OPCW) Nobel Peace Prize while the OPCW seized the opportunity to condemn U.S and Russia for noncompliance with Chemical Weapon destruction Treaty they entered into in 1972. Charity begins at home. If U.S and Russia are violating Chemical Weapon convention they willingly acceded to, of what moral rights have they to compel others? To their credit however, none of them, including their allies, have ever used it in the way it was used in Syria. The abuse of its usage in Syria led to international outcry that warranted checking further use of it and indeed outright disposal of it. Albert Einstein had, before his death, instructed that “We scientist, whose tragic destination has been to help in making the methods of annihilation more gruesome and more effective, must consider it our solemn and transcendent duty to do all in our power in preventing these weapons from being used” (Rosenblatt, 1999).

To this end, he (Einstein) and Russell presented what is known as Russell-Einstein peace Manifesto in 1955. “The famous peace manifesto demands nuclear disarmament and a stop to the development of the hydrogen bomb. Another disarmament document is also signed by eleven prominent scientists, including nine Nobel laureates”. Following this was Gottingen Declaration of 1957. This declaration was against planned nuclear armament of the West German army in April 1957 (Renn, 2005). “It is signed by eighteen of Germany’s most prominent atomic scientists, including four Nobel laureates. The signatories emphasize their unwillingness to participate in the production, testing, or use of atomic weapons” (Renn, 2005).

HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATION

This is another issue that divides the world into pro and anti-America. America and her western allies have carved a niche for themselves as global promoter and defender of Human rights. This has, at one time or the other, brought her into confrontation with Russia and China. The case of Russia was highlighted recently by Senator John McCain in his opinion piece on Russia Pravda website while that of China is represented here by Tiananmen Square massacre of protesting university students in China in 1989. Recently, US, as the global protector of Human right was exposed by an American citizen, Edward Snowden, as the greater violator of Human rights, nationally, internationally and, in fact, globally.

It led to Edward Snowden odyssey, first to Hong Kong,

Table 2. List of countries with chemical and/or biological weapons.

Country	Chemical				Biological			
	Program Status	Possible Agents	Signed CWC[1]	Ratified CWC[1]	Program Status	Possible Agents	Signed BWC[2]	Ratified BWC[2]
Algeria	Possible[3]	Unknown	01/13/93	08/14/95	Research effort, but no evidence of production[4]	Unknown	-	07/22/2001*
Canada	Former program[5]	-mustard -phosgene -lewisite[6]	01/13/93	09/26/95	Former program Started: 1941 Ended: 1945[7]	Past Weaponized Agents -anthrax Research -brucellosis -rocky mountain spotted fever -plague -tularemia -typhoid -yellow fever -dysentery -rinderpest -botulinum toxin -ricin[8]	04/10/72	09/18/72
China	Probable[9]	Unknown	01/13/93	04/25/97	Likely maintains an offensive capability[10]	Unknown	-	11/15/84*
Cuba	Possible[11]	Unknown	01/13/93	04/29/97	Probable research program[87]	Unknown	04/10/72	04/21/76
Egypt	Probable[12]	-mustard -phosgene -sarin -VX[13]	No	No	Likely maintains an offensive program[14]	Unknown[15]	10/04/72	No
Ethiopia	Probable[16]	Unknown	01/14/93	05/13/96	-	-	04/10/72	05/26/75
France	Former program[17]	-mustard -phosgene[18]	01/13/93	03/02/95	Former program Started: 1921 Ended: 1940 (dormant 1927-1934) 1940-1945 (German occupation)[19]	Past Weaponized Agents -potato beetle Research -anthrax -salmonella -cholera -rinderpest -botulinum toxin -ricin[20]	-	09/27/84*
Germany	Former program[21]	-phosgene -hydrogen cyanide -mustard -tabun -sarin -soman[22]	01/13/93	08/12/94	Former program Started: 1915 Ended: 1945 (dormant 1919-1939)[23]	Past Weaponized Agents -glanders (WW 1) -anthrax (WW I) Research -foot and mouth disease -plague -rinderpest -typhus -yellow fever -potato beetle -potato blight [24]	04/10/72	11/28/72

Table 2. Contd.

India	Former program[25]	Unknown	01/14/93	09/03/96	Research program, but no evidence of production[26]	Unknown	01/15/73	07/15/74
Iran	Known[27]	-mustard -sarin -hydrogen cyanide -cyanogen chloride -phosgene[28]	01/13/93	11/03/97	Likely maintains an offensive program[29]	-anthrax -foot and mouth disease -botulinum toxin -mycotoxins[30]	04/10/72	08/22/73
Iraq	Former program [31]	-mustard -sarin -tabun -VX -Agent 15[32]	No	No	Former program[33]	Past Weaponized Agents -anthrax -botulinum toxin -ricin -aflatoxin -wheat cover smut Research -brucellosis -hemorrhagic conjunctivitis virus (Enterovirus 70) -rotavirus -camel pox -plague (?) -gas gangrene toxin [34]	05/11/72	06/19/91**
Israel	Probable[35]	Unknown[36]	01/13/93	No	Research, with possible production of agents[37]	Unknown	No	No
Italy	Former program[38]	-mustard -phosgene[39]	01/13/93	12/08/95	-	-	04/10/72	05/30/75
Japan	Former program[40]	-phosgene -hydrogen cyanide -mustard -lewisite -chloropicrin[41]	01/13/93	09/15/95	Former program Started: 1931 Ended: 1945[42]	Past Weaponized Agents -anthrax -plague -glanders -typhoid -cholera -dysentery -typhoid -paratyphoid Research -gas gangrene -influenza -tetanus -tuberculosis -tularemia -salmonella -typhus -glanders -tetrodotoxin[43]	04/10/72	06/08/82

Table 2. Contd.

Libya	Former program[44]	-mustard -sarin -tabun -lewisite -phosgene[45]	-	01/06/04*	Possible former program Ended: 2003[46]	Unknown	-	01/19/82*
Myanmar (Burma)	Probable[47]	Unknown	01/14/93	No	-	-	04/10/72	No
N. Korea	Known[48]	-adamsite -mustard -hydrogen cyanide -cyanogen chloride -phosgene -sarin -soman -tabun -VX[49]	No	No	Research, with possible production of agents[50]	-anthrax -plague -yellow fever -typhoid -cholera -tuberculosis -typhus -smallpox -botulinum toxin[51]	-	03/13/87*
Pakistan	Probable[52]	Unknown	01/13/93	10/28/97	Possible[53]	Unknown	04/10/72	09/25/74
Russia	Probable[54]	-Novichok binary nerve agents[55]	01/13/93	11/05/97	Research, some work beyond legitimate defense activities likely[56]	Unknown	04/10/72	03/26/75
Soviet Union	Former program[57]	-sarin -soman -mustard -lewisite -phosgene -VX analogue[58]	01/13/93	11/05/97	Former program Started: 1926 Ended: 1992[59]	Past Weaponized Agents -smallpox -plague -tularemia -glanders -Venezuelan equine encephalitis -anthrax -Q fever -Marburg Research -Ebola -Bolivian hemorrhagic fever -Argentinian hemorrhagic fever -Lassa fever -Japanese encephalitis -Russian spring-summer encephalitis -brucellosis -Machupo virus -yellow fever -typhus -melioidosis -psittacosis -rinderpest -African swine fever virus -wheat stem rust -rice blast[60]	04/10/72	03/26/75

Table 2. Contd.

S. Africa	Former program[61]	-thallium -CR -paraoxon -mustard[62]	01/14/93	09/13/95	Former program Started: 1981 Ended: 1993[63]	-anthrax -cholera -plague -salmonella -gas gangrene -ricin -botulinum toxin[64]	04/10/72	11/03/75
S. Korea	Former program[65]	Unknown	01/14/93	04/28/97	-	-	04/10/72	06/25/87
Sudan	Possible[66]	Unknown	-	05/24/99*	Possible research interest[67]	Unknown	-	10/17/2003*
Syria	Known[68]	-mustard -sarin -VX	No	No	Research program, with possible production[69]	-anthrax -botulinum toxin -ricin[70]	04/14/72	No
Taiwan	Possible[71]	Unknown	N/A	N/A	Possible research program[72]	Unknown	04/10/72	02/09/73***
U.K.	Former program[73]	-phosgene -mustard -lewisite[74]	01/13/93	05/13/96	Former program Started: 1936 Ended: 1956[75]	Past Weaponized Agents -anthrax Research -plague -typhoid -botulinum toxin[76]	04/10/72	03/26/75
U.S.A.	Former program[77]	-mustard -sarin -soman -VX -lewisite -binary nerve agents[78]	01/13/93	04/25/97	Former program Started: 1943 Ended: 1969[79]	Past Weaponized Agents -Venezuelean equine encephalitis -Q fever -tularemia -anthrax -wheat rust -rice blast Research -brucellosis -smallpox -Eastern and Western equine encephalitis -Argentinian hemorrhagic fever -Korean hemorrhagic fever -Bolivian hemorrhagic fever -Lassa fever -glanders -melioidosis -plague -yellow fever -psittacosis -typhus -dengue fever -Rift Valley fever -Chikungunya virus -late blight of potato -rinderpest -Newcastle disease -fowl plague -staph enterotoxin B -botulinum toxin -ricin[81]	04/10/72	03/26/75

Table 2. Contd.

Viet Nam	Possible[81]	Unknown	01/13/93	09/30/98	-	-	-	06/20/80*
Yugoslavia, Former Federal Republic of (FRY)	Former program[83]	-sarin -mustard -tabun -soman -VX -lewisite -BZ[84]	-	04/20/00*	None/Unknown[84]	-	04/10/72	10/25/73

*Denotes countries which acceded to the treaty.

** Iraq ratified the BWC following the adoption of U.N. Security Council Resolution 687, which in addition to establishing UNSCOM, also "invited" Iraq to ratify the 1972 Convention (Paragraph 7), 04/08/91, (<http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1991/scres91.htm>).

*** The U.N. does not recognize Taiwan as an independent entity (from China), so their signature and ratification of the BWC in 1972, 1973 are not considered legitimate.

to China and lately to Russia with huge amount of U.S government top classified documents regarding her spying operations on domestic and foreign internet traffic, email and phone use (Snowden, 2013). The rate at which nations, particularly those of South America, were falling over one another in order to grant Snowden asylum show the enthusiasms of how these nations felt about the global monster being humiliated by her own citizen. For the first time, it was also an issue that divided her staunch allies too – Britain, France, Germany, Netherlands and indeed most of the Western Europe. According to the French interior minister, "If a friendly country – an ally – spies on France or other European countries, that is completely unacceptable" (The Guardian World News, 2013a)

The number of countries that signified intention to grant asylum to Snowden with varying degree of caveats included: Austria, Bolivia, Brazil, China, Cuba, Ecuador, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, India, Italy, Ireland, The Netherlands, Nicaragua, Norway, Poland, Russia, Spain, Switzerland and Venezuela (Fung, 2013) The issue of Snowden had already divided the world before the Syrian Chemical Weapon use in her

internal conflict cropped up. Bolivian President who was traveling to somewhere and had to pass through the airspace of France and Portugal was denied landing for refuel by these two western allies of US (Pearson, Smith, and Mullen, 2013). If this were to be an emergence case it would have led to catastrophe. Before this, Snowden's American passport had been withdrawn and left stateless. All these are nothing other than Human right violation by US government.

Speaking the minds of most aggrieved nations whom U.S has insulted by her spying activities, Brazilian President, Dilma Rousseff, attacked U.S's espionage by accusing the National Security Agency, NSA, of "violating international law by its indiscriminate collection of personal information of Brazilian citizens and economic espionage targeted on the country's strategic industries". She had earlier, in protest, put off a planned visit to Washington, after NSA documents leaked by Snowden revealed that the U.S electronic eavesdropping had monitored the Brazilian president's phone calls and spied on the state oil corporation, Petrobras. (The Guardian, 2013b)

External protest against U.S is one thing,

internal protests by U.S citizens are another. Some U.S citizens protest against their home country militarily, while others do so peacefully but no less deadly. Those engaged in military protest included Anwar al-Awlaki who died in Yemen in 2011. He had been accused of involvement in plots to blow up planes over U.S soil. He was also chief external operator for al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (Aqap) (The Guardian World News, 2013b). He was deliberately killed by drone attack in Yemen. Other U.S citizens killed by drone attacks included sixteen year old son of Rahman Anwar al-Awlaki's, Samir Khan and Jude Kenan; although these ones were not specifically targeted. Not less than five Somalia-Americans as well as a British woman, married to a deceased terrorist, also took part in the recent Kenya attack.

Africa's rights

Africa's right as a collection of sovereign nations is under siege of unipolar world and it (Africa) is leading the way aggrieved members of global community could make their protests strongly felt in U.S in particular and within her allies in general.

The global protest of U.S electronic surveillance activities against individuals, agencies, corporations, governments, and the continents, peaked in Africa and so was counter reaction from Africa. Protests in Africa are not about nuclear power proliferation or Chemical and Biological weapons proliferation. It is not even about protection of global Human rights parse. It is about injustices that have potentials towards Africa thinking of acquiring Nuclear, Chemical or Biological weapons of their own.

It started with Gambia withdrawing her Commonwealth membership over accusation by President Yahya Jammeh that the United Kingdom was backing his political opposition ahead of election. "Earlier this year, a foreign office report singled out the Gambia for its human rights record, citing the cases of unlawful detentions, illegal closure of newspapers and discrimination against minority groups"(BBC News, 2013g).

The Ivory Coast case is the second issue. Following the disputed general elections in 2010 in which Unipolar world intervened to forcefully remove President Gbagbo from office when he refused to accept defeat that led to carnage of 3, 000 people, the President and his wife were charged with crime against humanity and were to be tried at ICC. While the former President is awaiting trial in The Hague, a warrant was issued for transfer of his (Gbagbo's) wife, Simone, to The Hague for trial. She was accused of murder and rape. Swiftly, "Ivory Coast ministers voted to dismiss the ICC's arrest warrant" (BBC News, 2013h). Lawmakers also shortly followed suit by deciding to file a "motion to dismiss" the ICC's warrant issued in February 2012.

The Ivorian executive later issued a statement stating that "the Cabinet aims to have Mrs Gbagbo brought to trial by Ivorian courts, whose good reputation has been restored and which can hold a fair trial that will guarantee the rights of the defense" (BBC News, 2013h). If Gbagbo's wife is transferred to Hague, She would be the first former First Lady in the world to be so humiliated.

There are also cases of Libya concerning Gaddafi's son, Saif al-Islam Gaddafi, former intelligence officer under Gaddafi rule, Abdullah al-Senussi and the recently kidnapped alleged al-Qaida leader, Nazih Abdul-Hamed al-Ruqai, known as, by his alias, Abu Anas al-Liby. All of them are wanted by ICC to be tried at Hague for crime against humanity but Libyans and militia men in particular, are insisting the trial must take place in Libya. Libya's interim government demanded an explanation from Washington for what it called the "the kidnapping" of a Libya suspect. In the capital, Libyan civilians and political officials also reacted with surprise and confusion (Gall et al., 2013, The Guardian World News, 2013c, and BBC News, 2013i)

Realizing that Africa is becoming the testing ground or notorious for anything negative, African Union is, first, protesting the trial of both President Kenyatta of Kenya and his Deputy, William Ruto, accused by monstrous U.S and her octopus western allies of committing crime

against humanity (BBC News, 2013j). It (Africa Union) is accusing International Criminal Court, ICC, of "hunting" African leaders, (sitting leaders for that matter) and ignoring atrocities elsewhere. While the trial of Ruto is currently going on in Hague, that of President Kenyatta was expected to commence in November last year (2013). Earlier, Kenya's parliament had voted to leave (ICC). It followed this up with massive campaign for support across Africa. Eventually, a signed letter by 34 out of 54 African leaders was dispatched to ICC, saying Mr Ruto's presence in The Hague will disadvantage Kenya. Extraordinary summit of this agenda was held in the Ethiopian capital, Addis Ababa, on 13 October (BBC News, 2013j).

Secondly, Africa is the first continent where a former head of state of a country, Charles Taylor, would face judgment in an international court on war crime, since judges in Nuremberg convicted Karl Dönitz, an admiral who led Nazi Germany for a brief period following Adolf Hitler's suicide (The Guardian News, 2013a).

Thirdly, there had been high speculation that the tribunal could overturn Taylor's conviction, following stricter precedents set in the international criminal tribunal for former Yugoslavia president, Milosevic Slobodan, on what constitute "aiding and abetting". Charles Taylor was equally jailed fifty years for "aiding and abetting" Sierra Leone civil war but his own appeal was thrown out on the ground that what constitute "aiding and abetting" in the case of Yugoslavia did not apply to Liberia (The Guardian News, 2013a).

Fourthly and finally is the issue of caricature African "sovereignties". It is an illusion for any African nation today to think it has "sovereignty" in the real sense of the term. The crumbling of sovereignties of African nations, though started during the Cold War when foreign powers sponsored cup d'état in Africa in particular and third world in general, it became brazen after the Cold War (Olasupo, 2009). With the Unipolar world crumbling of sovereignties in Liberia, Ivory Coast, Libya and lately Mali, a powerful signal is sent to Africa that it has formerly entered neo-colonial era politically, economically and socially.

African Union that met in Addis Ababa on the 12 of October last year has begun to react to all these, accusing ICC of treating Africa, especially black Africa, unfairly. But attempt is already being made to break the solidarity of African Union by ICC decision not to demand Libya's Senusi transfer to Hague to face trial. Reacting to this, Mr. Tedros, who is the current Chairman of AU's Executive Council, said the ICC was "Condescending" towards the continent. According to him, "Far from promoting justice and reconciliation...the court has transformed itself into a political instrument targeting Africa and Africans. This unfair and unjust treatment is totally unacceptable", he said (BBC News, 2013k).

But given the pervasive poor governance performance, corruption and terrorist activities that permeate entire

Africa today, can the intervention of unipolar world in African affairs be regarded as ethical? Is it ethically sound for the Unipolar world to remain indifferent to slide to anarchy in Africa when it has wherewithal to checkmate growing incidences of anarchy, terrorism and unbridled corruption in African continent?

African nations are divided on this. While African nations favor move to withdraw from ICC, there is less support for it in West Africa. While Botswana also publicly supports the court, South African National Congress voiced criticism against it. Former UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, contributed that withdrawing from the court would be a badge of shame. For Nobel Peace laureate, Archbishop Desmond Tutu, "Those leaders seeking to skirt the court are effectively looking for a license to kill, maim and oppress their own people without consequence. They believe the interests of the people should not stand in the way of their ambitions of wealth and power" (BBC News, 2013l)

On the long run, African Union summit in Ethiopia on the 12 of October, 2013, demanded a deferral of The Hague trial of Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta, due to start in November. "It also agreed to a resolution stating no sitting African head of state should appear before an international court". African leaders have longed complained that the International Criminal Court unfairly target them (African leaders) and causing divide and rule among them at the same time. Currently, both Kenya and Sudanese presidents are sitting presidents, more so in the case of Sudan, but only Uhuru Kenyatta was to appear before the court in November (BBC News, 2013k).

Religious rights

The deadliest protest against unipolar world's Human right campaign comes from Arab world who consider US and her allies to be diametrically opposed to Islamic culture and values. The issues of women's rights with regards to their parity with men, dressing, leadership, democracy and other social activities are opposed to Islamic values and virtues. To add salt to an injury, citizens of U.S and Britain have brazenly insulted and assaulted Islam holy book – Quran. In March 2011, Terry Jones, a controversial evangelical preacher oversaw the burning of a copy of the Quran in a small Florida church after finding the Muslim holy book "guilty" of crimes. He had earlier planned to ignite a pile of Qurans on the anniversary of September 11, 2001 attacks (AFP, 2011). Again, on September 2013, he planned to burn almost 3000 Qurans but was arrested before he could do so (US News, 2013). This Terry Jones' action might be reaction to April 2013 marathon bombing by Dzhokhar Tsarnaev and his elder brother Tamerlan Tsarnaev. The two brothers are Muslim Russian Chechnya schooling in U.S.

Similarly in Britain, Salman Rushdie, a British-Indian novelist best known for the novel, *Midnight's children*,

wrote another novel in 1988, *Satanic verses*, which Arab and Islamic world accused him of blasphemy against Islam and on which Iran declare fatwa on him. Again, on 22 May this year, two men hacked a British soldier, Drummer Lee Rigby, to death in a broad daylight on a busy London street. The two men were formally, Christian, Michael Adebolajo, 28 and Michael Adebowale, 22. They later converted to Islam using their Islamic names – Mujahid Abu Hamza for Adebolajo and Ismail Ibn Abdullah for Adebowale (Holden, 2013). Their only reason for Rigby carnage is that "we have killed this man today because Muslims are dying daily by British soldiers" (Martin et al., 2013)

Countries such as Pakistan, Yemen, and Afghanistan are hot beds of confrontation against U.S and her allies over devaluation of Islamic religion. These are countries that have made U.S and Britain as well as their citizens and interests targets of attack all over the world by bombings and assassinations; through their terror organizations such as Taliban, al-Qaida and their various affiliates. Americans have also used the same method (violence), particularly through the use of drone planes (unmanned planes) to get rid of those they consider terrorists.

Some Black African countries with major Islamic population have, however, joined these al-Qaida based countries. Somalia, Mali and Nigeria are typical examples. In Somalia, Somali Islamist group, al-Shabaab, is an al-Qaida affiliate. It ordered a woman stoned to death for sex offence and the victim was indeed stoned to death at Jamama town, 425 km south of Mogadishu (Olasupo, 2013). It was also said to be responsible for the recent Westgate shopping mall attack in Kenya said to be aimed at foreigners e.g. U.S and British citizens who patronize it. Not less than 67 people lost their life in it. Less than two weeks after Kenyas attack, U.S Navy Seal in a pre-dawn, sea-launched counter attacked at al-shabaab leader, named Mukhtar Abu Zubeyr at his seaside villa in the Somali town of Baraawe, south of the capital – Mogadishu (Johnston and Withnall, 2013).

In Mali, there is a range of Islamist groups who moved into towns including Timbuktu. The Islamists impose their own interpretation of Islamic law, which is anathema to Timbuktu's Sufi inhabitants. "Women were to wear the veil, men to grow beards, and the two were not to associate unless they were married. Those who violated it were whipped in public or locked up in crowded cells" (The Guardian World News, 2013d).

Islamist group in the northern part of Nigeria had a mission of, according to CNN, creating Islamic state. It has identified western education as main enemy of Islamic religion hence adopting the name "Boko Haram" meaning, in Hausa language, "Western Education is forbidden" (Editorial, 2013). To bring this to bear, it recently embarked on attack of schools that are of western traditions. As recently as September 29 2013, "innocent students of the college of Agriculture, Gujba,

Yobe State, were woken from their sleep, assembled in groups and then cut down in a barrage of bullets" killing 41 of them. Last year, in Mubi, Adamawa State, over 30 students were killed. Additional more than 40 other students were killed in the town of Mamudo, Yobe State.

Thus, from Somalia to Mali and to Nigeria, the missions of the Islamists insurgents are to enthrone theocratic States based on Islam like Iran, Tunisia, Libya and Egypt. The Central Africa Republic is the latest in the process of doing this. The country has been in turmoil since Muslim Seleka rebels ousted President Francois Bozize in the predominantly Christian country in March this year (The Guardian World News, 2013c). But the events in Syria and Mali have greatly overshadowed this. The violence, apart from murder, rape and burning of houses, has driven more than 440, 000 people from their homes. These have ignited reprisal from the Christian militias and gradually leading to religious war. Locales in Bangui have begun to protest calling on France to intervene: "President Hollande we want your help" (The Guardian World News, 2013d).

However, apart from External discomfort of US, her allies, and their responses, there are internal resistances to all these as well. Externally, the only black African country, Somalia that has been graded as terrorist has come under barrage of drone attacks. She has received not less than nine drone visits (The Guardian World News, 2013e). Nigeria is the next country in black Africa to be upgraded as terrorist country because of the ravaging and carnage activities of Boko Haram (which in English means: Western education is evil). But they use western weapons to fight, western medicine to treat their wounded colleagues at battle front, western means of communications to link themselves up, western means of transportation to arrive at their arena of attack etc. Are not these parts of western education too?

It was recently reported that US Congress was about conducting hearing on Boko Haram. To that end, a delegation of the US Congress Committee on African Affairs came to Nigeria recently and met with the President of Nigerian Christian Association, Pastor Ayo Oritsejafor, in Abuja (Ayansina, 2013). On the 13 of November, US designated Nigeria's Boko Haram and Ansaru militant groups as foreign terrorist organizations. "The State department described the move as "an important" step to help Nigeria root out violent extremists" (BBC News, 2013m)

Women in Saudi Arabia have also begun to fight their own causes against series of encumbrances to their freedom. While those encumbrances prescribed by the holy books (e.g. dressing, leadership and associational codes) were understandable they are yet to come to terms with those that are modern and have nothing to do with religion at all. Against proscription of female drivers in Saudi Arabia women are taking part in mass driving protest against government authorities (Usher, 2013). To date there have been three such mass female drivers

protests –1990, 2011 and today 26/10/2013. "Punishment for deviance protest included arrest and loss of jobs as it was in the case of 1990. Earlier, about 17,000 Saudi people signed a petition calling either for women to be allowed to drive or for an explanation of why the prohibition should remain in force" (Usher, 2013).

In Egypt, Islamist party that came to power a year ago has crumbled; not democratically and not peacefully but by bloody military intervention. This led to a huge debate in U.S and within her allies whether the military intervention was a coup or not. It was recently decided that it was a coup and have therefore begun withdrawal of military aides from Egypt. The Egyptian military, after unconstitutional removal of the Islamist government of President Morsi, installed an unelected civilian president that pander to it. In Libya, the weak Islamist government is still struggling to tame rival militia who recently kidnapped the Prime Minister of the country; Ali Zeidan. Tunisia was however civil in her own approach to removing Islamic government peacefully and democratically through negotiation with secular opponents. (Markey and Amara, 2013)

On the issue of religion, it is interesting to note that neither U.S nor Russia is making religion a global rivalry. The two super powers, while recognizing religions as integral part of the States, felt they (religions) are expected to be subordinated to the supremacy of the States. They thus found unity in what should be the role of religions in global politics. The two super powers and their allies only clash with any religion that attempt to rival States' supremacy. Otherwise, religion could have been another source of global nuclear or chemical weapon war. Examples from Russia and China would suffice here.

Russia has millions of Muslims; so are Chechnya, Azerbaijann and State of Georgia (Online, 2013). In the era of Russian communism "all religious practices of all religions including Islam were totally banned. Several generations of Muslims were banned to learn anything about their religions". In fact, "Masjids were locked and religious schools were locked up". After the demise of the Soviet Union, "several Muslim states west of Afghanistan and north of Iran became independent; Islam started reviving in those Muslim states. Masjids are now open and children are being taught practices of Islam and how to read Quran (Online, 2013).

President Putin is said to have claimed that Islam is an inseparable part of Russia, tipping a nod to his Eurasian ambitions but has come out in opposition to Hijabs in schools suggesting that Russia should follow France's lead and resist Islamization of public spaces. Like China, "Russia keeps a tight grip on its Muslim leaders, as it does on the leaders of all religions, who ultimately answer to the authorities. Fundamentalism of a Chinese Muslim led to this. The said Chinese Muslim reportedly burned a Chinese flag (Greenfield, 2013). "The Chinese authorities responded quickly and decisively by issuing a circulation decreeing that Chinese flags be hung at

Table 3. State or established religion.

S/No	Religion	No of countries	Countries
1.	Islam	25	Afghanistan, Algeria Bahrain, Bangladesh, The Comoros, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Malaysia, the Maldives, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Oman Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Emirates, Yemen Republic.
2.	Roman Catholic	11	Argentina, Colombia*, Costa Rican Dominican Republic, Haiti, Panama*, Paraguay +, Peru, Seychelles*, Venezuela*,
3.	Evangelical Lutheran Church	4	Denmark, Iceland, Norway, Sweden
4.	Buddhish	3	Bhutan, Cambodia (Kampuchea), Thailand
5.	Greek Orthodox Church	1	Greece
6.	Judaism	1	Israel
7.	Hinduism	1	Nepal
8.	Church of England	1	United Kingdom
9.	Presbyte-rianism	1	United Kingdom (Scotland)
10.	Pancasila	1	+ Indonesia +

* Quasi – state religion; + Roman Catholicism is the official religion, although the constitution guarantees religious freedom.

+ A national secular state ideology, stressing unity and social justice, which is a compulsory belief for all social organizations.

Source: J. Denis Derbyshire and Ian. Derbyshire.(1991) Spotlight on world Political System, Edinburgh: W & R Chambers Ltd. P. 27. See also Olasupo F.A, (2013) "The Role of Arabian and Western Civilization in the Extinction of African Traditional Religion: The case studies of Senegal, South Africa and Nigeria" in International Journal of Sustainable Development Canada: International Development Agency. Forthcoming

mosques and that the flags be protected by the mosque imams tied to the Communist part. As mandated in the circulars, flagpoles were erected at all mosques and flags were hung" (Greenfield, 2013). Not only that, Chinese authorities prohibited "youth under 18 years old, women, and Muslim Uyghurs who are Communist Party members and civil servant from going to mosque". The clear message being put across in China is that "mixture of mosque and state" is prohibited and that government officials and party members should keep out of mosque. Borrowing from this, official Muslim leaders in Russia can call for terrorism in the West, but never inside Russia. And what they can and can't say is closely monitored and controlled by the authorities" (Table 3).

This is however no longer the case. Russian Muslims are no longer calling for terrorism in the West but in the Russia itself. And so is Russian government also trying to respond through drone attack inside rather than outside Russia. A woman, 30-year old Dagestan native, Naida Akiyalova, believed to be a partner of an Islamic militant, blew up herself in a bus in southern city of Volgograd, killing at least six people (BBC News, 2013n). Like the Taliban and al-Qaida, the US and her allies are combating in the West, terrorists in Russia are mainly women known as "black widows" and are often "related to Islamic

militants and carry out attacks to avenge their deaths". They have a history of nearly a decade behind them. In 2010, they struck at two underground railway stations in Moscow, killing more than 35 people. They were also believed to be responsible for explosion on two passenger jets at a Moscow airport in 2004 that killed 90 people (BBC News, 2013n).

Like US, Russia is also considering the use of drones to combat this all women terrorists "black widows". To this extent, Russia has ordered for Israeli made unmanned aerial vehicles at the cost of \$400 million. This has brought improvement to Israelis-Russian relation plummeted before (Fater, 2013).

Table 3 shows absence of state religion for the most powerful nuclear power nations in the world: USA, Russia, China and France. Though Germany is not a nuclear power nation, she has been currently under nuclear protection of her allies (not out of incompetence but sort of punishment for her role in the first and second World Wars. She does not also have state religion. Another observation here is lack of space for black African Traditional Religion (ATR) in the table. The leaders of African Traditional Religion (ATR) are not lying low over this. In countries where they (practitioner of ATR) are predominant like Benin Republic and Equatorial Guinea,

foreign religions are given effective challenge not only in political and economic spaces but also in social as well (Olasupo, 2013).

African traditional religionists and their supporters have also been persecuting followers of foreign religions in the last forty years. It climaxed in detaining a Catholic priest in 1976 for being subversive of the state. Not even the visit of the Pope to the country in 1982 was able to set him free (Olasupo, 2013). The ascension into power of a sympathizer of African Traditional Religion, Francisco Macias, who was baptized a Catholic, in Equatorial Guinea, made life uncomfortable for the Christians who constitute 80% of the country's population. On getting to power, two bishops, one African and the other Spanish, were sent into exile in 1974 (Olasupo, 2013). He followed this up in 1976 with the expulsion of a large number of missionaries and other foreign religious organizations. In 1978, Francisco Macias who proclaimed Equatorial Guinea as first African atheist state banned Catholic and Protestant communities. Until he was overthrown, not less than six Spanish priests were held in prison (Olasupo, 2013). It is important to note here that rather than genuine mission of promoting African Traditional Religion, the fear of the Church, seen locally as a power base that was antagonistic to Francisco Macias, was responsible for his renunciation of Christianity and promotion of ATR.

Gay rights

Same-sex marriage is another divisive issue that polarized the world and its two major religions. As a weapon of mass destruction, it was said to be responsible for the spread of AIDS pandemic that ravaged the world more than two decades ago. No religion actually supports this but U.S and her allies are championing this cause all the same and, in fact, compelling African nations to do so. Meanwhile, not less than fourteen western nations have allowed same-sex marriage: Netherlands (2001), Belgium (2003), Spain (2005), Canada (2005), Norway (2009), Sweden (2009), Portugal (2010), Iceland (2010), Denmark (1989), New Zealand (2013), France (2013) (Hindustan time, 2013); in Britain (2013), Northern Ireland (2013) in U.S (2003), but not every state in the US has done so. Those states that have approved same-sex marriage include Massachusetts, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New York, Rhode Island, Vermont and Washington – District of Columbia and lately New Jersey (New Research, 2013). Some Latin Americans like Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay and Portugal have also followed suit. In Africa, only South Africa has become same-sex marriage country.

Here again U.S and Russia are poles apart. Russia had issued "nationwide Article 6.13.1 law on restricting the communication of homosexual contents to minor" (Averko,

2013). Although the Russian government maintains that the law's intention is not meant to encourage discrimination against the Lesbians, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT), it has faced opposition from LGBT activists. Critics of the Article 6.13.1 says the broadly wording of the law serves to encourage rather than discourage discrimination. They, LGBT, have got support from western countries that see Russia as a largely socially conservative with regards to the LGBT. Against 2014 Sochi Winter Olympics coming up in Russia, several western media houses have been calling on the U.S to wield her big stick against Russia. The big stick here is NBC, the television network with Olympic broadcasting rights in the United States. This is suggested to be used to spend time on covering the opposition to the law rather than the Sochi Olympics game.

War rights

Under civil war, what rights do the children in particular and the civilian populations in general have, with regards to food and medication. U.S is lately raising the issue to the global level. Lack of food supply, hunger and medication for children and the civilian population in general, during civil war, is being raised to the status of weapon of mass destruction by U.S and her allies. The U.S recently urged "the Syrian government to allow immediate aid convoys to starving civilians cut off in rebel-held suburbs of Damascus" (BBC, 2013n). According to her, (US), months-long siege left many people in desperate need of food, water and medicine. It also cited "unprecedented reports" of children dying of malnutrition. This is seen as another weapon of mass destruction; more so that "The Syrian army has warned the rebel-held areas must surrender or starve" (BBC, 2013n). The situation has gotten to a critical stage where a Muslim Cleric issued a religious ruling allowing people to eat cats, dogs and donkeys just to survive. What brought Nigeria civil war to a quick end in 1970 was the employment of method of starvation; though painful, it led to quick resolution of the conflict.

On the issue of starvation as weapon of mass destruction, no reaction has yet emanated from Russia, but U.S has not also crossed, for Russia, the "red line" – military intervention in the Syrian civil war. If America chooses to, then armed struggle between the two may ensue, for, it is part of UN resolution on Syria that should there be need for US to intervene military in the Syrian question, approval must be obtained from UN.

OBSERVATIONS

Three issues capable of igniting nuclear and chemical wars in the world have been examined in the paper. While U.S is the undisputed doyen of all the three, the

world is realizing that she (US) is becoming dictatorial and despotic. And therefore there is need to break her monopoly. Russia ought to have been doing this more than two decades ago but it was just emerging ideologically, militarily and economically from the collapsed Soviet Union and her communist ideology to embrace capitalism which it needed time to master. Potentially, therefore, she is better positioned to do this, and has done so recently having come of age. America was effectively checkmated in Syria by Russia because of abuse of power and mandate which UN gave her in the case of Libya in 2011. The UN mandate for US did not include regime change much less that of murdering the then head of State of Libya, Moamar Gadhafi. Syria's case thus became U.S.'s comeuppance. Russia, supported by her allies, denied U.S the use of force before, during and even after the destruction of Syria's stockpile of chemical weapons. Even if Syria violates UN resolution on the declaration and destruction of her chemical weapon, U.S, under the UN resolutions regarding Syria, should not unilaterally embark on application of force. This would be the first universal compromise to whittle down the power of U.S and her grumbling allies; particularly, Germany, France and Spain.

Economically, again, U.S is found to be the power house of the world economy. After almost half a century of ideological rivalry between Capitalism and Communism, Capitalism humbled communism with the collapse of Soviet Union in 1990. But an important ally of Russia has risen to fill in the gap. China today is U.S largest creditor. According to Mr Zhu, a high ranking Chinese official, China and U.S are "inseparable". Beijing is a huge investor in US Treasury bonds" (BBC News, 2013o). China used this vantage position to warn US over the recent government shutdown by telling "U.S to avoid debt crisis for the sake of global economy", warning that "Washington must agree a deal to raise its borrowing limit by 17 October, or risk not being able to pay its bills" (BBC News, 2013o).

On human rights enforcement by unipolar world and, using Africa as the testing ground, Africa as a continent has met in Addis Ababa on the 12th of August last year to affect Africa's withdrawal from international bodies such as UNO and the Commonwealth. Here, Africa is also setting precedent for other continents in the universe. It is to be a peaceful, non-violent protest and the first time a whole continent would unite against world powers. In this, Africa has got support of three other continents: South America led by Brazil, Europe by Germany and Asia by Indonesia. Above all, Germany and Brazil are dragging UN into this global outrage by urging a UN General Assembly resolution. This "raft resolution, which does not name individual countries, will be debated by a General Assembly committee focusing on human right".

The draft calls on the UN members to declare that it is "deeply concerned at human rights violations and abuse that may result from the conduct of any surveillance of communication" (BBC News, 2013p). This includes

"extraterritorial surveillance of communications, their interception, as well as the collection of personal data, in particular, massive surveillance interception and data collection". The resolution, which was expected to be voted last November, calls on all countries to protect the right to privacy guaranteed under international law. The global allegation against U.S is that "US have been eavesdropping on foreign leaders, including Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff and German Chancellor Angela Merkel" (BBC News, 2013p).

The actions of North Korea, Syria and Edward Snowden affirm Russia as capable of providing balance of power against U.S. When North Korea threatened nuclear war against South Korea in early April last year, it was China U.S and her allies looked up to, to calm down North Korea and she (China, a major ally of Russia) did. It was Russia that pressurized Syria to surrender her chemical weapons for verification and destruction before she could agree to do so. When Edward Snowden had problem with his home country (US), the only places he ran to were first, China and later, Russia that eventually accorded him temporary asylum. All these point to Russia and her powerful ally, China, as effective rival powers to U.S and her allies, to whom weaker nations could look up to, to call off US bullies.

Finally, religion as potential issue that could ignite nuclear war is being tamed by super powers, while worldwide efforts are being made to prevent nuclear rivalry in the Middle East, the originators of the two most powerful religions in the world – Islam and Christianity. Already, world nuclear powers USA, Russia and China have separated religion and subjugated it to the state. They expect other states in the world to follow suit by persuasion rather than application of force.

Conclusion

With the compromise reached in the case of Syria, between U.S and Russia in particular, and UN security council in general, with regards to chemical weapons, the world is inching towards world unification and "government to control atomic bomb", which Albert Einstein envisioned and predicted more than half a century ago (Hawking, 1999). But similar compromise needs to be reached on other flashpoints of the world having nuclear power rivalry – North-South Korea, Israel-Iran and India-Pakistan.

Meanwhile, infrastructures towards World government are already in place: Parliament (UN General Assembly) in New York, Judiciary (International Criminal Court) in The Hague, Interpol (international police). Militarily, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Warsaw Pact need to be fused into a world army. After this, arrangements could then be put in place on how World President could emerge based on two party systems represented by USA and Russia. Of course, there could be other minor parties like Non-aligned nations and Common-

wealth of nations etc., these two will be the major ones.

There is a significant and developing idea here. International non-governmental organizations are beginning to tame growing powers of these two super powers. US and Russia are being watched, controlled and blackmailed if they fail to comply with any international treaty on the control of any weapon of mass destruction. First is the Nuclear Information Service (NIS), an organization for the control of nuclear proliferation. It showed, through information obtained under Freedom of Information Act, that U.S and USSR nearly plunged the world into accidental nuclear war. Second, Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical War (OPCW) recently rebuked the two super-powers for non-compliance with Chemical Weapon destruction Treaty entered into in 1972. Thirdly, Amnesty international as well as other international Human rights organizations called the super powers to order when abusing human right freedom. They recently called for prosecution of US officials responsible for the secret CIA drone campaign against suspected terrorists in Pakistan and Yemen. They (US and Russia) are often accused of “clear violation of international humanitarian laws” such as the killing of 68-year-old woman called Mamana Bibi who was killed by missile fired from drone while she was picking okra outside her home with her grandchildren nearby. A second strike minutes later injured family members tendering her (Guardian News, 2013a). These show that the super powers are also not beyond reproach.

Meanwhile, a zone of the world that is neither US nor Russia and located at the middle of the Earth would have to be created and infrastructures listed above moved there. At this point, only U.S, Russia and their allies may retain their nuclear arsenal as a balance of terror here on Earth and as planetary rivalry: mankind is already in Mars exploring its challenges and Rockets of various types are equally in space to rival celestial bodies such as Comets, Meteoroids and Asteroids. (After the incident of Russia meteorite that injured more than 1,000 people, destroyed over 7,200 buildings, nuclear scientist predicted that nuclear weapon could be used to fight these terrestrial bodies before they reach the Earth’s atmospheres

Although this is said to be century affair, preparation towards combating can be made far ahead of similar occurrence. The last time such happened was in 1908 in Siberia. But the recent one in Russia, according to National Aeronautic Space Administration (NASA), “was a space rock about 50 feet in diameter. They said the resulting explosion was equivalent to detonating about 300 kilotons TNT – making it roughly 20 times more powerful than atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima, although the bomb was detonated near the earth surface” (The Boston Globe, 2013).

This will surely require synergy of effort between these rival super powers. Currently, there is intense rivalry between US and Russia on one hand and their allies on the other. Starting from 1960, USSR (now Russia) was the first country to attempt reaching Mars and actually

reaching there but unable to land successfully on more than eleven occasions. USA started in 1980 and has made eight successful landing on the Mars (Kluger, 2012). One of the allies of US, Europe, has also successfully landed spacecraft on the Mars and a third one – India – is about to with the successfully launching of Mars spacecraft on the 5th of November, 2013. An ally of Russia, China, is just potentially warming up. It is already being speculated that with this successful launching attempt, space race has commenced between India and China, the two most populous and nuclear states in Asia (BBC News, 2013q). Thus, in the same way that we have five nuclear club states (U.S, Russia, Britain, France and China) so are we beginning to have five spaces club (USA, Russia, Europe, India and, any moment from now, China)

These are just military dimensions of nuclear power; there is also a peaceful dimension of it as well. Recently, four top environmentalist scientists raised the stakes in their fight to reverse climate change and save the planet. These climate and energy scientists: James Hansen, Ken Caldeira, Kerry Emanuel and Tom Wigley released an open letter calling on world leaders to support development of safer nuclear power system, which they believed is the only way to reverse the looming threat of climate change which they blamed on fossil fuels (Patterson, 2013).

Thus, long after his demise, Albert Einstein ideas find new role for our nuclear weapons against terrestrial challenges and the destructive climate change. Albert Einstein comes to life again!

Unification of the world religions, particularly the most important and pervasive ones – Islam and Christianity – will come about at the nick of time and Science and technology are going to be the means through which this would be realized. The Pope already represents the Christian world while King Fad of Saudi Arabia, the custodian of the Muslim holy land, Makah, represents the Islamic world. Both of them are already allies of unipolar world. Both religions do not deny the potency of science and religion but are, in fact, dependent on it: Medicine, Aircrafts, Motor cars, Telephones, Television, Satellites etc. are not manners from heaven; rationality and rigorous scientific and technological research produced them not passion and emotions that are the hall and trademarks of religions.

When all of these shall have been realized, Albert Einstein would have truly become “THE CHIEF ENGINEER OF THE UNIVERSE” (Renn, 2005).

Conflict of Interests

The author has not declared any conflict of interests.

REFERENCES

Averko M (2013). Gay Rights in Russia and the 2014 Sochi Winter

- Olympics. Global Research, 16 September.
- Ayansina C (2013). US Congress to conduct hearing on Boko Haram: FG to create compensation fund for victims. In *The Vanguard*. 25 September. p.8.
- Brian B (2013a). G-20 summit: More questions than answers: Those who march swiftly to war are those who never have to fight. In *The Nation on Sunday*. September 2013, P 65.
- Brian B (2013b). Stumbling out of war? Syria, the media and lessons learned: A mistake timely made can often be more profitable than a perfect answer tardily had. In *The Nation on Sunday*. September 13, P12.
- Fani-Kayode F (2009). America's blood lust and the bombing of Syria. In *The Nation* of September 8. P66.
- Fater Y (2013). Israel signs \$400 million deal to sell spy drones to Russia. In *Israel News*. 14 October.
- Fung B (2013). The Complete List of Countries where Edward Snowden Wants Asylum. In *National Journal Defense*. Online, June 26. <http://www.nationaljournal.com/nationalsecurity/the-complete-list-of-countries-where-edward-snowden-wants-asylum-20130702>
- Gall C, David D, Kirkpatrick N, Kulish and Eric S (2013). Libya demands explanation after US raid captures terror suspect. In *boston.com*
- Golden F (1999). Albert Einstein: He was the pre-eminent scientist in a century dominated by science. The touchstone of the era – the Bomb, the Big bang quantum physics and electronics – all bear his imprint. In *Person of the Century Time*. December 31, p.37.
- Greenfield D (2013). How Russia and China Deal with Islam. In *Frontpage Mag*. 23 March.
- Greenslade R (2013) "Putin chooses New York Times to address the American people" in *The Guardian*. Online.
- Guardian N (2013a). "Amnesty says US officials should face war crimes charges over drone strikes". 23, October.
- Guardian WN (2013a). How a war game brought the world to the brink of nuclear disaster. 3 November.
- Hawking S (1999). A brief history of relativity: What is it? How does it work? Why does it change everything? An easy primer by the world's most famous living physicist. In *Person of the Century Time*. December 31, p.32.
- Johnston I, Withnall A (2013). US Navy Seal team fails in attempt to kill al-shabaab leader in Somalia raid following Nairobi mall attack. In *The Independent*. 6 October. Online.
- Karimi F (2013). 20 questions about the Iran nuclear deal: What it says, what's at stake, what's next. *CNN Online*.
- Kate DT, Yoon S (2013). Kerry Hails China in Urging North Korea Programs. *Bloomberg* July 01, 2013 12:00 PM EDT.
- Kluger J (2012). MARS: What we can learn from a robot 248 million km away. In *Time*. 20 August. p.8.
- Magidor M (2005). President of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. In Jurgen Renn (Ed.) *Chief Engineer of the Universe: Albert Einstein: Einstein's Life and work in context*. Berlin: Weinheim and Max Plank Institute for the history of Science. p.13.
- Markey P, Amara T (2013). Tunisia Islamists in talks to relinquish power. In *Business Day Live-mobile*. 7 October 2013.
- Martin A, Sam G, Chris G and Rob C (2013). *View Comments*. 23 May. Online.
- Michael A (2013). Gay Rights in Russia and the 2014 Sochi Winter Olympics. In *Global Research* 16 September.
- Michael H (2013). Two men plead not guilty to killing British soldiers on London street. September 27. Online
- Michael P, Matt S, Jethro M (2013). Snowden's asylum options dwindle. *CNN*. July 2. Online.
- New R (2013). *Gay Marriage Around the World*. In *Religion and Public Life Project*. July 16.
- Olasupo FA (2009). Africa and the Challenges of unipolar world: Sovereignty, civil society and women's rights as case studies", in *Afr. J. Political Sci. Int. Relations*. 3(8):320-340, August 2009. Available online at <http://www.academicjournals.org/AJPSIR>
- Olasupo FA (2013). The Role of Arabian and Western Civilization in Extinction of African Traditional Religion: The case studies of Senegal, South Africa and Nigeria. In *International Journal of Sustainable Development, Canada: in International Journal of Sustainable Development, Canada: International Development Agency*. Available at SSRN: <http://srn.com/abstract=2333260>
- 5(12):19-34.
- Patterson T (2013). Climate change warriors: It's time to go nuclear. In *CNN*. 3 November.
- Pearson M, Smith M, Mullen J (2013). Snowden's Asylum Options Dwindle. *CNN*, 2 July. Online.
- Perlez J (2013a). China Bluntly Tells North Korea to Enter Nuclear Talks. May 24. Online.
- Perlez J (2013b). China Bans Items for Export to North Korea, Fearing Their Use in Weapons. September 24. Online.
- Philippe P (1999). Beyond genius: Patek Philippe's legendary legacy. In *Person of the Century Time*. December 31, p.17.
- Renn J (2005). Einstein and Judaism. In: Jurgen Renn (Ed.) *Chief Engineer of the Universe: Albert Einstein: Einstein's Life and work in context*. Berlin: Weinheim and Max Plank Institute for the history of Science. P146 and 203.
- Renn J (2005). The Atomic Bomb. In: Jurgen Renn (Ed.) *Chief Engineer of the Universe: Albert Einstein: Einstein's Life and work in context*. Berlin: Weinheim and Max Plank Institute for the history of Science. pp. 156 and 200.
- Rosenblatt R (1999). The age of Einstein: He became, almost despite himself, the emblem of all that was new, original and unsettling in the modern age. In the *TIME Person of the Century*. December 31, p.47.
- Snowden B (2013) Missile doors left open while Air Force nuclear officer slept. In *CNN Pentagon*. 23 October.
- Starr E (2013). Edward Snowden: 'The US government will say I aided our enemies' – video interview. In *The Guardian*. 8 July 2013. Online.
- Usher S (2013). Saudi government warns women over driving protest. In *BBC News*. 26 October.
- Walsh NP, Labott E (2013). *CNN, Security Council OKs Syria resolution, warns of consequences*. 9 September.
- Wikipedia, (2013). List of states with nuclear weapons. In *Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia*. Online.

CITATIONS

- AFP (2011). Quran burnt in Florida church. March 21.
- BBC N (2013a). India PM Singh in 'terror' warning to Pakistan ahead of talks. Online. 29 September, 2013. Last updated at 02:54
- BBC N (2013b). Iran's Rouhani claims full authority to seek nuclear deal. Online: 27 September. Last updated at 20:21
- BBC N (2013c). South Korea display cruise missiles at military parade. 1 October, 2013.
- BBC N (2013d). US sack nuclear missiles General Michael Carey. Online. 11 October.
- BBC N (2013e). Stanislav Petrov: The man who may have saved the world. 26 September 2013
- BBC N (2013f). John McCain takes aim at Putin in Russia Press. 19 September 2013. Last updated at 12:16
- BBC N (2013g). The Gambia to withdraw from Commonwealth. Online. 3 October.
- BBC N (2013h) "Ivory Coast dismisses ICC warrant for Simone Gbobo", 20 September.
- BBC N (2013i). Gaddafi-era spy chief al-Senussi to be tried in Libya. 11 October 2013.
- BBC N (2013j). African Union summit on ICC pullout over Ruto trial. 20 September, Online.
- BBC N (2013k). African Union urges ICC to defer Uhuru Kenyatta's case. 12 October.
- BBC N (2013l). African union condemns unfair ICC. Online. 11 October, 2013.
- BBC N (2013m). US names Nigeria's Boko Haram and Ansaru 'terrorist'. November 13.
- BBC N (2013n). Russia bus bomb: Volgograd blast kills six. 21 October.
- BBC N (2013o). Syria must allow aid convoys to starving civilians, says US. In *bbc.co.uk navigation Menu*. 19 October.
- BBC N (2013p). China tells US to avoid debt crisis for sake of global economy. 7 October 2013). Online.
- BBC N (2013q). India launches spacecraft to Mars. 5 November.
- Editorial (2013). Protect schools from terrorists. In *Vanguard*. Online. 14 October.

- Online (2013). Are there Muslims in Russian. In an Online questions and answers.
- The Boston G (2013). Russian meteor a once in a century display – science –The Boston, 15 February.
- The Guardian (2013a). U.S. nearly detonated atomic bomb on own soil by accident in 1961. September 21.
- The Guardian (2013b). Brazilian president: U.S surveillance a 'breach of international law'. 24 September.
- The Guardian N (2013a). Charles Taylor's 50-year sentence upheld at war crimes tribunal Unsubscribed. Online.
- The Guardian WN (2013a). Snowden leaks: France summons US envoy over NSA surveillance claim. 21 October.
- The Guardian WN (2013b). White House says drone strikes have killed four U.S
- The Guardian WN (2013c) "global development: Islamist insurgency in Mali casts long shadow over Timbuktu" 1 July. Online.
- The Guardian WN (2013d). Libya demands explanation for 'kidnapping' of citizen by US forces. Sunday 6 October. Online
- The Guardian WN (2013e). "France to boost troops in Central African Republic as crisis deepens". 23 May. Online.
- The Times of Israel (2013). Full text of Netanyahu's 2013 speech at the UN General Assembly: Prime ministers says the world must not be fooled by the new face of the Iranian regime. 1October 8:52 pm. Online.
- U.S. N (2013). Controversial Pastor Terry Jones arrested before he could burn Qurans 11. Online. September.



African Journal of Political Science and International Relations

Related Journals Published by Academic Journals

- Journal of Geography and Regional Planning
- Journal of Economics and International Finance
- Journal of Hospitality Management and Tourism
- International Journal of Sociology and Anthropology
- Journal of Public Administration and Policy Research
- African Journal of Marketing Management

academicJournals